有關個人福利的重要社會經濟政策
 
基本上，各國非政府組織和政府組織試圖促進人道主義發展，這被稱為福利的踐行。當局不僅僅想通過財政狀況的改善促進公民福利水平的提高，也是通過這些做法提高就業狀況，改善個體整體的健康程度。然而，不同類型的法律實體，如本地或國際慈善團體可能有助于福利水平的提高，福利是應該由政府按照立法的基本知識傳播。為了實現這一目標，福利可能分布在某些方面，包括補貼，醫療服務或現金付款，也可以由政府單獨資助或聯同私人金融企業給予福利保障。在此背景下，福利國家- 換言之，福利的政治經濟學[1]-認為政府的經濟和社會政策應該集中在活著的公民福利。因此，政府的主要職責是維護和加強其現有的公民社會和經濟福利。 

Importance Social Economic Policy On Welfare Of Individuals Economics Essay
 
Basically, governments, non-governmental and governmental organizations, which attempt to foster humanitarian development for alive individuals, are known as the implementors of welfare practices. Authorities do not only endeavour to progress the financial condition of citizens, who are deprived of welfare, but also they are able to develop the employment conditions and the overall individual health through these practices. Nevertheless, different types of groups of legal entities such as local or international charities may be helpful to spread welfare, welfare is supposed to be spread and sustained by governments according to the basics of legislation. In order to achieve it, welfare may be distributed in some ways including subsidies, health services or cash payments, that can be sponsored by governments themselves or collaborated with private financial enterprises. In this context, welfare state - in other words, political economy of welfare [1] - comes into prominence as the economic and social policy of the government should concentrate on welfare of its alive citizens. Therefore, the government’s major duty is to preserve and enhance social and economic welfare of its existing citizens. This fact is constructed upon the doctrines of public responsibility, fair distribution of wealth and equality of opportunity for those who are incapable of benefiting themselves and surviving sufficiently (Encyclopedia Brittanica, 2010). For this reason, it is crucial to settle the procedures of welfare state within broader running of the economy and society (Saunders, 2002 cited in Crothers, 2004, p.1).
 
Well-built social norms, which foster individuals to work and save, also exist (Elster, 1989 cited in Dackehag, 2009, p.1). The social norm renders the individual incorporate the positive externalities within herself through sanctions (Coleman, 1990 cited in Dackehag, 2009, p.1). For instance, if an individual becomes unemployed, there will be some social and psychological costs that are faced due to disobidient attitudes (Clark, 2003; Stutzer & Lalive, 2004 cited in Dackehag, 2009, p.1). Consequently, the intimidating outcome of the social norm is conducive to maintaining stimulating welfare state schedules for existing citizens (Dackehag, 2009, p.1).
 
To what extent should economic and social policy prioritize the welfare of citizens currently alive? This paper tries to mention the importance of concentration on economic and social policy in order to provide welfare for people. However, the perspectives presented in this study are not based on welfare of future generations since social and economic policies should only be concerned with the welfare of people currently alive. This issue is explained in terms of Australian welfare system and other aspects, such as pareto optimality, income system, labour market, social norms and discount factor, related with the establishment of optimal welfare state.
 
AN OVERVIEW OF AUSTRALIAN WELFARE SYSTEM
 
Whereas rising economic success is ongoing in the recent years in Australia, widening social hassle is observed even though welfare-reform political agenda concentrates primarily on contracting the welfare state (Saunders, 2002 cited in Crothers, 2004, p.2). This low target of public attention has been triggered by the media which is a strong influencer on welfare decision-making (Saunders, 2002 cited in Crothers, 2004, p.2). Instead, governments should intend to achieve social targets that can be kept with stable citizen encouragement in order to reach a a success in economic policies (Saunders, 2002 cited in Crothers, 2004,p.2). Therefore, a new welfare system requires a lot of proficiency to rebuilt (Saunders, 2002 cited in Crothers, 2004,p.2). Furthermore, economic structures should be wide enough to perceive the complication of welfare system sufficiently. In order to understand this complication and besides, to render a structure that gauge social improvement, it is significant to explore social values (Saunders, 2002 cited in Crothers, 2004,p.2). Social policies are usually ignored when economic policies are carried out due to the global effects of economic policies; thus, they are prioritized by the leading agents of economy (Crothers, 2004,p.2). On the other hand, social policy success results in political stability and eventually economic policy achievement (Saunders, 2002, p.10 cited in Crothers, 2004, p.2).
 
Saunders (2002, p.87) mentions that whilst the working population is rising, the period of working life is falling. According to this, the more extensive time is spent for formal education, the more belated labour market access is appearing, whereas individuals are obliged to be retired at early ages. The duration of working is going up as the number of people who are working part-time and for long hours. For this reason, the advantages of permanent jobs are being destroyed due to the rise in casual employment. This is more related with social inequality in fixed income and working conditions. Therefore, welfare state should reconstruct justice especially for lower and middle classes in order to reach the political and economic success in short-term because justice acts a crucial role in economic stabilization. Despite the fact that Australian working population are encountered with deficient working arrangements, both Howard Coalition and Labor Government avoided the esousal of policies that would cause a decrease in unemployment (Watts, 2002, p.24). Instead, some public policy theorists, such as Van Parijs (2000a), Fitzpatrick (1999), Widerquist (1999), Clark and Kavanagh (1996), Lerner (2000) and Tomlinson (2000), suggest that it is beneficial for citizens to get paid an unconditional basic income at a livable level in order to prevent economic insecurity (Watts, 2002, p.25).
 
THE ASPECT OF PARETO OPTIMALITY
 
In terms of pareto optimality, it is too challenging for a welfare state to distribute welfare to all existing citizens in one time due to the ruling pareto optimal circumstance that is not able to render someone better off without rendering another one worse off (Cudd, 1996, p.1). Therefore, according to Cudd (1996, p.1) pareto optimality can not ensure the fair distribution of goods in the society, while pareto non-optimal distribution can assume a sign for enhancement because a reallocation is able to render at least one person better off without making anyone else worse off. In this case, pareto optimality appears to be strongly relevant to justice.
 
Pareto optimality is essential for the justice of social policy in the distribution of goods (Cudd, 1996, p.1). The given theory demonstrates that it is impossible for two individuals to benefit from the identical good in the same level; nevertheless, there is a gap left in order to evaluate this situation from another side: Pareto optimality may be a controlling paradigm for some societies that are pursuing justice (Cudd, 1996, p.1). The pareto optimal distribution tools are vast enough; still, they are inadequate to establish an official base of justice in medium term (Cudd, 1996, p.1). Hence, it has to be integrated with other principles solely to obtain a whole theory of justice (Cudd, 1996, p.1). It is impossible to integrate all other principles with pareto optimality if pareto optimality is not able to be substituted with other principles, it should not be accepted in the cases those related to justice (Cudd, 1996, p.1).
 
The origin of the assertion that pareto optimality is a benchmark of justice consists of three paths: utilitarianism, welfare economics, and contractarian moral theory (Cudd, 1996, p.1). In the sense of utilitarianism, provided that a society maximizes the total or average utility of the society, it has to fulfill the requirement of pareto optimality (Cudd, 1996, p.1). However maximization of utility produces a pareto optimality distribution, pareto optimality is just an unexpected or a secondary consequence of maximization of utility (Cudd, 1996, p.1). Welfare economics suggests that pareto optimality is how individuals behave rational in utility preferences. According to the contractarian theory of John Rawls (1971 cited in Cudd, 1996, p.2), pareto optimality contradicts contractarianism. Apart from Rawls, David Gauthier introduces a precise discussion for pareto optimality as a prerequisite of neutrality in the entirely competitive market, and then proceeds to presume that it should be a prerequisite of justice aside from that model (Cudd, 1996, p.2).
 
The theory of pareto optimality, or efficiency can be identified as an approach to weigh international politics affairs without rendering interpersonal distinctions of utility that utilitarianism demands (Cudd, 1996, p.3). Welfare economists mostly refrain from utility comparisons involving relations between persons due to their assertion regarding the privacy of utility (Cudd, 1996, p.3). Instead, it is crucial to consider aggregate utilities within society in order to maximize the average utility which is also fundamental for justice. One of the benefits of pareto standard for average utility in terms of justice is that the standard regards each individual’s preferences and choices for different social states (Cudd, 1996, p.3). Second one is that pareto optimality is not a stronger standard than maximization of average utility; therefore, it does not support a concept of unique ideal distribution (Cudd, 1996, p.3).

WELFARE CREATION WITH THE COMPARISON OF JOB GUARANTEE AND BASIC INCOME
 
In addition to pareto optimality, welfare programs such as unemployment or disability insurance generated by governments and various legal organizations around the world should pledge financial protection when individuals are able work and afford surviving (Dackehag, 2009, p.1). Nonetheless, these governance operations usually do not process properly; therefore, an optimal system which benefits individual behavour and welfare is sought due to the deterrent impacts of welfare state systems.
 
It is substantial to consider the effects of an endogenous social norm on the optimal policy, tax and transfer, in an extensive welfare state program (Dackehag, 2009, p.2). There are two possible scenarios that are pertinent with social preferences in welfare states. On the one hand, the first one is that social planner monitors individual productivity and manages the welfare allocation for transfering recipients (Dackehag, 2009, p.2). In this optimality, the recipients can be easily restrained and also welfare can be enhanced by the rising transfer level (Dackehag, 2009, p.2). Still, this is not an indicator of an adequate policy that perfectly complies with the social norm as transfer of the welfare to future recipients is not often possible due to the change in the preferences of policy-makers and the demands of future recipients. On the other hand, the second scenario concerns with individual productivity which is non-observable; therefore, the social norm is conducive to progressive beneficence (Dackehag, 2009, p.2). This perspective points that in order to impose adequately generous policies, social norm is conducive to the reduction of program expenditures (Dackehag, 2009, p.2).
 
The efficiency of tax system is essential for the generation of welfare in medium term. Intrinsically, it is commonly suggested that basic income be funded by a flat tax deducted from all or most personal incomes in order to broaden the tax base (Clark & Kavanagh 1996; Widerquist 1999; Van Parijs 2000a cited in Watts, 2002, p.26). A revenue-neutral, partial basic income infers a lower marginal rate of tax; however, would not be able to resist poverty (Fitzpatrick, 2001 cited in Watts, 2002, p.26). Not only flat tax, but also other types of taxes, such as an ongoing tax on income or an expanded value added tax and a Tobin tax which is a recent tax instrument, are recommended (Watts, 2002, p.27). Moreover, it is possible to gain government revenue from the country’s natural resources; however, in the last a few years, most governments have been tending to privatize public goods and assets due to recurring global financial recessions (Fitzpatrick, 2001 cited in Watts, 2002, p.27).
 
Job guarantee can be practiced as an economic policy scheme that annually or a number of years-based purposes maintained as a permanent result of the multiple issues of inflation and unemployment, targeting to generate price stability and full employment. In order reduce the unemployment, there are several important attributes of job guarantee, offered by Mitchell and Watts (2001a cited in Watts, 2002, p.27). The first one is a buffer stock of jobs, conducted by public sector, that grows (drops) when private sector proceeding drops (grows) (Watts, 2002, p.27). These jobs can be considered as more appropriate for people who has strong body resistance. The second one is job guarantee wage in order to eschew bothering the private sector wage structure and to warrant he job guarantee is constant with stable inflation (Watts, 2002, p.27). The level of job guarantee wage alters correspondingly to productivity. The third one is social wage, which covers social range expenditures, such as sufficient levels of public education, health, child-care and access to legal aid and which would reinforce job guarantee income (Watts, 2002, p.28). However, job guarantee policy would never substitute for the traditional fiscal policy practices in order to reach a high level of economic circumstances. The fourth one is family income supplements, which is strongly related with the new legislation in Australia and USA and which allows single parents to search for unemployment as job guarantee wage is accessible to all working age population (Watts, 2002, p.28). The last attribute is the unemployment benefits which come into prominence in recent years due to the economic recession. According to this attribute, the unemployment benefits program would be discarded with the associated administrative infrastructure being applied for job guarantee conductions (Watts, 2002, p.29). Therefore, working population who are unable to work for acceptable reasons would get advantage (Watts, 2002, p.29).
 
Instead of job guarantee that has long-term effects for welfare, basic income is endorsed by Van Parijs (2000b cited in Watts, 2002, p.30) who is holding real-libertarian ideas of justice. According to Van Parijs (2000b cited in Watts, 2002, p.30), all individuals in the society should act conventionally free, with a well-built and well-assimilated property rights that not only involves individual ownership assumed to internalize personal liability, but also essential to the idea is the actual standard of those rights, gauged by the individual resources that is constructed with her willpower. The distribution of resources should provide the optimal stable opportunity to least advantaged opportunities, depending upon the regard of each individual’s formal liberty (Van Parijs, 2000b cited in Watts, 2002, p.30).
 
Social policies should not be social solidarity because this is not regarded as an only one indicator of social justice or fair allocation of resources. The exchange of rights, benefits, commitments or obligations is not a compulsory provision; ‘every man is the architect of his own fate’. In addition, governments should encourage their citizens to spend much more leisure time due to overtime working conditions despite low wages especially for those who have dependents, such as children or other family members, without ability to work. There are also individuals who are at working age but unable to find a job because of the low hiring rate within the country. Therefore, the question arises: Is it fair not to provide adequate working conditions and not to pay anything for those who are unemployed? Why should governments leave their citizens in poor conditions in order to save future lifes? Instead, individuals should be left to make rational choices about education and work as much time as they wish while financially supported by their own governments, until they are determinent to be actively involved in business life.
 
DISCOUNT FACTOR FOR THE FUTURE
 
Since welfare of future people are not addressed, policies that suits present time should be implemented on people. In this case, details and possible changes related with future are likely to be discounted and simplified, it is essential to roughly inform about discount factor for critical analysis. Discount factor implies that in a multi-period model, agents in economics may hold dissimilar utility functions for various practices such as consumption or expenditure in different time periods (About.com: Economics, 2010). These kind of models often overestimate the future value of practices compared with present value of practices because these two values are computed as approximiately the same values. Discounting acknowledges that both individuals and societies favour to utilize sooner and to delay any costs until later (Goklany, 2009, p.36). Discount factor is identified as a constant which is determined between zero and one in order to simply discount the next period’s utility (About.com: Economics, 2010). That is, discount factor can be explained as a biased probability that the agent will not exist before the next period and therefore discounts the future practices that may not happen (About.com: Economics, 2010).
 
The question of welfare of people currently alive is possibly involved in the distinction between the inter-temporal allocation of benefits within a life, which is called inter-temporal question [2] . Inter-temporal question arises from an assocation of jointly settled policy and private action (Brennan, 2005, p.3). In terms of policy action, governments and non-governmental organizations should intend regulations according to the current the needs and wants. The factors related with past or future individual desires should not be included in the contemporary policies. For instance, global warming is being attempted to be stopped or prevented in order to save the planet for future generations; however, there are a lot of costs paid in order to make this target come true. Therefore, if the purpose of preventing global warming is to provide an uncontaminated world for future generations, is it reasonable to pay and suffer too much for people currently alive? It seems like shifting current resources in favour of future generations. It is commonly known that the duty of welfare state is to implement economic and social policies for the maximization of welfare of its present citizens, so why would welfare state violate this rule because of future generations? The future governments should be concerned with potential future issues. Furthermore, it is too hard for agents to guarantee that inter-generational policies [3] would satisfy future generations due to the level of justice that is valid in each time period. The policies, which can be considered as fair in the present time, sometimes may not meet the requirements of justice in the future. For example, slavery was legal and also it used to be thought as beneficial for citizens in ancient times; however, it is impossible to proceed considering and applying the same thought in the contemporary world. Slavery can be possibly seen indirectly around the world but it does not mean that it is legal. In this sense, ‘feasibility’ [4] of the policies in intergenerational circumstances plays a major role. It is difficult to predict in the present time whether future generations would vote for the policies, which are current no, or not if both generations have a large time and perception gap between each other (Brennan, 2005, p.8). What is more, future generations might count that present policies would endeavour to manipulate them in different ways, vice versa. Another potential feasibility problem is that savings policies are inadequate to attach the inter-temporal transfer to future generations since individuals hardly afford to purchase their daily needs rather than saving the funds they hold (Brennan, 2005, p.9). In other words, it does not imply that policies are not able to manage intergenerational problems while dealing with intertemporary problems. Governments have no responsibility to implement policies that support inter-personal transfers [5] across generations and also have no intergenerational-concerned duties, such as enlarged legacy at a plausible grade or intensified stocks of long-lasting assets in the public sector because governments have already been barely financing current social and economic policies due to tough recent economic conditions. Another and last explanation of feasibility question is that considering the transformations in individual’s preferences, inspite of the fact that policy resolution development is itself resistant to individual’s preferences and the level of effectiveness of predication, governments should not integrate the predication and policy technologies with the aim of providing intergenerational justice (Brennan, 2005, pp. 9-10).
 
CONCLUSION
 
The object of this study is to emphasize the distribution of welfare within the generation currently alive. The fact is, each generation struggles to improve the policies by take lessons from their mistakes or deficiencies. Hence, there is no objection for present generations to de-emphasize future generations whose needs and wants can hardly be predicted.
 
Basic income is more likely to be an individual preferably rather than a collectivist remedy for income inequality and income insecurity in a way that economic results are based on individual choices regarding employment, consumption and spare time activities in opposition to the background of the basic income (Watts, 2002, p.41). It is also presumed that if people spend their spare time with unpaid activities, such as community or even personal missions, they voluntarily fulfill the requirement of persistent social and environmental needs of society (Lerner, 2000 cited in Watts, 2002, p.41). On the one hand, the job guarantee scheme regarding employment and income aims to prevent poverty. This is more likely to be a collectivist remedy and likewise governments tend to generate more employment therefore income opportunities as a duty in long term (Watts, 2002, p.42). On the other hand, the effect of basic income on consumption, production and therefore aggregate employment are disregarded for at the beginning of basic income practice, this effect may be modest and so aggregate hours of paid work would endure more or less immutate (Watts, 2002, p.42).
 
Pareto criterion is a reasonable reglementary paradigm (Cudd, 1996, p.23). In other words, if all members of the society were aware of seeking perfect necessary information about society for potential development and they perceive their desires over them, and they expect the same outcomes of had common these facts, eventually the pareto criterion would be reasonable (Cudd, 1996, p.23). Apart from this, policies should be static which means that policies should not proceed distributive attributes for further generations. In order to accomplish this, governments should regulate cyclical political contracts fitted in current economical and social circumstances and value judgements; however, it is essential for citizens to take part in the process policy implemention.
 
To sum up, governments’ priority as a welfare state is to cover key policies in favour of citizens; however, they should act as policy agencies who can maintain welfare through social and economic policies in human life time period, not for future generations. Preferences are multidimensional and versatile; they may present diverse aspects between present and future time periods. Individuals do not have to take into account future preferences that are possibly opposite to their current customs, biases and habits. Future does not have to be predicted but it does not imply that future in unclear as different periods bring different policies as expected.