對于每一個學習外交政策分析的同學而言,最重要的事情之一,就是必須首先記住是外交政策是一個多層次的分析,它需要我們去考慮國內和國際因素,并要求我們關注國際層面,國家層面以及個人層面。因此,要回答這個問題,外交政策分析是否有感悟,我會回答,各級的觀念無疑是重要的。

大多數現實主義者和自由主義者多集中于客觀現實多于觀念,但一些學者認為,許多現實主義或自由主義的核心概念,如權力、利益或現實收獲都是固有的認知。

外交政策的分析在大多數情況下,它是由個體決定外交政策,即使是理性的個人因素,但他們的理性往往是受限的,認知的影響應該是對相同的情況下為什么不同決策者會產生不同的外交政策問題的一個適當解釋。
 

Introduction介紹
 

For every students who study FPA, one of the most important thing we have to firstly keep in mind is that FPA is a multi-level analysis, it requires us to take both domestic and international factors into consideration, and requires us to pay attention to the international level, the national level as well as the individual level. So, to answer the question that whether perceptions matter in FPA, I shall give the answer that perceptions is undoubtedly important at all levels.

The majority of realists and liberalists concentrate on objective reality more than perceptions, but some scholars argue that many central concepts of realism or liberalism, such as power, interests or relative gain, are inherently cognitive.

In most cases of FPA, it is the individuals who make the foreign policy, and since the individuals are rational factors, while simultaneously their rationality is often bounded, the influence of perceptions could be a proper explanation to the question why different decision makers lead to different foreign policies under the same circumstances.

Perception’s Role in FPA

Using perceptions in FPA researches have provoked mixed responses. Some scholars are convinced of its utility. Others doubt the importance of cognitive variables and feel more comfortable with a focus on “objective” factors. 

In my opinion, on the one hand, perceptions is influential and indispensable in FPA. Because, just like Robert Jervis argued, it is the cognitive world rather than the object world which inherently influence the decision making process, and it is the perception which shape the cognitive world directly. So, objective realities only could not determine foreign policy. On the other hand, perceptions have to base on some certain objective realities and also influenced by them. That is to say, metaphorically speaking, objective is the materials, while the belief and values of decision makers are factory, only the two factors work together can they produce the final production -the cognitive world recognized by decision makers -which should be the determined factor. 

Maybe the above argument is a little broad-brush and abstract, then I will focus on two fields which are the main fields when we talk about the effect of perception in FPA -the role of perception in diplomatic adjustment, and the role of misperception in conflict. Both discussion will attached with a case, respectively focus on US’s diplomatic adjustment towards China during 1950s, and the break out of the Iraq War in 2003.

 

Role of Perception in Diplomatic Adjustment

Change in both of international relations and domestic politics could reflect in the output of the political system, namely, the policy. Just as some scholars pointed out, the foreign policy decision making always take place in the appreciable environment . Foreign policy combines nation with the international environment where it located .

On the one hand, compared with domestic policy, foreign policy is made so as to be applied in the international society. A country’s foreign policy should fit the current international environment, such as the distribution of power, the global economic development trends, the mechanism and principle of cooperation, the development of NGOs and global issues . So, international environment is a main variable in diplomatic adjustment. 

On the other hand, although foreign policies would be applied in international society, they are formed within the country, thus they must be influenced by domestic political factors. Objectively, the condition of one country determines what options the decision maker have to choose; subjectively, the requirement of the social development determines what options the decision maker prefer to choose. So, domestic environment is another main variable in diplomatic adjustment.

These two variables seem to be good explanation for diplomatic adjustment, but we should not forget the individual level. Actually, when we talk about how a nation makes its foreign policy, we are talking about how the decision maker -the individual -makes decisions. Undoubtedly, decision makers make foreign policies according to their national interests. But what are national interests is a subjective concept, it is highly influenced by decision makers’ perceptions on the whole current environment. In addition, even though there is no any change of international or domestic environment happened, change in decision maker’s own perceptions itself can also lead to diplomatic adjustment sometimes . It is because that when people who hold different believes consider the same thing or situation, they probably draw the different perceptions. So, perceptions of decision maker is also a main variable in diplomatic adjustment. 

In conclusion, the change in international and domestic environment is the blasting fuse of diplomatic adjustment, while how to react to such change -the content of diplomatic adjustment -is determined by the decision makers’ perceptions on the change.

 

Case 1: US’s diplomatic adjustment towards China in the 1950s.

During the construction of the Sino-Soviet alliance, Americans believe that the most basic goal of Moscow and Beijing is contrary, so the Sino-Soviet conflict is inevitable . Even after the establishment of the Sino-Soviet alliance, the United States still attempted to win China's favor, as well as took some measures in order to divide sino-soviet relations. But after the outbreak of the Korean war, the American government thinks that, in the foreseeable future, the close Sino-Soviet relationship would continue. And the US government stopped to draw China over to its side . 

So why would the US think that the basic goals between China and Soviet Union are opposite, the conflict is inevitable, while the Sino-Soviet alliance turn out to be continued? Why the United States would change his foreign policy in a short time? To answer these questions, we should consider the effect of perception. 

For the first question, it is the difference in perceptions between communism and western countries on this issue that makes the difference between foresee and fact. At first, the US government took the national security and national interests as the key factor, regardless of the influence of ideology. In the US’s opinion, the reason why Eastern Europe became the Soviet union’s “satellites” is because the Soviet Union has a firmly control in eastern Europe in the military strength and economic power, not because they are all communist countries. But the US believe China is different from the Eastern Europe, because the Chinese Communist Party get the regime on their own, what’s more important, have conflict with the Soviet Union on the national sovereignty interests. This is the United States’s judgment about sino-soviet relations in the beginning. And we can see that to some extend, it is a realism perspective. However, China and the Soviet Union have different perceptions. Since both of the two counties share the same ideology, the national interest on both sides is changed a little so as to reduce conflicts. In consideration of International Communist Movement, some traditional national interest may not be as important as before -although the disagreement in national interest seems to be irreconcilable in the US’s perception.

For the second question, it is because the way the US government look into the issue changed, so their perceptions on the Sino-Soviet alliance changed therewith. The Sino-Soviet alliance is always exist during the switch of US’s foreign policy, so there is not any obviously change of objective factors happen . Therefore, it is the perception change of US government which start to take ideology into consideration, and thus, understand the communism countries’ perception better, that lead to the diplomatic adjustment.

So, we can draw a small conclusion for this case, that is, perception plays an important role in diplomatic adjustment.

 

Role of Misperception in Causes of War

Another aspect of perception’s role in FPA, is the relation between misperception and war.

Robert Jervis, one of the most important scholars in this field, argues that, perceptual dynamics could cause statesmen to see the false appearance, thus lead to conflicts or even wars between countries. He use the term misperception broadly, to include inaccurate inferences, miscalculations of consequences, and misjudgments about how others will react to one's policies.

Jack S. Levy hold the same opinion with Jervis, he pointed out the three most important forms of misperception, namely, the misperception on capability of adversary, the misperception on intention of adversary and the misperception on capability or intention of a third country .

There are three stages in the process of misperception’s leading to a war. Firstly, misperception in the decision maker’s brain influence the decision making process; secondly, the decision making is carried out as national behaviour; finally, the national behavior leads to war .

So, what is the reason why misperception happened? Generally speaking, on the one hand, decision makers bear much pressure from surroundings, on the other hand, decision makers’ own cognitive competence as well as their emotions are the potential causes of misperception. 

Specifically, according to Jervis’s works, there are four main causes of misperception. The first one is the Conspiracy Theory -people tend to think adversary’s behaviour as a consequence of deliberateness mull and well planed. 

The next one is overestimation of one’s own influence -people often overestimate their own influence if their prediction and adversary’s action converged; while when the action do not meet their prospect, they would rather consider such consequence come from the adversary side, regardless that it may also be a response to their behaviour . Specially, if such response is threatening or damaging, people often consider the adversary to be hostile and deliberately .

The third one is Wishful Thinking -people often perceive what they want to perceive. And the last one is cognitive dissonance -people always have their original perception on certain things, when the fact turns out to be different later, people may filter out some information to make the reality seems to be their original perception.

But we should also notice that, the causes of war are complexed, misperception itself can hardly leads to war. So, there are conditions. Arthur A. Stein pointed out that misperception can only happen between interdependent countries; misperception would be less influential if one of or all of the countries have dominate strategy; misperception can only influence the prospect, not the policy, if the decision maker is rational enough .

So, we can see that, misperception do play an important role in the cause of a war, but its influence is also conditioned.

 

Case 2: “War on Terror” and the conflict between the West and Muslim

This case focuses on the “War on Terror” and the conflict between the West and the Muslim World. The Iraq War brock out in 2003. Now ten years has gone, but there is still no final conclusion that why the former president George W Bush decided to start the war. Realists tend to believe that the Iraq war is a preventive war, because Iraq is considered a great threat to the security of the US. It also meet with what the former president Bush said about the war. He put forward a policy which said the US should take a preemptive military strike if there is any menace to the national security. But as we now know, there proved to be no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq- which used to be the main reason why president Bush choose to fight. It seems that president Bush was fighting with an enemy which is made up by himself. So here is a question which is even more ultimate than the decision-making process arises -why the war occur even if there is no reliable information to show the existence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction? What factor led to president Bush a perception that Sadam Hussain is extremely dangerous? 

I think the misperception of overestimate the adversary’s hostility could be the answer. The US government -to some extend, the president George. W. Bush -hold the misperception that Iraq is extremely dangerous and would be a great threat to US’s security. So when such prospect formed -whatever whether the WMD exist, whatever the true story is -it just turns out to be the self-fulfilling prophecy. 

But it is still confused that how is the “Iraq brings threat” belief formed. I think, since perceptions and misperceptions are highly influenced by one’s identity and one’s experience, we can seek answer in history of Muslim-West relations. As we all know, the West World had much conflict with the Muslim World historically. Then the impression on each side for a long time may lead to an opposite identity both in the Westerners and the Muslims. Just as Ted Hopf told us in his article, the unique identity has three effects in general- it help us make clear who we are, tell others who we are, and inform us who is the other ones .

So, from the misperception perspective we may better understand the break out of the Iraq war and the conflict between the West and the Muslim world.

 

Conclusion總結
 

This article talked about the role of perception in FPA. Some scholars are convinced of perception’s utility, while some others deny. 

Through discussing on both diplomatic adjustment and the causes of war, we can draw conclusion that, perception is undoubtedly important, but its role is not fundamental nor absolute. That is to say, on the one hand, it requires objective realities from international and domestic environment as bases; on the other hand, its influence is conditioned. #p#分頁標題#e#

So, although perception matters in FPA, we should treat it rationally and evaluate it objectively. 

 

Reference文獻

 

English

 

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