留學生dissertation網提供美國華盛頓大學媒體學留學生畢業dissertation定制MEDIA FRAMING OF GEOSTRATEGIC OUTCOMES OF WAR IN IRAQ
by Tijana Milosevic
B.A, May 2007, The American University in Bulgaria 
 
 A Thesis submitted to  
 
 The Faculty of The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences  of The George Washington University   in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
 
August 31, 2009 
Directed by
 
Dr. Steven Livingston
Professor of Media and Public Affairs and Professor of International Affairs
 
UMI Number: 1467463
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 © Copyright 2009 by Tijana Milosevic
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Abstract 
Media Framing of Geostrategic Outcomes of
War in Iraq 
This study explores how the media in the US covered Iran in the context of Iraq War and influenced ability of  the public  to understand geopolitical consequences of US policies  in the War. By toppling Saddam Hussein’s government, the US administration chose to break decades’ long policy of containment towards Iran, arguably increasing Iranian geopolitical leverage and creating  turbulence on a  territory critical for  the US security and stability  in the  Middle  East. When  Iraq War  is  concerned,  the  mainstream  media  rarely  seem  to examine tactical outcomes in the light of broader, strategic goals. Success is usually seen as diminishment  of  violence,  reduction  of  US  casualties  and  the  creation  of  a  stable government in Iraq. However, such media discourse fails to point out that the US had not gone  to  Iraq  to quell what  it  terms  to be “sectarian violence,” or  to  reduce US casualties, and  hence  neglects  to  hold  the  government  accountable  for  the  possible  failure  of  its strategic  policy  goals.  Nor  does  such  discourse  raise  questions  as  to what  constitutes  a stable  Iraqi government and  the  implications  thereof  for  the  regional and global  security. #p#分頁標題#e#
This study draws conclusions from a content analysis of The New York Times and NBC coverage of Iran from 2001 to 2008 to examine media framing of Iranian geopolitical gains from the War in Iraq. The central implication of this study is that the coverage that neglects to  draw  public  attention  to  geopolitical  implications  of  the  Iraq War,  fails  to  equip  the public with the necessary tools for holding the government accountable for what could be defined as a strategic failure of its policies and hence constrains the ability of the public to exert a change in policy. 
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Table of Contents
 
Abstract of Thesis ............................................................................................. iii
Table of Contents ...............................................................................................iv
List of Figures......................................................................................................v
List of Tables  .....................................................................................................vi
Chapter 1: Introduction .......................................................................................1
Chapter 2:Literature Review: Policy and Political Communication................9
Chapter 3: Methodology ...................................................................................38
Chapter 4: Quantitative and Qualitative content analysis...............................46
Chapter 5: Discussion and Concluding Remarks  ...........................................78
Reference list .....................................................................................................86
Appendices.........................................................................................................98
 
 
 
 
v
List of Figures
Figure 1………………………………………………………………………………….53
Figure 2………………………………………………………………………………….55
Figure 3………………………………………………………………………………….55
Figure 4………………………………………………………………………………….57 #p#分頁標題#e#
Figure 5………………………………………………………………………………….58
Figure 6…………………………………………………………………………………59
Figure 7…………………………………………………………………………………64
Figure 8………………………………………………………………………………….65
Figure 9………………………………………………………………………………….66
Figure 10…………………………………………………………………………………67
Figure 11…………………………………………………………………………………68
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List of Tables
Table 1………………………………………………………………………………….60
Table 2………………………………………………………………………………….61
Table 3………………………………………………………………………………….63
Table 4………………………………………………………………………………….69
Table 5………………………………………………………………………………….70 #p#分頁標題#e#
 
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Chapter 1: Introduction
 
The  reasons behind President Bush’s  invasion of  Iraq  in 2003 were  changing over  time:
from accusations of weapons of mass destruction;  to  those  that  linked Saddam Hussein’s
regime to Al Qaeda; and finally those of hope that a democratized Iraq would spur reform throughout the Middle East (Robinson and Livingston, 2005). For instance The New York
Times  columnist  Thomas  Friedman  wrote  in  2003  that  Iraq  can  “serve  as  a  progressive model  to  spur  reform-educational,  religious,  economic  and  political-around  the  Arab World”  (Friedman,  2003).  It  was  hence  compelling  to  track  the  development  of  this geopolitical discourse as it gradually became apparent that the Iraq War would not lead to such a positive effect in the region. Throughout the Iraq War, media seem to have focused
on its tactical outcomes that tend to be embedded in daily events: reports of violence and casualties. Attributions of responsibility for American losses would typically be placed on
Al Qaeda-spurred violence and sectarian fighting. With the Surge policy in 20071 promoted by  the White House,  the  problem  was  framed  in  terms  of  lack  of US  troops. Once  the reduction of violence was  to  a  certain  extent  achieved,  and  the number of US  casualties gradually began to diminish, the success of US efforts in Iraq seems to have been framed in terms  of  these  outcomes. Whereas  this  study  does  not  rest  on  the  assumption  that  the reduction  of  violence  and  casualties  should  not  be  framed  as  success,  it  does  make  a different point by adding the geopolitical dimension to the discussion. Instead of examining what  is present  in media  framing of  the War,  this  study  seeks  to  look  into  an  important aspect of the coverage that might be scarce and crowded out by an overwhelming focus on its  tactical  outcomes.  What  was  suspected  to  be  missing  was  the  examination  of  US policies  in  terms of  their strategic  intentions and broader goals: what kind of geopolitical effect was achieved by the very toppling of Saddam Hussein’s government and what is the nature of the Iraqi Shia government that took its place? Within this context, the aim of this study is to examine how media portrayed Iranian influence in the light of these geostrategicoutcomes. #p#分頁標題#e#
 
United States intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 and the Iraq War in 2003 have created
major turbulence that has benefited Iranian geostrategic position. Numerous authors point out that Iranians have welcomed the collapse of  the hostile Sunni government in Iraq as well as the disruption of Taliban-Pakistan-Saudi Arabian alliance, and now perceive Shia revival  as  a  means  of  preventing  the  resurgence  of  Sunni  domination  (Nasr,  2006, Pelham, 2008). It was the Treaty of Qasr-i-Shirin in 1639 that had established the border between  the  Ottoman  and  the  Persian  Empires,  creating  a  rift  between  the  Sunni  and Shia-governed  lands.  During  the  Iran-Iraq  war  in  1980s,  Iran  had  tried  to  breach  the border,  while  the  President  Reagan’s  administration  supported  Saddam  Hussein  to
prevent that from happening (Galbraith 2008, Khatami, 2004). Yet, with the War in Iraq in  2003  and  the  establishment  of  a  Shiite  government  in  Baghdad,  the  United  States violated this boundary, opening the door to Iranian influence. Iraqi Sunnis see the rise of
Iran as a regional power in the light of its close relationship with the Shiite government in 1 President George W. Bush’s decision  to  increase US  troops  in  the beginning of 2007  in order  to provide
greater security to Baghdad and the Al Anbar Province 
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Iraq. “Everything  Iran  fought  for  in  the  Iran-Iraq war, America gave when  it  invaded,” Saleh  al Mutlaq,  the  head  of  Iraqi Front  for National  Dialog,  the  second  largest Sunni party  in  the  Iraqi  parliament,  concluded  (Sly,  2007).  Prince  Turki  al-Faisal,  former director of Saudi intelligence and ambassador to the United States, said that Saudi Arabia had told the United States when it brought a Shiite-dominated government to power after
the 2003 invasion, that US  “handed Iraq to Iran on a golden plate” (Rubin, 2009).
 
During 1980s Shia politics in regional countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Pakistan began to change as the Shias started to abandon
Arab nationalism to join Shia political movements, many of which received support from Iran  to push  specifically Shiite  agendas  (Nasr, 2006). Political  events  such  as  the  Iran-
Iraq war during the 1980s; Saddam Hussein’s oppression of the country’s Shiites in 1991; the rivalry between the Iranians and Saudis, which was triggered by the 1979 Revolution; are all manifestations of  this Sunni-Shia division that affects Middle East policies albeit in  ways  that  are  often  not  apparent  to  those  who  observe  from  the  outside  (Ibid). Establishing a Shiite governmentin Iraq constitutes a major geopolitical gain for Shiites in each of these countries. Shiites constitute majority population in Lebanon and Bahrain as well as a significant minority  in Saudi Arabia, situated  in strategically crucial part of the  country  with major  oil  reserves  (Ibrahim,  2006). Hence,  they  have  all  extolled  the institution of electoral democracy in Iraq, which would lead to empowerment of Shias in these  countries  as  well  (Pelham,  2008,  Nasr,  2006).  The  major  implication  of  this geopolitical shift is that it leads to an anchoring of Shiite interests into national identities, and over time, Iraqi-ness, Bahraini-ness and Lebanese-ness “can come to mean forms of “Shia-ness” just as Iranian nationalism has long been entwined with Shia identity” (Nasr, #p#分頁標題#e#
2006, p. 234). This drastic change  in  leverage of Shiite communities  relates  to growing Iranian  influence  (Ibid).  What  constituted  causes  traditionally  associated  with  Arab identity and Arab nationalism, such as defending Palestinians and fighting Israel, has now become associated with Shiite identity. Success of Hezbollah in war in Lebanon in 2006 exemplifies  this  change.  The  conflict  turned  Hezbollah’s  sponsor-  Iran-  into  “regional power  broker  and  custodian  of  Palestinian  cause,”  leaving  Sunni  powers  that  had denounced Hezbollah  in  this conflict- Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt- on  the  sidelines (p. 256).   The very fact  that  these powers adopted sectarian  tone confirmed  that War  in Iraq  had  a  rippling  effect  in  the  region  by  influencing  balance  of  power  in  the  Arab-Israeli conflict as well. 
 
The goal of  this  study was  to examine how mainstream media  in  the US covered  these geopolitical implications of the War in Iraq that lead to growing Iranian influence in the
region. When  Iranian  influence  in  Iraq  is  concerned,  the most  common  reports  coming from  the media are  the accusations of  Iranian support  for  the  insurgency  in  Iraq, which typically  frame  Iran as a “meddling  force”-the one  that obstructs US efforts  in  Iraq. On the other hand, any discussion that would attribute responsibility for the growing Iranian influence  in  Iraq  and  the  region  to  the  US  government’s  decision  to  invade  Iraq  and establish a Shiite government seemed  to be missing. The content analysis of New York
Times  articles  and  NBC  transcripts  starting  from  September  11  2001,  when  these geopolitical changes were set in motion, was intended to examine if media captured this
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discourse;  why  this  framing  might  be  missing  from  the  coverage;  and  what  are  the implications for public accountability and US policy if such framing is wanting. 
A brief survey of The New York Times articles from 2009 reveals that Iran still seems to be primarily framed as a “meddling force” in the Iraq War- a culprit obstructing the work of US troops: “Washington must find a way to work with Iran and other Iraq’s neighbors to try  to  limit outside meddling  as American  troops  prepare  to  go,”  an  editorial notes  (The #p#分頁標題#e#
New York Times, May 3). Although the Iranian “meddling in Iraq War,”2 the notion used to  denote  primarily  Iranian  support  for  the  insurgency,  is  certainly  a  problematic  factor
when Iranian influence in Iraq is concerned, this frame seems to crowd out a more complex discussion about long-term, geopolitical benefits that Iran has potentially garnered from the
very toppling of Saddam Hussein’s government in Iraq, understanding of which this thesis sees as crucial  for an accurate assessment of success and  failure of  the US government’s policy. 
Another New York Times article from May 2009 could be used to bolster the proposition that  reduction of violence  is  still used  in  the media  as  the primary benchmark  for policy
success:  “[…]  violence  across  the  country  remains  at  its  lowest  levels  since  2003. Mr. Maliki could be rewarded for those gains when voters go to the polls this winter to choose a
new Parliament and prime minister” (Santora, May 19, 2009). Success in Iraq is also often measured  in  terms of Prime Minister Nouri  al Maliki’s  creation  of  a  stable  government,
whereby Prime Minister’s  ties  to  Iran often  remain unexamined.  Inter-Shiite  relations are
2 This  support  involves  supply of weapons;  speculations of  support  for Al-Qaeda;  as well  as  efforts  to get involved in Iraqi political process and typically obstruct the work of the Iraqi government 
6often simplified to the distinction between parties that are deemed to be Iran-backed, such as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)3 and those that are seen
as  resisting  the  Iranian  influence.  The  following Washington  Post  article  from  February 2009,  indicates  this  view  that  seems  to  be  prevalent  in media  reports:  “Prime Minister
Nouri  al-Maliki’s  strong  performance  in  Iraqi  national  elections  was  also  a  victory  for American  goals  […]  and  voters  rejected  religious  parties  backed  by  militias  that  were perceived  as  close  to  Iran”  (A12,  February  6).  Such  media  discussion  simplifies  the complexity of  inter-Shiite  relations  in  Iraq  and  fails  to  capture  the  complexity of  Iranian involvement  in Shiite  politics  in  the  country;  and  portrays  Iran  primarily  as  a  force  that stands  in  the  way  of  a  stable  Iraqi  government. The  attribution  of  responsibility  for  the #p#分頁標題#e#
rising Iranian influence among the Iraqi Shia is almost never traced to the US government policy  of  invading  Iraq  in  2003-which  reduces  public  ability  to  accurately  attribute
responsibility for potentially failed policies.
The  thesis  argues  that  the  coverage  that misses  geopolitical  aspects  of  the  war  would undermine  the  public  ability  to  assess  US  government’s  policies  in  the  light  of  their strategic outcomes. The study seeks to explore if topics that focus on tactical outcomes of the War and lend themselves to procedural frames, such as the reduction of violence and “threat of nuclear  Iran,” dominate  the news environment  to  the detriment of a sustained discussion on what could be defined as a geopolitical failure in Iraq War. The relevance
of this study is predicated on the notion that frames are not just ways of presenting news
content-they have  implications  for processing news  and  constitute  “predictive basis  for
3 Now renamed under ISCI –Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq 
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observed  effects  of  news  formats  on  citizens”  (Cappella  and  Jamieson,  1997,  p.  47).
Previous studies have pointed out that the Iraq War coverage has been characterized by a
“neglect  of  more  profoundly  negative  news  not  rooted  in  daily  events”  (Entman,
Livingston and Kim, p.701, cf. Livingston and Bennett, 2003). Discussion of geopolitical
outcomes would  exact  that media  engage  in  issue-oriented  coverage  as  exemplified  in
thematic framing; such discussion is typically missing from the coverage that focuses on
daily events- primarily reports of violence, casualties and individual instances or Iranian
meddling  in  Iraqi affairs. Disjointed coverage  that neglects certain policy outcomes and
does not piece  together  separate  events  into  a broader picture would  also  exemplify  an
instance of “fragmentation media bias” that could further undermine the public ability to
understand  consequences  behind  US  government  policies  (Bennett,  2001).  Such
fragmented  coverage,  characterized  by  procedural  framing,  would  fail  to  “motivate  or
equip the public to engage in political deliberation,” (Entman, 2004) with the implication
of further reduction of incentives for keeping the government accountable since the very #p#分頁標題#e#
“paucity  of  media  images  themselves  may  reduce  pressure  on  officials  to  consider
changing  problematic  policy”  (Entman,  Livingston  and  Kim,  2009,  p.  701).  When
seeking  theoretical  explanations  as  to why geostrategic  framing might be missing  from
the coverage-one of the implications could be found in the notion of cultural congruence
and  the  idea  that most  successful  frames  are  the  ones  that  have  “the  greatest  intrinsic
capacity  to  arouse  similar  responses  among most Americans”  and  “are  fully  congruent
with  schemas habitually used by most members of  the  society.”  (Entman, 2004, p. 14). 
Conveying  geostrategic  frame  would  require  that  media  reinforce  the  notion  that  for
decades prior to Iraq War in 2003, the US policy supported the brutal regime of Saddam
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Hussein,  an  idea  that  is  not  consistent  with  the American  self-image  and  its  values  of
promoting  democracy  around  the  world,  typically  associated  with  the US  government
policy. An  idea  of  “arrogant,  imperialist  and  decadent American  empire”  is  not  easily
thinkable neither  for  journalists, nor  for  the American public  (Ibid). Finally, by  looking
into type of story as well as sources that are most often quoted when Iranian involvement
in  Iraq  is  concerned,  this  study  seeks  to  shed  further  light  on  the  debate  about media
capacity to generate independent frames, and the extent to which journalists influence, or
merely  reflect  the  framing  contests  that  take  place  between  the  elites  and  the
administration.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review: Policy Literature and Political Communication Literature 
  
Peter Galbraith  gave  an  apt  summary  of  how  a  neglect  of  geostrategic  implications  of Iranian  involvement  in  Iraq  helps  frame  a  government  policy  failure  as  success.  He observes that the Surge might have helped reduce the violence. Yet, whereas the decline in violence  is a “welcome development,  […]  less violence, however,  is not  the same as #p#分頁標題#e#
http://www.400190.com/dissertation_sample/New_Zealand_Dissertaion_Sample/success.”  (Galbraith, 2008). This conclusion  stems  from  the proposition  that  the United
States did not go  to war  for  the purpose of ending  the  sectarian violence, and  that  it  is now  Iran  and  not  the United  States  that  is  the most  important  ally  of  the  ruling  Iraqi Shiite  parties.  One  of  the most  influential  Shiite  parties  in  Iraq,  the  Islamic  Supreme Council of  Iraq  (ISCI), was  founded by Ayatollah Khomeini  in  Iran  in 1982. Before he had returned to Iraq in 2003, Maliki himself had spent more than twenty years in exile in Iran  and  Syria.  This  study  sought  to  explore  to  what  extent  the  discussion  in  the  US media managed to convey these arguably important details behind Iranian involvement in Iraqi politics.  
 
 Numerous  scholars  and  policy  analysts  in  the  field  of  international  relations  have identified various ways in which Iran has increased its geopolitical strength thanks to US involvement  in  Iraq. They  seem  to  agree  on  the  notion  that Saddam Hussein  had  been used by  the United States as a containment  tool against a stronger  Iran  for more  than a decade  preceding  the  Iraq War  in  2003  (Chubin  2009,  Carpenter  and  Innocent,  2007,
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Kemp,  2005).  The  disruption  of  the  balance  of  power  incurred  by  the  deposition  of
Saddam  Hussein,  “the  principal  strategic  counterweight  to  Iran,”  increased  Iran’s
influence  in  the  region.  They  claim  “because  the  region  remained  divided  [back  in
Saddam  Hussein’s  era]  neither  side  could  achieve  hegemony  and  shut  out  American
influence” (Carpenter and Innocent, 2007, p. 68). 
Scholars from the Brookings Institution also explained the potentially perilous role of the
US support for Shiite opposition in Iraq. The fidelity of Iraqi dissident groups surpassed
their  ties with Washington both before and after  1  the US  invasion and both Kurds and
Shia  groups  are  inclined  to  use  the  support  from  Tehran  to  strengthen  their  positions #p#分頁標題#e#
(Maloney, 2008). This could be considered as a geopolitical winning point and a power
increase  for  Iran,  gained  from  the  US  involvement.  Instead  of  promoting  an  Islamic
revolution  and  thus  alienating  the  Iraqi  government,  Iran  has  played  prudently  by
supporting the democratic establishment that favors its allies in Iraq. Such strengthening
of  its  own  position  within  Iraq  in  combination  with  the  support  for  insurgents  has
increased  its  leverage  and power  with Washington.  Iran’s  financial  investments  in  Iraq
present another proof that “Iran has existential interest in ensuring a friendly government
in Baghdad” (Ibid). Even earlier reports from Brookings suggested that “the War in Iraq
has  left next-door  Iran  the uncontested  regional power, which  is  sure  to  raise  fears  that
Iran could gain too much influence in Iraq and the rest of the Gulf” (Telhami, 2004).
1 Emphasis added 
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Recent political changes  in Bahrain can be used  to  illustrate quite well  the  rising Shiite
influence  and  the  growing  geopolitical  power  of  Iran  in  the  region,  spurred  by  the US
invasion  of  Iraq.  Bahrain  is  a  predominantly Muslim  Shiite  nation,  ruled  by  a  Sunni
minority, similar to the case of Iraq prior to the invasion. The ruling Sunni elite has been
accusing  Iran  of  stirring  Shiite  opposition  that  has  blamed  the  government  of  curbing
Shiite political rights on a regular basis over the past couple of years (Los Angeles Times,
February 22, 2009). In this island country of only 700, 000, Shiites constitute more than
70  percent  of  the  population  that  have  been  ruled  by  Sunni  minority  since  the  18th
century. The country gained independence in 1970 and Shiites have participated in every
significant  coup  attempt,  which  intensified  in  1994,  leading  the  government  to  banish
opposition  leaders  and  institute  repression  (Louer,  2008,  Nasr  2006).  Policy  analysts
argue that impoverished Shiite youth of Bahrain are encouraged by Ayatollah al Sistani’s
support for “one person one vote” that spurred the similarly dispossessed Shiite youth of #p#分頁標題#e#
Iraq, many of which joined the ranks of Moqtada al Sadr, to ask for democratic changes
that  opened  the  door  to  Shiite  empowerment  (Nasr,  2006  p.  235).  Shiite  protests  in
Bahrain  in  2005  where  the  masses  asked  for  the  institutionalization  of  full-fledged
democracy  are  a  testament  to  this  encouragement  spurred  by  the  US-induced  Iraqi
example. 
Unlike  in Bahrain, Shiites  in Saudi Arabia constitute a minority, yet one geographically
located  in  a  critical  part  of  the  country  with major  oil  resources  (Ibrahim,  2006, Nasr,
2006). Saudi leaders have often openly stated that the US invasion has handed over Iraq
to  Iran  and  bolstered  Iranian  regional  influence  by  enabling  Iran  to  spur  unrest  among
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regional Shiites in other countries (Nasr, 2006). During Iran-Iraq war and prior to the US
invasion of 2003,  the  coalition  comprised of Sunni-led Baathists, Saudi Arabia,  Jordan
and Kuwait prevented Shiite regime in Iran from becoming a regional power. During the
Iran-Iraq,  war  it  was  part  of  Saudi  Arabian  ruling  elite’s  propaganda  to  emphasize
Khomeini’s  Shiite  identity  on  the  one  hand,  as  opposed  to  Sunnism  of  the  other  side
(Nasr, 2006, p. 154). Yet, after  the 2003  invasion,  this  role  is  fulfilled by violent Sunni
extremists  that  spurred  sectarian violence  in  Iraq,  and were  in  fact  serving  the national
interests  of  the  above mentioned  Sunni-ruled  countries,  even  though  the  governments
were officially aligned with  the United States and President George W. Bush’s War on
Terror (Nasr, 2006, p. 242). The conflict hence has the potential to evolve into a greater
struggle between the Sunni Arab establishment of the old order and the emerging Shiite
power-  with  Saudi  Arabia  dominant  influence  on  the  one  side,  and  Iran  as  a
representative of emerging Shiite power on the other. 
 
Disruption of the regional balance of power is also visible in the realignment in financial
and political support for Iraq. The Sunni-led oil rich states have recently declined support
for  Iraq’s debt  relief (Yaphe, 2008). Sunni-led Gulf regimes were once  the main source #p#分頁標題#e#
for more  than 80 billion dollars  in  loans supplied  to help  Iraq defeat  Iran; yet  they now
oppose assistance to Iraq since they fear Iranian influence (Yaphe, 2008). As a matter of
fact,  it  was  President  Ahmadinejad  who,  during  his  visit  to  Iraq  in  early  2008, made
generous offers  to  Iraqi development, which constitutes  further evidence of geopolitical
realignment of traditional alliances.
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Officials  in President Bush’s administration and neoconservative  scholars  seem  to have
been so focused on removing Saddam Hussein from power “that they largely overlooked
wider geopolitical  ramifications of his  removal”  (Carpenter  and  Innocent, 2007, p. 70). 
Iran’s two strategic goals, aimed at increasing its power are: to weaken the possibility of
US  intervention  through  support  for  insurgency;  and  to  deepen  political  and  economic
influence over  Iraqi Shiites (p. 71). Some scholars also argue  that once Western powers
leave,  “Iran  will  be  left  to  benefit  from  the mess  that  they  have  created.”  (Lowe  and
Spencer, 2006, p. 10) Recent Western policies have encouraged those more strategically-
oriented  actors  in  Iranian  foreign policy  to  constructively  engage  with  regional players
and prepare “political terrain for later,” which is, according to their view, already evident
in  Iranian  policy  towards  Iraq  (Ibid).  These  scholars  also  agree  that  Iran’s  biggest
leverage,  “assisted,  if  not  per  se  caused  by  the  US  invasion,”  is  its  ability  to  “further
destabilize  the already chaotic public space  in  Iraq” (p. 18). Hence,  the policy  literature
seems  to  agree  on  the  notion  that  growing  Iranian  influence  in  the  country  has  been
enabled through the US-induced establishment of a Shiite government in Iraq.
However,  inter-Shiite  divisions  in  Iraq  add  another  layer  to  the  complexity  of  Iranian
involvement in Iraq. Iranian simultaneous support for opposing Shiite factions in Iraq often
seems  contradictory  and  hence  exacts  a  degree  of  examination  as  well.  If  we  perceive #p#分頁標題#e#
Iran’s core strategic gains in its support and strong ties with a stable Iraqi government, then
the speculation of Iranian support for Moqtada Al-Sadr’s JAM (Jaish-Al-Mahdi Army) that
first supported and yet later on fought against Prime Minister Maliki’s government would
seem  inconsistent with  Iranian  long-term goal. Yet, policy  analysts point out  that  Iranian
14
regime may believe it also has strategic interest in supporting the Iraqi insurgency in order
to keep the US forces in Iraq in a quagmire and hence render an attack on Iran –triggered 
by  Iranian   nuclear  threat- unlikely  (Crisis Group Report, 2005). “It  is plausible  that  Iran
might  provide  some  weapons  to  the Mahdi  Army  and  some  of  its  factions,”  Galbraith
observes.  (p.  84).  Some  policy  institutes  deem  that  Iran  is  playing  on  multiple,  often
contradictory fronts, to ensure its power grip in  Iraq. American Enterprise Institute (AEI)
reported  that  Iran  had  consistently  supplied  weapons  and  its  own  advisers  to  multiple
resistance groups in Iraq—both Sunni and Shia  (Rubin, 2007).
Most  importantly,  these  seemingly  incongruent  Iranian  tactical  efforts  could be  seen as
aspects of a broader strategy aimed at ensuring Iranian long term interests in Iraq, which
entail the preservation of Iraq’s territorial integrity, and avoidance of chaotic instability;
encouragement  of  a  Shiite-dominated,  friendly  government;  and  keeping  the  U.S.
preoccupied  (Crisis Group Report,  2005).  In  order  to  achieve  this,  Iranian  strategy  has
been  focused  on  the  following:  “encouraging  electoral  democracy  (as  a  means  of
producing  Shiite  rule);  promoting  a  degree  of  chaos  but  of  a  manageable  kind;  and
investing  in a wide  array of diverse, often  competing  Iraqi  actors  -to minimize  risks  in
any  conceivable  outcome  (Ibid). Content  analysis  will  also  explore  if  the  idea  that  all
Iranian  seemingly discrepant efforts might be part of  a broad  strategy,  enabled  through
the US involvement in Iraq, is at all conveyed in the media coverage. 
A common accusation  leveled at  Iran  is  that  the elite units of  the  Iranian Revolutionary #p#分頁標題#e#
Guard Corps (IRGC)-Al Quds- are directly involved in attacking US troops. This type of
“name calling” and direct attribution of responsibility to Al Quds and individual leaders
15
was  expected  to  be more  common  in  the  network  news  than  in  The New York  Times
articles. The discussion concerning Al Quds would typically revolve around whether they
are  operating  in  Iraq  with  or  without  direct  sanction  of  the  highest  level  individuals
within  the  Iranian  government.  The  facts  behind  the  very  accusation  that  they  are
operating  in  Iraq  in  the  first  place,  as  put  forth  in  a  frame  often  stemming  from  the
administration, are rarely questioned. Yet, regional policy experts often make a different
point. For instance, London-based Center for the Study of Terrorism reported that Iranian
policy  in  Iraq  is  not  about  dispatching  Al Quds,  but  about  “giving  proper  training  and
support  to  Iran’s natural allies  in  Iraq  in order  to  influence  their political positioning  in
post-occupation Iraq. The Iranians are far too smart […] to challenge American power in
Iraq directly.” (RFE/RL, Feb. 16, 2007).
In  2006,  one  of  the  most  influential  British  think-tanks  –The  Royal  Institute  of
International  Affairs  at  Chatham  House-  published  a  report  that  outlined  the  strategic
errors made by President Bush’s administration that left Iran in control of the cards in the
Middle East. The study  reports  that “most states [in  the Middle East] desire  to maintain
good relations with Iran or, where the relationship is less strong, to avoid antagonization”
(p. 25).   The  report  concludes  that  “if  Iran were  seriously  threatened by outside  forces
[regarding nuclear  issues],  it has  the potential  to  inflame  the  region  yet  further”  (Ibid). 
This  idea  should  also  be  borne  in  mind  in  the  context  of  content  analysis  yet  to  be
presented  in  this  thesis.  If  the  threat of nuclear  Iran  is expected  to be  the most  frequent
frame, then is the Iranian nuclear empowerment examined in the light of Iraq War? Have #p#分頁標題#e#
the  media  paid  attention  to  ways  in  which  Iranian  nuclear  ambitions  and  aspirations
16
towards regional influence might have been bolstered by the Iraq invasion? Quantitative
content and descriptive analysis that follow, seek to shed some light on this issue as well.
The  report  raises  another  interesting  issue  that  illustrates  the potential  long-term benefits
that  Iran  has  garnered  through  US  involvement  in  Iraq-  and  that  is  the  possibility  of
creating “an  expansive  “Region of  the Center  and  the South  -a  super province  including
Najaf  and  Karbala,”  which  is  of  special  interest  to  ‘geopolitically-savvy  Iranians.”  The
writers of  the  report  cited  ISCI’s power  in  this  southern  Iraqi  region,  claiming  that  ISCI
was  the  Iraqi  Shia  party  most  susceptible  to  Iranian  influence.2  They  conclude  that
“maintaining  influence  in  southern  Iraq  is  of  paramount  importance  to  Tehran”  (p.  19).
However, more  importantly,  these authors  introduce  the caveat  that “virtually every  Iraqi
Shia party now 3 has strong links with Tehran” (Ibid.). They claimed that this was the case
even with the parties deemed nationalist –such as Mahdi Army. 
Other scholars deem that Iran does not have an interest in creating a Shiite state in southern
Iraq, which would destabilize the country. “[…] the present situation is easier for Iran than
it would be if it faced hostile Kurdish and Sunni states and a problematic Shiite state […]
Iran is not in favor of dislocating Iraq and hopes instead to realize its interests in a unified
Iraq.” (Sahib, 2008, p. 309) Following this line of argument, Iranian strategic goal seems to
be  a  stable  Iraq, malleable  to  its  influence.  Iranian  officials  themselves  seem  to  discuss
Iranian  interest  in  stable  Iraq  in  a  quite  open  and  straight-forward manner. For  instance,
Iran’s deputy foreign minister Abbas Araghchi raised the rhetorical question in a statement
2 One  should, however, bear  in mind that  ISCI  lost heavily in  Iraqi Provincial Council elections  in January
2009. 
17
for the Financial Times: “Why should we undermine a government in Iraq that we support #p#分頁標題#e#
more than anybody else?” (May 10, 2007).
Cultural  dynamism  of  the  new  Iraq  is  another  example  of  growing  Iranian  regional
influence that is often not framed as such. Hundreds of thousands of Iranian pilgrims who
travel  to  Iraq reinforce  investments, social and economic  ties between  the  two countries
(Nasr,  2006).  In  her  testimony  before  the House Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  in  the
summer  of  2008,  Judith  Yaphe,  Distinguished  Research  Fellow  at  the  Institute  for
National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University drew attention to gains that
mainstream media, as the analysis will show, do report but fail to frame as Iranian gains:
an  influx  of  Iranian  businessmen,  diplomats,  security  personnel  and  intelligence
operatives along  the 900 mile-long border between  the  two countries. Perhaps  the most
striking idea behind growing Iranian influence is that it has funded “virtually every Shia
candidate standing for election to the National Assembly [and that] it expects, in return, a
compliant government in Baghdad willing to accede to its vision of the New Iraq” (Ibid.) 
The author, however, must point out that this thesis does not seek to adopt any preferred
policy prescription towards Iran; the goal is merely to draw attention to the fact that the
success of the US government policy in Iraq and the media coverage thereof merits to be
assessed in the geopolitical light as well.   
3 Emphasis added 
18
Political Communication Literature 
 
This  study  draws  on  framing  theories  and  attribution  of  responsibility  theories.  Prior  to
focusing  on  framing  theory,  the  literature  review will,  however,  provide  an  overview  of
media bias theories since certain types thereof are particularly pertinent to the explanation
of the nature of media coverage that this thesis seeks to explore. Literature review will also
briefly  touch  upon  inter-media  agenda  setting  theory,  providing  rationale  for  the media
sources chosen for the content analysis.
Agenda setting, priming and framing theories could be clustered under the broader concept
of media bias, as some researchers suggest (Entman 2007, Niven 2002). When discussing
the notion of  “media bias”  some of  the potential biases  in  the United States media have #p#分頁標題#e#
been categorized in the following manner: news that distorts reality (distortion bias); news
that  favors one over another  side of political  reality-content bias; and motivations behind
journalists’  actions  that  produce  decision-making  bias  (Entman  2007,  Scheufele  2000). 
Most of the studies in the field of media bias have focused on discovering systematic bias
towards  or  against  some  political  issues  or  sides  of  political  spectrum  within  a  society.
Some  recent  research  on  media  bias  indicates  that  media  outlets  tend  to  accord  more
attention  to  stories  and  aspects  of  stories  that  favor  the  democratic  or  liberal  political
standpoints  and  are  hence  labeled  as  having  “liberal  bias”  (Ansolabehere,  Lessem  and
Snyder  2004). Yet,  despite  these  accusations  of  “liberal  bias”  in  the American media,  a
great number of studies  that  focused on  the concept of bias during presidential and other
19
types  of  elections,  for  instance,  failed  to  find  consistent  evidence  for  either  liberal  or
conservative, or Democratic and Republican media bias (Niven, 2002, Kuypers, 2002). 
Lance Bennett  (2001) described  four  types of media biases, all of which are  relevant  for
this study’s content analysis. Personalization  is  the  first  type and  it  refers  to  the  idea  that
complex social, economic and political factors are neglected in the media coverage in favor
of “dramatic, personal tragedy-oriented” coverage (p. 35). This first type of bias is touted
as a  typical  feature of  the American news media. Dramatization,  the second  type of bias,
which describes  the  tendency  towards actor-oriented stories and  focus on  the narrative as
opposed  to  heavy  issue-analysis,  is  also  deemed  to  be  inherent  in  American  reporting.
Bennett  also  explains  that  “there  is  bias  in  placing  so much  news  focus  on  the  largely
emotional questions of, “who is in charge” and “will the order be restored” to the detriment
of  substantive  discussion  about  issues  behind  the  policies  (Ibid).    Descriptive  content #p#分頁標題#e#
analysis  will  pay  particular  attention  to  examining  the  prevalence  of  such  news  and
implications of such coverage. These tendencies are all germane to the analysis of The New
York Times  and NBC media  coverage  of  Iran. The  former  could  be  exemplified  in  the
focus of  the  coverage on visible political personalities,  such  as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad;
and the latter through the portrayal of visually compelling images and simple news reports
that  focus  on  violence  and  the  Iranian  support  for  insurgency,  for  instance.  The  most
relevant  type  of  bias  for  this  thesis  is  the  third  type  of  bias-  “fragmentation  bias”-  that
Bennett describes as “isolation of stories from each other and from their larger contexts so
that information in the news becomes fragmented and hard to assemble into a big picture”
20
(p.  37).1  Media  coverage  of  the  Iraq  War  abounds  in  coverage  of  “near  daily  but
disconnected  reports  of  mounting  costs,”  coupled  with  “a  neglect  of  more  profoundly
negative news not rooted in daily events.” (Entman, Livingston, and Kim, 2009 p. 701 cf.
Bennett  and  Livingston,  2003).    One  of  the  propositions  of  this  thesis  is  that  Iranian
geostrategic  gains  exemplify  these more  profoundly  negative  news  that  are  usually  not
rooted  in  daily  events  and  are  hence  outnumbered  by  topics  such  as  Iranian  support  for
insurgency-a  topic  typically  rooted  in  a  daily  event  and  bolstered  by  the  administration
officials. Fragmentation bias is hence particularly important for the main argument of this
thesis-the hypothetical failure to piece together a coherent frame of Iran that would convey
the geostrategic leverage that this country has gained as an unintended consequence of the
US  efforts  in  Iraq.  Finally,  the  fourth  type  of  bias,  “authority-disorder  bias,”  refers  to
journalists’  tendency  to  default  to  official  sources  “in  many  political  news  dramas,”
especially when the information is scarce or of questionable veracity (Bennett, 2001 p. 38). #p#分頁標題#e#
This  last  type  of  bias  is  particularly  relevant  for  the  portrayal  of  Iranian  support  for
insurgency,  where  journalists  barely  questioned  the  veracity  of  Administration’s  claims
(Entman, Livingston and Kim, 2009). 
In  its  strictest definition,  framing  is described  as  the  selection of  certain  content  and  the
attribution of salience to some information and aspects of the content over others (Entman,
1993). Three  broader  theoretical  approaches  to  framing  could  be  discerned  in  literature:
constructivist, which primarily sees frames are benign; critical, which relates to the concept
of hegemony, and cognitive, which explores psychological influence on the audience, and
1 Emphasis added 
21
is  also  the  line  of  framing  research  that  thesis  primarily  draws  on  (D’Angelo  2002).
Selection  and  salience  are  the  most  important  aspects  of  framing  for  this  study,  for
“framing  includes not only what  is made prominent but also what  is  left out,2  treated  as
secondary, tertiary, or less” (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997, p. 45). This study hence seeks
to explore that which is missing in the framing of a country and its involvement in the War
in Iraq. Most importantly, “framing provides a way to think about events,” (Ibid.) and this
is  the broad  theme  that  this  thesis  is embedded  in-how  the media coverage of  Iran might
have influenced the way the public thinks about the country.
Pan  and Kosicki’s  discourse  analysis  sought  to  describe  devices  that  journalists  have  at
their  disposal  when  framing  news.  They  explain  that  news  texts  operate  on  four  broad
organizing  structures:  syntactical,  thematic,  scripts  and  rhetorical  structures  (1993).
Syntactical  structures  refer  to  typical  story  elements  such  as  headline,  lead,  episode,
background and closure. Thematic  structures  represent a particular  thesis  that defines  the
problem-for instance Iran is a nuclear rather than contained threat; scripts are habitual story
lines  that  create  narrative  tension  e.g.  “candidates  doing  better  than  expected  in  the #p#分頁標題#e#
primaries”;  finally,  rhetorical  devices  include  stylistic  symbols  that  would  convey  the
character of the account, e.g. objectivity. When thinking about framing Iranian geopolitical
gains from the Iraq War, the most important aspect of the news story for this study then is
the  “thematic  structure,”  which  contains  problem  definition.  In  this  context  it  is  very
important  to  point  out  that  “both  small wording  changes  and  larger  contextual  cues  can
generate  significantly  different  textual  interpretations”  (Cappella  and  Jamieson,  1997,  p.
2 Emphasis added by the author of this thesis
22
46). This notion was used as one of  the rationales  for  taking  the entire story as a unit of
analysis- rather than coding by paragraph. Geostrategic frame might not be contained in
the  wording  of  a  sole  paragraph;  rather,  the  problem  definition  could  sometimes  be
inferred only  from  the  context of  the  entire  story. This  idea was also  taken  into account
when  the parameters  for defining  the  frame were devised. They are described  later on  in
the methodology chapter. The author thus sought to refrain from a strict verbal definition
of what would constitute a “geostrategic” frame that this study analyzes. It can be an idea
inferred  from  the  larger  contextual  cues  of  the  story,  or  specific  wording  changes-as
explained above. 
This  study  draws  on Entman’s  definition  of  framing, whereby  he  separates  framing  into
substantive  and  procedural  (Entman,  2004).    According  to  his  primary  definition,
substantive frames perform at least two of the following functions, when covering political
issues  and  events.  They  need  to  “define  effects  and  conditions  as  problematic;  identify
causes; convey a moral  judgment and endorse  remedies or  improvements” (Entman, p. 5,
1993). The  two most  important  framing  functions are problem definition, which  tends  to
determine the rest of the frame; as well as the remedy, because it directly leads to support
or opposition for a certain policy (Ibid). News frames highlight certain aspects of news and
downplay  others  through  selection,  emphasis,  exclusion  and  elaboration  (Cappella  and #p#分頁標題#e#
Jamieson, 1997, p.77 cf. Tankard et. al, 1991). 
In  domestic  politics  in  the  United  States,  concepts  similar  to  procedural  frames  are
sometimes  referred  to  as  “game”  or  “horserace”  frames  (Cappella  and  Jameson,  1997,
Patterson,  1994).  Other  scholars  describe  similar  notions  under  the  label  of  “episodic”
23
frames (Iyengar, 1994). These scholars seem to agree that procedural framing pervades the
US media.  Foreign  news  is  often  characterized  by  procedural  framing  as well  (Entman,
2004) and past studies of the Iraq War have shown that procedural framing has permeated
much of the coverage (Entman, Livingston and Kim, 2009). 
The  focus  and  function of procedural  frames  are much narrower  than  that of  substantive
frames. These frames tend to focus on legitimacy of political actors based on the technique
they  are  using,  success  or  their  representativeness  (Entman,  2004).  They  also  evaluate
behavior of different political actors and attribute political motives to those involved.  On
the  other  hand,  “substantive  assertions  are  those  clearly  relevant  to  audience members’
understanding and acceptance of a policy” (Entman, 2004, p. 79). The crucial aspect behind
procedural framing that this study relies on is the idea that it fails to “motivate or equip the
public  to  engage  in  political  deliberation.”  (Entman,  2004,  p.  6).  When  discussing
procedural  framing, Entman also notes  that  journalists  in  the United States have a  strong
tendency  to define news  as  “action described  and predicted,  rather  than  ideas  analyzed.”
(Entman, 2004 p. 74, cf. Gans, 1979, Mermin, 1999). In respect to their influence on public
opinion, this thesis views procedural frames as similar to what Jamieson and Cappella have
described  as  “strategic  frames,”  in  domestic  politics.  These  frames  draw  audience’s
attention  to  the motivation of  the people  depicted  in  the news. They  argue  that  strategic
news activate cynical attributions and “cynical response to politicians, politics, governance,
campaigns  and  policy  formation,” whereas what  they  call  “issue  frames,”  “may  depress #p#分頁標題#e#
cynical  reactions  that  lead  to  public  disengagement  or  at  least  fail  to  activate  them.”
(Cappella and Jamieson, 1997, p. 139).  When this idea is applied to foreign news and the
24
case  of  Iran:  one  of  the  implications  of  this  study  then  is  that  a  potential  dominance  of
frames that focus on individual foreign actors and their motivation instead of providing a
coherent issue-based discussion about Iranian stakes in Iraq, would act as a contributing
factor to a similar lack of engagement from the public. As explained further, the coverage
of Iranian involvement seems to be procedural in nature- focusing on success or failure of
US  pressure  on  Iranian  establishment  and  providing  a  lot  of  attention  to  visible
personalities such as President Ahmadinejad or the Supreme leader Khamenei, without an
effort  to  piece  together  Iranian  involvement  in  Iraq  into  a  coherent  picture.  Hence-  the
implication  that  the  public might  be  left without  adequate  tools  to  hold  the  government
responsible for its policies in Iraq.
Another  concept  that  this  study views  as  conceptually  similar  to procedural  framing  and
pays  particular  attention  to  are  “episodic  frames”  (Iyengar,  1994,  p.14). Relevant  aspect
behind episodic news is that it is defined as an “event-oriented” report that “depicts public
issues  in  terms of concrete  instances”  (Ibid). On  the other hand,  “thematic  frames” place
issues  in  “more  general  or  abstract  context”  taking  the  form  of  “backgrounder”  report
“directed at general outcomes and conditions.” Although Iyengar applied these concepts to
network news reporting, they conceptually relate to procedural framing and are used in this
thesis to refer to The New York Times coverage as well. 
Episodic  or  procedural  vs.  thematic  or  substantive  framing  are  chosen  as  explanatory
notions  used  for  this  study  because  of  their  implications  for  the  people’s  capacity  to
attribute  responsibility  for certain policies.  “Attribution of  responsibility  theories” pertain #p#分頁標題#e#
to  the  field  of  social  psychology  and  look  into  ways  in  which  the  public  attributes
25
responsibility to individuals and issues for certain policies. Most Americans do not possess
enough  information  about  political  events  and  issues  (Iyengar,  1994,  Delli  Carpini  and
Keeter,  1996).  In  an  effort  to  understand  the multitude  of  political  information  that  they
receive on a daily basis, “individuals simplify political issues by reducing them to questions
of responsibility [and hence] the paramount task of public opinion research is to determine
how people attribute responsibility for political issues” (Iyengar, 1994, p. 8). 
Episodic news frames focus on “specific episodes, individual perpetrators, victims or other
actors at the expense of more general, thematic information […] and depict concrete events
that  illustrate  issues while  thematic  framing presents collective or general evidence”  (p.5,
Iyengar, 1994). The dominance of the episodic frames in TV news had been established in
numerous  studies  (Gitlin,  1980, Gamson  and Modigliani,  1989).  For  example  TV  news
depicting  protests would  focus  on  specific  events  taking  place  during  the  protest,  rather
than  issues  that  led  to  the protests. Concerning  Iran hostage crisis  in 1979,  the  issue was
reduced  to  one  story:  freeing  of  the  hostages,  and  hence  neglecting  the  discourse  on
complexities  of  Iranian  politics,  historical  background  and  larger  context  behind  the
hostage  crisis.  Data  analysis  that  follows  this  literature  review  seeks  to  explore  if  the
coverage  of  Iranian  involvement  in  Iran  follows  the  same,  simplified  pattern,
predominantly by focusing on Iranian support for insurgency and Iranian nuclear threat. 
Thematic  frames,  on  the  other  hand,  place  issues  in more  general  and  abstract  context,
providing  more  background  information  for  the  story.  In  order  to  frame  Iran  as  a
geopolitical winner  from  the War  in  Iraq,  an  article/news  story was  expected  to  rely  on #p#分頁標題#e#
more complex information about Iranian political interests, Iraqi situation on the ground, or
26
historical  background  information,  among  other  issues,  to  present  Iran-Iraq  relations.
Hence,  framing  Iran  as  a  geostrategic  winner  from  the  War  in  Iraq  was  expected  to
illustrate an instance of substantive or thematic framing. 
The  crucial  implication  behind  episodic  framing  is  that  it  triggers  attributions  of
responsibility where both cause and treatment of problems are directed at individuals rather
than the society and situations. Such framing tends to make particular acts or characteristics
of particular  individuals more accessible, while  thematic  reporting helps viewers  to  think
about political issues in terms of societal and political outcomes.” (Iyengar, 1994, p. 134).
Episodic news also “short-circuits the public’s ability to assess responsibly the conditions
created  by  policy  decisions  [and]  encourages  acceptance  of  foreign  policy  solutions  to
problems misunderstood as the consequence of ‘evildoers’- overly simplistic individualized
problem  origins”  (Livingston,  2007  p.  50  cf.  Iyengar,  1991).  Coverage  of  Iranian
involvement  in  Iraq  seems  to  be  what  Iyengar  defines  as  “non-interpretative”  (Iyengar,
1994, p. 32).  –piece of news is merely announced and not thoroughly examined in the light
of problem definition, cause and moral judgment. Since numerous news reports cite Iranian
support  for violence  in  Iraq, often  tying  the  country  to  support  for  terrorism,  it becomes
important  to  look  into  how  individual  acts  of  violence  are  covered:  if  they  contain
background information and issue-oriented discussion, as exemplified in thematic framing;
or if they are reduced to  individual acts of violence without attempt to provide context in
which  it  occurs,  as  exemplified  in  episodic  framing. Different  types  of  coverage  would
trigger  different  attributions  of  responsibility.  Non-interpretative,  episodic  coverage
typically  attributes  responsibility  to  Iran  or  visible  individuals within  the  Iranian  regime
27
and leaves out an issue-oriented, thematic discussion that would explain how the US policy #p#分頁標題#e#
had  opened  the  door  to  Iranian  involvement  in  Iraq  in  the  first  place,  and  consequently,
fails  to explain  the rippling effect of such  involvement on  the geo-political balance  in  the
region. 
When attempting to answer the question as to why such issue-oriented, thematic coverage
might  be missing  in  reporting  on  Iraq War,  a  common  explanation  lies  in  the  fact  that
professional norms and commercial pressures often lead to cursory, entertainment-oriented
coverage malleable  to  officials’  influence  (Patterson,  2000, Kalb  1998,  Patterson,  1993;
Frank  1991).    Daily  routines  that  interactions  among  reporters  and  news  sources  are
comprised of, bestow power on sources to define political reality and shape the dominant
discourse (Sigal, 1973). The implication of such coverage is that media tend to repeat prior
mistakes  and  habitually  default  to  officials  as  primary  sources,  leading  to  prevalence  of
positive framing of government’s policies. This notion will also be explored in quantitative
analysis section.
Another theoretical reference that should be made when attempting to answer the question
as to why the geostrategic frame might be missing in the coverage is the notion of cultural
congruence. The concept refers to the notion that most successful frames are the ones that
have “the greatest  intrinsic capacity  to arouse  similar  responses among most Americans”
and “are  fully congruent with schemas habitually used by most members of  the society.”
(Entman, 2004, p. 14).   Conveying geostrategic frame would require  that media reinforce
the notion  that  for decades prior  to  Iraq War  in 2003,  the US policy supported  the brutal
regime of Saddam Hussein, an idea that is not consistent with the American self-image and
28
its  values  of  promoting  democracy  around  the  world,  typically  associated  with  the  US
government policy. Although this study does not seek to test the cascade model (Entman,
2004) and hence an elaborate explanation  thereof will be  left out,  certain  implications of
the model  should be  referred  to nonetheless. The  cascade model  suggests  that  the media
should provide enough  information  independent of  the executive branch  that citizens can #p#分頁標題#e#
construct  their  own  counter  fames  on  issues  (Entman,  2004,  p.  17). Scattered  parcels  of
information are not enough; what citizens need instead is a culturally resonant frame with
sufficient magnitude  to construct  a  sensible  alternative  to  the  administration  line. Hence,
this study also seeks to explore the magnitude, as tested through frequency and prominence
of the geostrategic frame- arguably not a culturally congruent one.
This  study  is  also  predicated  on  the  notion  that  political  participation  of  the  public  does
influence  the  advancement  of  certain  policies,  and  citizen  participation  in  liberal
democracies serves as a check on the tendency of those in power to use their position for
their own gain often by means of manipulating public opinion  (Delli Carpini and Keeter,
1996,  cf.  Page  and  Shapiro,  1992).  “For  citizens  to  engage  in  politics  in  a way  that  is
personally and collectively constructive, however, they must have resources to do so [and]
the  central  resource  for  democratic  participation  is  political  information.”  (Delii Carpini
and Keeter, 1996, p. 5) In the similar vein, this thesis draws on the notion  that media can
limit the influence of public opinion on US foreign policy by creating what  is termed “an
accountability  gap, whereby news  coverage disconnects policy outcomes  from  the  larger
strategic  picture  and  from  officials  responsible”  (Entman, Livingston  and Kim,  2009,  p.
689). This proposition then also relates to media bias concepts referred to earlier (Bennett,
29
2001)  in  the  following manner:  if  the coverage abounds  in news pieces  that are  removed
from larger historical and political context; if news reports focus on event-driven, isolated
instances  of  violence  or  “Iranian  meddling,”  without  delving  into  background  of  these
individual events,  focusing on dramatic news where responsibility  is  typically attached  to
visible  political  actors  such  as Ayatollah Khamenei,  President Ahmadinejad  or  the  notclearly
  defined  collective  notion  of  “Iranians,”  then  such  coverage  would  result  in  a
fragmented picture of Iranian involvement-where the most striking Iranian gains are lost in #p#分頁標題#e#
the midst of prominence of event-driven reports. Perhaps the most important consequence
of this type of coverage is the reduction of incentives “for American officials to learn from
and correct their errors by changing flawed policies,” and the fact that the very “paucity of
media  images  themselves  may  reduce  pressure  on  officials  to  consider  changing
problematic policy” (Entman, Livingston and Kim, 2009, p. 689). 
To develop a sustainable counter-frame, researchers argue that it is not enough for media to
provide “scattered morsels” of critical information that does not necessarily concur with the
administration line, but when they present a coherent counter frame “that attains sufficient
magnitude  to  gain  wide  understanding  as  a  sensible  alternative  to  the  White  House
interpretation”  (Bennett, Lawrence and Livingston, 2007, p.89,  cf. Entman, 2004). These
scholars  point  out  that  it  is  not  enough  to  convey  just  “bits  and  pieces  of  alternative
perspectives” (p. 90). Researchers admit that this is “a high standard,” but “if the ultimate
concern  is with  public  opinion  and  democratic  accountability,  anything  less  in  the  daily
news stream may constitute a single message environment that produces a compliant rather
than  informed  public”  (Ibid).  This  study  proposes  that  by  not  drawing  attention  to  the
30
Iranian geopolitical gains as an  important  implication of  the US  involvement  in  Iraq,  the
mainstream  media  would  also  contribute  to  the  creation  of  a  message  environment
conducive to such effect.  However, the author needs to point out that this study does not
examine  “framing  contests”  by  comparing  the  prevalence  of  one  frame  over  the  other;
instead, it focuses on the examination of frequency of one frame only: Iranian geopolitical
gains from the Iraq War. 
This  series  of  Iraq  War  studies  showed  that  the  mainstream  media  “provided  the
administration line much greater visibility, detail and coherence,” when the administration
denounced Iran for supplying Iraqis with weapons to fight the US mission, and framed Iran
as a “meddler  in  Iraq War,”  in February 2007. The content analysis conducted as part of #p#分頁標題#e#
this  thesis, seeks  to explore  the extent  to which  the support for  insurgency dominated  the
coverage; however the primary focus of this thesis’ analysis is on exploring the frequency
of  geostrategic  frame.  Should  the  presence  of  geostrategic  frame  prove  scarce  in  the
coverage,  relative  to  the portrayal of  Iran  as  a meddling  force  in  Iraq,  then  a  conclusion
could be drawn  that  the prevalence of “meddling  frame” crowds out  the discussion about
Iranian geopolitical gains.  
Previous  studies  have  already  shown  that  Iraq  War  coverage  abounds  with  ominous
predictions  that  Iranian  weapons  and  terrorists  will  present  a  threat  to  US  home  front,
should the US troops leave  Iraq; the coverage is also characterized by a “neglect of more
profoundly  negative  news  not  rooted  in  daily  events”3  (p.  701,  Entman,  Livingston  and
Kim,  2009  cf.  Livingston  and  Bennett,  2003).  This  is  the  reason  why  this  study  also
31
examines the relationship between the “story type” and the occurrence of the geostrategic
frame. It was expected that features, characterized by their “timeless quality” (Bennett and
Livingston,  2003)  as  well  as  editorials  and  columns,  with  their  benefit  of  greater
independence from official sources, would provide more space for discussion that does not
necessarily  toe the administration line. To this end, the study will provide a discussion of
most frequently cited sources for the most important frames of Iran.
By focusing on Iranian support for insurgency and other topics that easily lend themselves
to  procedural  framing,  the  media  potentially  missed  the  broader  issue  behind  Iranian
involvement in Iraqi politics, enabled by the US invasion of Iraq. Hence, the coverage that
reports  only  tactical  successes,  such  as  reduction  of  violence  and  casualties,  and  fails  to
report potential  larger  geopolitical  failure of US  policy, would open  the door  to positive
framing that sees US government’s policies as victory and political success. To convey an
important  narrative  that  would  equip  the  public  with  tools  to  hold  the  government #p#分頁標題#e#
accountable on issues such as Iraq War, more is necessary than an “occasional alarm bell”
(Bennett, Lawrence and Livingston, 2007, p. 41). And hence, even if the geostrategic frame
might appear occasionally, data analysis will  test  the proposition  that  this occasional blip
might have been a far cry from a coherent and sustainable frame. 
The  implications of  this  study primarily  rely on  the notion  that  framing can affect public
opinion, which was  proven  in  numerous  studies  (Kinder  and  Sanders  1990, Nelson  and
Kinder 1996). Framing effects are also found in people’s knowledge, attitudes and behavior
(Cappella and Jamieson, 1997). Potential reasons behind the effectiveness of framing could
3 Emphasis added 
32
be explained in several ways. Firstly, because people are not well informed regarding most
of the politically and socially relevant issues and their cognitive activity is not high enough
when  complex  problems  are  concerned  (Delli  Carpini  and  Keeter,  1996,  Zaller  1992,
Kahneman,  Slovic  and  Tversky,  1982).  Iyengar’s  line  of  research  on  attribution  of
responsibility proved framing effects on a great variety of issues that involved people with
multiple levels of sophistication, and hence supported the thesis that framing effects are by
no means limited to the “ignorant or naïve” (Iyengar, 1994 p. 13). Research has shown that
“unobtrusive  alterations  in  the wording  and  form  of  survey  questions  produce  dramatic
variations in opinions” (Ibid.) 
Researchers also argue that people are “limited capacity processors” or “cognitive misers,
“which makes  them particularly  susceptible  to  framing  (Fiske  and Taylor,  1991). For  an
attitude change and a change in public opinion, the priority given to one aspect of an issue
over  another needs  to be changed  (Iyengar  and Kinder 1982, Kinder  and Sanders 1990).
For instance, when prompted to state an opinion, people are not capable of processing all
the information they might store in their memory. Instead, they would refer to information
and those aspects of information which are considered to be the most accessible and easy to
retrieve at the given time. This line of argument is relevant for this thesis because it infers
that  the  absence of  geostrategic  frame  and  the prevalence  of  nuclear one,  among others,
would  prime  the  public  to  perceive  Iran  primarily  as  a  nuclear  threat  and  disregard  the #p#分頁標題#e#
Iranian  geostrategic  gains  from  Iraq  War  when  assessing  the  effectiveness  of  US
government policies in the Iraq. 
33
Finally,  one  must  acknowledge  that  news  cannot  be  assumed  to  inevitably  influence
public’s attitudes, knowledge and behavior (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997). Even if framing
effects  are  present  and  significant,  the  effects  of  personal  experience  or  influence  from
others can obstruct or have a counter effect on  the  influence of  framing  (Ibid. cf. Kinder
and O’Sears, 1981). The author must also point out that this thesis does not set out to test
the  influence  of  geostrategic  framing  on  public  opinion. The  content  analysis  allows  the
author  to make  conclusions  solely  about  the  nature  of  the  coverage;  influence  on  public
opinion can only be inferred on the basis of previous studies and available public opinion
polls. 
This study briefly refers to inter-media agenda setting to provide the rationale for using The
New York Times and NBC as prime examples of “Mainstream Press” in the United States
and hence  the basis  for  its content  analysis  (Bennett, Livingston  and Lawrence, 2007, p.
57).    The  concept  of  “intermedia  agenda  setting”  refers  to  those  instances when media
agenda  is  influenced  by  other media  (Lopez-Escobar  et  al.,  1998; Reese  and Danielian,
1989).  Agenda  setting  research  has  demonstrated  that  the  New  York  Times  plays  the
agenda setting role for the rest of the US media especially for national issues (Golan et. al.,
2008, Dearing and Rogers, 1996).  The New York Times was hence chosen because of its
influence  on  broader  media  landscape  in  the  United  States  and  was  considered  to  be
representative of US media coverage. Inter-media aspect of agenda-setting has traditionally
looked into the relationship between newspapers and news agencies, and researchers have
also  established  the  link  between  newspapers  and  television  networks  (McCombs  and
Shaw, 1976). It was also established that television network news follow each other’s leads
34
to determine the salience of news stories (Reese et. al., 1994). NBC was hence considered #p#分頁標題#e#
to be an appropriate choice that would be indicative of broader network news coverage of
the  issue. Quantitative  content  as well  as  descriptive  analysis will  point  to  some  of  the
similarities in New York Times and NBC coverage. 
This thesis rests on the argument that Iran has achieved long term geopolitical gains from
the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003. This first part of the argument was elaborated on in
the previous chapter that provides the policy overview of this topic. The central hypothesis
of  this  thesis  is  the  proposition  that  the  mainstream  media  in  the  United  States  have
underreported Iranian geopolitical gains from the War in Iraq. This hypothesis was tested
by tracking the frequency and appearance of the frame over time, to be further explained in
the methodology chapter of this thesis.
The  second  hypothesis  tests  the  proposition  that  procedural  or  episodic  frames  (as
previously  defined  in  the  literature  review)  dominate  the media  discourse  when  Iran  is
concerned to the detriment of substantive or thematic framing that would capture the frame
of Iranian geostrategic gains.  It was expected that topics that lend themselves to procedural
framing, such as Iranian nuclear threat and Iranian support for insurgency in Iraq dominate
the media  landscape  and  thus  crowd  out  a  sustained  discussion  of  Iranian  geostrategic
gains.  This  hypothesis  will  be  elaborated  on  in  the methodology  chapter,  and  tested  via
quantitative content analysis.
The third hypothesis proposes that the geostrategic frame is more likely to appear in stories
that provide more space for an issue-oriented, or thematic discussion of Iranian gains from
35
the War in Iraq-such as feature stories; as well as stories that are less dependent on official
sources  for cues-such as editorials and columns. Hence  the  expectation was  to  find more
cases of geostrategic frame in feature stories, editorials and columns. Quantitative content
analysis tests this proposition; and descriptive analysis sheds additional light on the nature
of the story that is likely to capture the complexity behind Iranian involvement in Iraq. One
of the propositions of this thesis is that discussion of Iranian geostrategic gains exemplifies
an instance of “more profoundly negative news” that are “not rooted in daily events” and
are hence outnumbered by Iranian support for insurgency-a piece of news typically rooted #p#分頁標題#e#
in daily events and  reported  in hard news stories  (Entman, Livingston and Kim, 2009 cf.
Bennett and Livingston, 2003). 
The final hypothesis proposes that topics that lend themselves to episodic framing are more
pervasive  in  network  news  than  in  The  New  York  Times  coverage,  resulting  in  lower
frequency  of  geostrategic  frame  in  NBC  coverage  relative  to  The  New  York  Times.
Episodic  news  is  “defined  by  the  availability  of  pictures  and  drama,  and  usually  lacks
thematic context and political or historical perspective” (Livingston, 2007, p. 50). Because
of  the visual nature of  television  as  a medium,  it was  expected  that NBC would  contain
more stories triggered by dramatic, and visually compelling daily incidents-such as acts of
violence. This hypothesis also stems from studies that have shown that traditional news has
been  repackaged  into  various  entertainment-oriented  programs,  making  them  more
susceptible to this type of coverage (Baum, 2003, Patterson, 2000, Kalb 1998). It was also
expected  that NBC would contain more  stories  that  focus on  the “who  is  in charge” and
“will the order be restored” aspect of policy-making, as exemplified through types of media
36
biases  referred  to  earlier  in  the  literature  review,  rather  than  on  issue-oriented  questions
such  as  “why  is  this  a  problem”  and  “what  are  the  alternative  explanations  beyond  the
official  ones?”  (Bennett,  2001,  p.  38).  These  “procedural”  frames  (Entman,  2004) were
typically  exemplified  in  stories  whose  topic  of  the  Iran-Iraq  link  (Variable  V)  was
“Congressional debate or action in the US regarding Iran and Iraq” and “discussion within
US presidential campaign.” Hence, to test this hypothesis, quantitative content analysis will
also look into the frequency of these topics in NBC relative to The New York Times; and
descriptive analysis will exemplify articles and news stories that illustrate this point. 
Conveying a sustainable geostrategic frame that would also capture the complex nature of
Iranian involvement in Iraq is expected to require a frequent issue-oriented discussion and
would thus present an instance of thematic framing. Hence, one of the implications of the #p#分頁標題#e#
missing  frame  and  prevalence  of  topics  that  focus  on  reduction  of  violence  is  the
confirmation  of  the  broader  hypothesis  that  the war  coverage  remains  to  a  great  extent
procedural in nature. Another central implication of failure to discuss geopolitical outcomes
of  the  war  in  Iraq  is  the  confirmation  of  “fragmentation  bias,”  (Bennett,  2003)  which
disconnects  tactical  policy  outcomes  from  the  larger  strategic  picture,  thus  reducing  the
public ability to hold the government accountable for its policies. The methodology chapter
that  follows provides a detailed explanation of how  the  research was operationalized and
the hypotheses tested. The author must point out once again, however, that this study does
not  proceed  to  explore  the  influence  on  public  opinion  via  surveys  or  experiments.  The
influence  of  hitherto  described  framing  on  public  opinion  can  only  be  inferred  from  the
37
previous  studies4  that  had  proven  the  influence  on  framing  on  public  opinion  as well  as
from studies that demonstrated how certain coverage fails to trigger response from public
opinion that could produce an effect on policy.5
 
 
4 Referred to in the literature review 
5 Also elaborated on the in the literature review 
38
Chapter 3: Methodology
To  explore  these  hypotheses,  the  study  relies  on  a  quantitative  content  analysis  and  a
descriptive  analysis  of  The  New  York  Times  articles  and  NBC  news  transcripts,  as
appropriate examples of the US media agenda setters. A random sample was chosen from
the population of The New York Times articles and NBC news transcripts from September
11, 2001 until October 3, 2008, when the Lexis-Nexis database search was conducted. The
goal  was  to  track  how  the  geopolitical  discourse  was  shaped  starting  from  9/11-  prior,
during  and  after  the April  2003  invasion. The methodological  principle was  to  take  ten
percent from each population when drawing a representative sample. The population was
retrieved  using  the  search  term  “Iran!” The  idea was  to  retrieve  a  population  of  all  the #p#分頁標題#e#
stories that dealt with Iran in this period of time and refrain from limiting the search using
Lexis-Nexis tools as much as possible. The coding completed for this thesis was part of a
larger study that will examine the overall nature of the Iran coverage, and this was another
rationale for using as broad term as possible for the database search.  The number of stories
in the population differed for each year, and the random sample reflects this idea as well-
since  one  of  the  goals  of  the  analysis would  be  to  observe  any  potential  chronological
changes  in  the  frequency  of  the  frame  analyzed.  The  sample  included  editorials  and
columns, and the rationale behind this decision will be elaborated on later in this chapter.
Our coding  scheme1 was designed  to  capture  the  idea  that  some of  the  stories dealt with
Iran only; some stories dealt with Iran in relation to Iraq (variable V: “topic of the Iran-Iraq
link”); and  some  stories contained both. This  is why  the analysis  that  follows provides a
39
graph that outlines the percentage of stories that discuss Iran in the context of Iraq-which is
the pool of stories that this thesis is primarily interested in.
The  justification  behind  using  the  entire  article/news  transcript  as  a  unit  of  analysis was
made  in  the  literature  review  chapter  and  relies  on  the  fact  that  the primary  goal of  this
study was to observe the presence and frequency of a frame that was suspected to be scarce
in the coverage. The textual unit was not relevant in the sense that the idea behind Iranian
gains from the War in Iraq could be captured in a sentence, paragraph, or within the context
of the entire article. 
The  crucial variable  for  this  study  is  located under  section marked  as  “V”  in  the  coding
scheme  (also  labeled  red  in  the  coding  scheme)-“the  topic  of  the  Iran-Iraq  link.” Under
variable V,  the category we were  looking  for was “focus on  Iran’s  strategic gains due  to
Iraq War.” Stories that would discuss Iranian geostrategic gains from the War in Iraq would
be  labeled  under  this  category.  Also,  an  article  that  under  “topic  of  the  Iran-Iraq  link”
discusses Iranian strategic gains from the War in Iraq would also frame Iran as a “strategic #p#分頁標題#e#
benefactor from the Iraq War”- under variable XI (also marked red in the coding scheme). 
However, one needs to point out that an article that discusses Iranian strategic gains from
the  Iraq War  (under  variable  V-  “topic  of  the  Iran-Iraq  link”)  might  also  discuss  Iran
separately from Iraq at greater length and with greater prominence (for instance within the
first  three  paragraphs),  and  hence  the  prevalent  (dominant)  frame  for  the  whole  article
could be different from “Iran as strategic benefactor of Iraq war.” For instance, there were
numerous  cases  where  an  article  would  discuss  Iranian  geostrategic  gains,  but  only
1 Please refer to the coding scheme sample in the Appendix section
40
tangentially,  and  the dominant  frame of  Iran  for  that  article would  be  “Iran  as  a nuclear
threat.”  
In order  for an article/news  transcript  to actually  frame  Iran as a “geostrategic benefactor
from  the  Iraq War”  the article would need  to define  the problem  in  terms of  these gains
(one  of  the  essential  four  framing  functions)  and  it  would  also  discuss  the  cause  (yet
another of  the  four essential  frame  functions) of  Iranian strategic gains  in  the  light of  the
US  intervention  in  Iraq.  An  article/news  transcript  is  considered  to  frame  Iran  as  a
“strategic benefactor of Iraq war” if it discusses any of the strategic geopolitical gains that
were described  in detail  in  the policy analysis section of  this  thesis. The author sought  to
refrain  from a narrow verbal definition of  the  frame-an  expression of  an  assessment  that
Iran has been geopolitically strengthened by the War in Iraq, or an article that would even
include an implication of such gains was deemed to frame Iran as a geostrategic benefactor
from  the War  in  Iraq.  To  convey  the  frame  of  Iran  as  a  geostrategic  benefactor,  the
article/transcript would  typically define  the problem  (problem definition, PD)  in any way
that conveys  the  idea  that  Iranian gains  from  establishing  a Shia-government,  friendly  to
Iran and/or malleable  to  Iranian  influence  is harmful for US  interests and could present a #p#分頁標題#e#
perilous geopolitical shift in the region, triggered by the very invasion. 
The frame of Iran as geopolitical winner from the War, however, needs to be differentiated
from  the frame of  Iran as “a meddling force  in  Iraq.”2  Iran as a meddling force  in  Iraq  is
typically a White House frame that portrays short-term Iranian benefits from supporting the
insurgency or violence  in  Iraq;  and  from obstructing  the work of  Iraqi government. This
2 Variable XI, category two in the coding scheme
41
frame  is usually used by officials  to  justify  the  lingering presence of  the United States  in
Iraq  (Entman, Livingston  and Kim,  2009). The  “geostrategic  frame,”  on  the  other  hand,
would be expected to go against the White House line because it would imply that the very
invasion  was  a  failure  that  led  to  potentially  unprecedented  regional  turbulence.  The
geostrategic frame would confer the idea that the very establishment of Shiite government
is a potential failure for US policy in and of itself. 
The primary way of  testing  the hypothesis  that  the geostrategic  frame might be scarce  in
the  coverage  is  to  track  its  frequency-which was  captured  in  the quantitative  analysis; as
well as its appearance over time-to test the sustainability aspect of the hypothesis. 
The way to test the second hypothesis and its implications about procedural framing was to
examine  the  frequency and prominence of  the geostrategic  frame relative  to  the  frame of
Iran as a nuclear threat- a frame pervasive in hard news stories and typically procedural in
nature; as well as relative to the frame of Iran as a “meddler in the Iraq War” (category
under  variable  XI  in  the  code  sheet).  Stories  that  focused  on  “Iranian  support  for  the
insurgency” (category under variable V) as well as “Iranian involvement in Iraqi political
affairs” (another category under variable V) would typically frame Iran as a “meddler in the
Iraq War.” Hence, to test this hypothesis we explored if there was a conspicuously greater
frequency  of  the  “meddling  frame”  relative  to  the  geostrategic  frame.  Similar  argument
applies for the comparison in frequency with the nuclear frame. Stories that describe Iran as
a  nuclear  threat  tend  to  focus  on  the  very  process  of  persuading  the  Iranian  regime  to #p#分頁標題#e#
abandon  the  pursuit  of  weapons,  often  focusing  on  motivations  of  individual  political
actors, or the deliberation process within the international community. It is in this sense that
42
stories dealing with  Iranian nuclear  threat  tend  to be procedural as well. Again,  the study
hypothesizes  that  an overwhelming presence of  such  a procedural  framing would detract
from the attention to Iranian geostrategic gains from the Iraq War. 
The  third hypothesis  tested  the assumption  that  the geostrategic  frame was more  likely  to
appear in stories that a) provided ample space for an elaborate discussion of Iran’s role in
the War  in  Iraq;  b)  and were  less  dependent  on  administration’s  sources  for  cues.  The
hypothesis  tests  the  proposition  that  geostrategic  frame  presents  an  instance  of  issueoriented
 or thematic framing, that would tend to examine Iranian tactical efforts in Iraq in
the  light  of  their  strategic  goals;  as well  as  the  proposition  that  in  order  to  convey  the
geostrategic  frame,  reporting would  be  less  reliant  on  administration’s  sources  for  cues.
Stories about Iranian involvement in Iraq that do not question official sources often result
in framing Iran as a “meddling force.” The coding scheme, therefore, divided stories into:
1)  hard  news  stories;  2)  features;  3)  news  analyses;  4)  editorials;  5)  New  York  Times
columnists’ stories; 6) letters to the editor and 7) guest columns. Hard news were defined as
news of an event or process that occurred within the news cycle of the publication-the story
would be anchored to a particular time; features were singled out by their “timeless quality”
in the sense that they could be published a week or a month later without detracting from
the meaning  of  the  article-“they  are  not  anchored  to  precise  time  frame”  and  are  often
defined as “news  that can wait  for another day  ”  (Livingston and Bennett 2003, p. 374);
news  analyses  were  labeled  as  such  by  the  Lexis Nexis  service;  and,  finally,  editorials
would voice the official position of the Times and are unsigned. We also sought to make a
distinction between the guest columns and those written by the New York Times regulars.  #p#分頁標題#e#
43
However, for stories in the NBC sample this type of differentiation could not apply so we
used Lexis-Nexis service  to capture whether each story pertained  to one of  the  following
programs: Today Show, Dateline, Nightly News, Nightline, and Meet the Press (were each
assigned  a  separate  code,  and  all  other  programs were  assigned  a  common  number  and
were coded under “other”). 
The  final hypothesis  that procedural  framing  is more  likely  to occur  in NBC coverage  to
the  detriment  of  the  geostrategic  frame was  also  tested  via  quantitative  content  analysis.
This hypothesis  is  embedded  in  the  idea  that  television  coverage  is  expected  to be more
susceptible to episodic framing; more focused on personalities and dramatic events than the
newspaper coverage. This proposition was operationalized in the following manner: it was
expected  that  under  “Variable V”  –substance  of  the  Iran-Iraq  link- NBC would  have  a
greater  percentage  of  stories  that  are  typically  procedural  in  nature,  such  as  “US
Congressional debate or action in the US regarding Iran and Iraq,” (category five) as well
as the “Discussion in the US Presidential campaign,” (category six) both of which tend to
focus on the very process of deliberation regarding Iranian influence and do not delve into
more  intricate  facts  behind  Iranian  involvement.  Hence,  we  expected  to  find:  i)  fewer
stories with geostrategic frame in the NBC relative to The New York Times coverage; ii)
the frequency of “categories five and six” under “Variable V” were expected to be higher
in the NBC coverage relative to The New York Times. 
Descriptive analysis seeks to add nuance to the quantitative content analysis by providing
more detailed description of the stories encountered during the coding process. The primary
goal of descriptive analysis when hypotheses-testing is concerned is to explain what topics
44
and  frames  pervade  media  environment  regarding  Iranian  involvement  in  Iraq  to  the
detriment of  the  geostrategic  frame. The  study  hypothesizes  that  the  coverage of  Iranian
involvement  in  Iraq  abounds  in  stories  of  Iranian  support  for  insurgency  and  Iranian #p#分頁標題#e#
involvement  in  Iraqi political affairs: both of which do not  convey  the  idea  that  Iran has
made geopolitical gains  from  the US  invasion;  typically  stem  from  the White House and
frame  Iran as “meddling  force”  in  the  Iraq War  (Entman, Livingston  and Kim, 2009).  If
stories  cover  instances  of  Iranian  involvement  in  a  disjointed  manner,  which  does  not
explain  the  complex  nature  of  Iranian  stakes  in  Iraq-then  such  coverage  would  present
another instance of “fragmentation bias,” (Bennett, 2001) as well as “procedural framing,”
(Entman,  2004)  which  does  not  equip  the  public  with  informational  tools  to  keep  the
government accountable, ultimately  leaving  the government without  incentives  to correct
potentially flawed policies. By depicting the nature of individual stories that frame Iran as a
“meddling force” and “nuclear threat,” descriptive analysis seeks to shed additional light on
the  proposition  that  these  stories  exemplify  procedural  framing,  by  failing  to  focus  on
substantive issues behind topics they are discussing. Descriptive analysis also compares the
details  behind  The  New York Times  and NBC  coverage,  exploring  the  proposition  that
network coverage appears to be even more fragmented. 
What follows is a quantitative content analysis that tests the hypothesis about the frequency
and  sustainability  of  geostrategic  framing  in  both  New  York  Times  and  NBC  stories;
quantitative  analysis  is  then  combined  with  a  descriptive,  qualitative  analysis  captured
during  the  coding  process  and  analyzed  in  the  light  of  relevant  political  events  over  the
period of time coded. 
45
Chapter 4: Quantitative and Qualitative Data Analysis
The objective of data analysis of The New York Times was to examine the frequency and
character of articles that discussed the geopolitical implications of the War in Iraq for Iran
and the region.  Has the New York Times informed readers in a sustained manner about the
geopolitical implications of the war?
The sample  included stories  that dealt only with  Iran as well as  the stories  that contained #p#分頁標題#e#
Iran-Iraq link. Out of the entire number of sampled stories only twenty-three percent of the
stories discussed Iran in relation to Iraq. The very fact that such a small portion of stories
discussed Iran in relation to Iraq could be used as evidence that Iraq has not been central to
the coverage of Iran in the period of time included in the coding. Please see Figure 1.
Shares for "Iran and Iraq link"
76.66
17.91
5.43
No mention of Iraq
Passing mention of Iraq
More than passing mention of Iraq
Figure 1. Shows percentage. Total number of stories 12003
The graph in Figure 2 demonstrates the topical distribution of stories that contain Iran-Iraq
link.  Out  of  the  total  number  of  stories  that  discuss  Iran  in  relation  to  Iraq War,  only
slightly  over  13%  discuss  Iranian  geostrategic  gains  due  to  Iraq war. The most  frequent
3 Figure 1.Shows percentage.  Total number of stories 1200.
46
topic  in  overall  stories  (when  we  do  not  discriminate  on  a  yearly  basis),  is  the  Iranian
involvement  in  the  Iraqi  political  process  (30. 26 %),  followed  by  the  topic of  Iran  as  a
supporter for the insurgency (22.51 %).  In reference to this observation it is important to
notice  that  stories  focusing  on  Iranian  involvement  in  Iraqi  political  process  and  Iranian
support  for  insurgency, which  clearly outnumber  those  that discuss  Iranian  “geostrategic
gains  from  the  Iraq War,”  typically  frame  Iran  as  a  “meddler  in  Iraqi  politics.”  This
statistical  observation  speaks  to  the  hypothesis  that  “Iranian meddling”  frame,  typically
promulgated by  the White House,  crowds out  the  frame of  Iran  as  a  geopolitical winner
from the War in Iraq.  Furthermore, stories that focused on “Congressional debate or action
in the US regarding Iran-Iraq link” are also to a great extent procedural in nature since they
focus on the very nature of the debate, rarely on intricacies of issues that are the object of
the debate/action. Descriptive analysis will elaborate on the nature of the stories that were
included  in  these  largely  procedural  frames  that  seem  to  detract  attention  from  the
geostrategic frame.  #p#分頁標題#e#
Share of Strategic frame in Iraq-linked stories
30.26
22.51
19.19
13.28
12.92
1.11
0.74
Involvement in Iraqi political process
Supporting insurgency in Iraq
US Congressional debate/action
Iran's strategic gains due to Iraq war
Other
Iraqi offical's visit to Iran (vise versa)
Discussion in US Presidential
campaign
4Figure 2. Shows percentage for the total number of stories 1200.
4 Figure 2, shows percentage for the total number of stories 1200
47
When all the stories in the sample are taken into consideration-including those that do not
discuss Iran in connection to Iraq, the distribution in Figure 3 shows that the strategic frame
appears in barely over three percent of all the stories. 
Share of Strategic frame in all stories
76.57
3.14
4.58
5.35
6.96
2.97 0.25
0.17
No mention of Iraq
Involvement in Iraqi political process
Supporting insurgency in Iraq
US Congressional debate/action
Iran's strategic gains due to Iraq war
Other
Iraqi offical's visit to Iran (vise versa)
Discussion in US Presidential
campaign
5Figure 3. Shows percentage for the total number of stories 1200.
Perhaps the scarcity of the strategic frame is best reflected when this frame is compared to
the frequency of those instances when Iran was framed as a nuclear threat (please refer to
the  graph  below with  chronological  distribution). The  image  in Figure 4  shows  the  total
number of stories per year that had nuclear threat for their main frame as opposed to those
that had Iranian geostrategic gains for their dominant frame. The numbers here confirm the
assumption of overwhelming prevalence of the nuclear frame that then seems to crowd out
the discussion of  Iranian geostrategic gains  from  the War  in  Iraq. The  stories  that  frame
Iran  as  a  nuclear  threat would  typically  focus  on  the  very  process  of  persuading  Iran  to
abandon  its  nuclear  intentions,  casting  the  issue  in  terms  of  “winning  and  losing”  or
“strategy”  and  focusing  on  the  effectiveness  of  sanctions  aimed  at  containing  Iranian
nuclear  threat. Hence,  arguably  this  type of  coverage  is  another  instance  of  framing  that
48
fails to examine the intricacies of issues at stake, ultimately contributing to the isolation of
policy outcomes from each other and from wider strategic goals (Entman, Livingston and #p#分頁標題#e#
Kim,  2009). Only  on  rare  occasions would  a  story  actually  examine  the  possibility  that
Iranian nuclear build-up might have been facilitated through the US involvement in Iraq. A
more  elaborate  examination  of  stories with  nuclear  frame  and  their  implications  for  the
scarcity  of  the  discussion  about  Iranian  geostrategic  gains  follows  in  the  descriptive
analysis section of the thesis.
0
2.24 2.37 2.04 2 2.52 1.65 0.88
4.44
12.69
27.22
33.33
36
41.18
26.92
24.78
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Strategic benefactor of Iraq War Nuclear threat
6Figure 4. Shows percentages for the total number of stories in the sample 1200. Total number of stories where
nuclear frame is the dominant one for the entire story: 345 stories and geostrategic frame: 37 stories.
Even when the topic of Iran-Iraq link is analyzed on a yearly basis, in no single year does
the  topic  of  Iran  as  geostrategic  benefactor  in  the  Iraq War  become  the  dominant  one.
Please  refer  to  the  graph  in  Figure  5  below.  Iranian  involvement  in  the  Iraqi  political
process  is  the most  common  topic  on  a  yearly  basis,  up  until  the  year  2007, when  the
Iranian support for insurgency becomes conspicuously the most common topic –with more
than  50%  of  all  stories,  as  compared  to  barely  15  %  of  stories  that  discussed  Iranian
5 Figure 3, shows percentage for the total number of stories 1200
6 Figure 4,  shows percentages  for  the  total  number of  stories  in  the  sample 1200. Total  number of  stories
where nuclear frame is the dominant one for the entire story: 345 stories and geostrategic frame: 37 stories 
49
strategic gains from the War for that year. It should be observed here that it was precisely
in  the beginning of 2007  that  the Administration  increasingly mounted  the accusations of
Iranian  involvement  in  Iraqi  insurgency.  Hence,  this  observation  could  also  serve  as  an
indicator of  journalists’ dependence on official  sources, as part of  the  “authority disorder
bias” (Bennett, 2003).  #p#分頁標題#e#
0
14.71
11.29
6.67
14.71
20.51
14.58
10
0
26.47
30.65
17.78
61.76
38.46
16.67
20
0 0
16.13
22.22
5.88
15.38
58.33
50
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Percent of total
Iran's strategic gains due to Iraq war Involvement  in Iraqi political process Supporting insurgency in Iraq
7Figure 5. Shows percentage of stories; total number of stories in the sample: 1200. 
As  hypothesized  in  the methodology  chapter,  the  geostrategic  frame was  expected  to  be
more  frequent  in  story  formats  that would provide more  space  for  thematic  framing  and
less reliance on official sources and White House cues. This was the rationale for including
editorials and columns in the sample as well. As evidenced in the graph below, in almost
half  of  the  cases,  the  geostrategic  frame  appears  in  feature  stories.  The  frame  is  also
common  in columns stemming  from New York Times columnists  (almost 38%). Perhaps
the most pertinent observation from the graph below is that the geostrategic frame did not
appear in one single hard news story coded. Feature stories were expected to provide more
space  for  issue-oriented  discussion-what  Iyengar  would  term  as  “thematic  framing.”
7 Figure 5, shows percentage of stories; total number of stories  in the sample: 1200
50
Feature stories are characterized by “their timeless quality,” which is why they are expected
to have  fewer  instances of  reports  that  are  rooted  in daily  events-in  this  case-  individual
reports of  Iranian support for  insurgency or other  types of meddling  in  Iraqi affairs. New
York Times columnists were particularly apt at conveying the frame, but only in the later
time  period  after  the  invasion. Maureen Dowd  for  instance would  point  out  that  the US
gave  the  country  to  Shiites  that  are  closer  to  Iran  on  quite  a  few  occasions. Hence,  the
nature of the story where the geostrategic frame was more likely to appear proved to have a
tendency  to  be more  independent  from  official  sources-as  exemplified  in  editorials  and
columns. 
Story type vs. Strategic frame
48.57#p#分頁標題#e#
37.14
5.71
2.86 2.86 2.86
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Feature story NYT columnist Editorial News Analysis Letter to editor Outside columnist
Percent
8Figure 6. Shows percentage of stories. Out of the total number of stories with the geostrategic frame-37 stories total.
In  order  to  examine  the  level  of media  dependence  on  official  sources  for  information,
content  analysis  looked  into  the  sources  directly  quoted  in  stories  that  contained  most
common frames of Iran. One of the hypothesized assumptions was that media tend to focus
on tactical outcomes of the War and typically rely to a great extent on government officials
for  cues.  The  underlying  assumption  was  that  the  stories  that  tend  to  focus  on  tactical
8 Figure 8., shows the percentage of stories. Out of the total number of stories with the geostrategic frame-37
stories total
51
outcomes of the War, and were expected to be procedural in nature, would rely to a greater
extent  on  officials  for  cues-providing  straight-forward,  often  neutral  reporting,  without
thematic or issue-oriented discussion. 
The  analysis  is  also  intended  to  provide  a  more  subtle  analysis  of  what  is  termed  as
“official  sources”  –whether  particular  frames  have  been  populated  primarily  by White
House officials, often referred to as “the administration,” or other elites, such as Congress
members, staffers, ex-officials and experts (Entman, 2004). Results are presented in tables
below  and  intended  as  basis  for  inference  about  the  media  capacity  to  generate  an
independent  frame  as  a  counterweight  to  the  administration  line,  having  in  mind  the
amount of opposition  coming  from officials outside of  the White House  and  represented
voices of independent experts. 
Sources speaking about Iran in stories with the nuclear frame (Table 1)
Source 
Percentage of stories with direct quotes that 
contained nuclear frame
(total number of stories for this category: 345;
out of the 1200 stories in total for the sample)
Other administration official  27
International official  19
Bush  12
Other Iranian official  12
Rice  12
Think tank scholar/non-military analyst  4  #p#分頁標題#e#
Congressional Democrat  3
Ahmadinejad  3
Powell  3
Cheney  1
Iranian citizen  1
Other  1
US/Coalition military official  1
Congressional Republican  1
52
Table 1, displayed above, shows the distribution of sources for the most common frame of
Iran-the  nuclear  frame.  As  descriptive  analysis  will  elaborate  further  on,  stories  that
contained  the  nuclear  frame would  typically  focus  on  the  process  of  persuading  Iran  to
abandon its nuclear arsenal. They would rarely examine the more complex proposition that
Iranian standing in nuclear debate might have been empowered by the US war in Iraq. The
distribution of direct quotes from Table 1 seems to bolster this proposition. Administration
officials  constitute  the  majority  of  directly  quoted  sources,  and  their  views  are  usually
complemented  by  those  of  international  officials,  or  counterbalanced with  the  views  of
Iranian officials. Even the views of “other elites” as exemplified in Congress members and
experts are not as prominent as government sources. 
Sources speaking about Iran in stories with the meddling frame (Table 2)
Meddling frame is particularly interesting in this regard as it had been initially described as
a  frame  typically  stemming  from  the White  House-hence  the  administration  frame-that
would place the blame for US challenges in Iraq on Iranian meddling. The Table 2 below
demonstrates that administration officials indeed prevail in this discussion. Their comments
are usually counterbalanced with those of Iranian officials. Other elites, such as Congress
members seem to be left behind in this discussion, as the numbers indicate. 
 
 
 
 
53
Source
Percentage of stories with direct quotes that
contained meddling frame
(total number of stories for this category: 101;
out of the 1200 stories in total for the sample)
Other administration official  19
Rumsfeld  11
Other Iranian official  11
Think tank scholar/non-military analyst  8
Bush  5
US/Coalition military official  5
Iraqi government official  5
Ahmadinejad  5
Iraqi citizen  5
Other Iraqi official  5
Rice  2
Powell  2
Congressional Republican  2
Iraqi cleric  2
International official  2
Iranian citizen  2
 
Stories speaking about Iran in stores with the geostrategic frame (Table 3) #p#分頁標題#e#
Finally,  the  Table  3,  below,  indicates  the  distribution  of  directly  quoted  sources  for  the
geostrategic frame. The list of sources would suggest that apart from President Bush, other
elites- and primarily think-tank scholars and analysts pervade this discussion. The fact that
President Bush appears among the most commonly quoted sources relates to the previous
finding about the story type-many of these stories were opinion pieces where a direct quote
from an official would be counter-balanced with a non governmental source,  or used as a
baseline  for  an  opposing  remark.  The  fact  that  policy  experts  are  often  quoted  in  these
stories is in line with the proposition that stories with geostrategic frame are expected to be
less  reliant  on  government  officials.    Yet,  the  finding  that  even  the  stories  where
geostrategic  frame  appears  also  contain  quotes  from  officials  within  the  administration
54
could  indicate  the  need  for  journalist  to  tie  any  type  of  story  to  official  sources  –  as  an
incentive or trigger for the coverage itself 
Source
Percentage of stories with direct quotes that
contained geostrategic frame 
(total number of stories for this category: 33;
out of the 1200 stories in total for the sample)
Bush  30
Think tank scholar/non-military analyst  20
Rumsfeld  10
Other administration official  10
Iraqi government official  10
Ahmadinejad  10
Other Iranian official  10
 
Quantitative content analysis for the NBC as compared to the New York Times
Out  of  the  entire  sample  of  coded NBC  transcripts,  only  slightly more  than  17%  of  the
stories discussed Iran in the context of the Iraq War. Just like in the case of The New York
Times, the fact that such a small portion of stories examined Iran in the context of Iraq can
be seen as evidence that the media do not perceive Iraq as central to the coverage of Iran.
Please refer to the Figure 7, located below.
 
55
Shares for "Iran and Iraq link"
82.35
15.57
2.08
No mention of Iraq
Passing mention of Iraq
More than passing mention of Iraq
9Figure 7. Shows percentage of stories, for the total number of stories -289. 
 
When we look at the share of stories that discuss Iranian geostrategic gains from the War in #p#分頁標題#e#
Iraq, we can observe that only slightly less than 6 % of the stories discuss this topic out of
all the stories that contain Iran-Iraq link. Just like in the New York Times case, the topic of
“Iranian support  for  the  insurgency,” with more  than 32% of  the stories, and  the  topic of
“Iranian  involvement  in  the  Iraqi  political  process,”  with  20 %  of  the  stories  seem  to
dominate to the detriment of the geostrategic discussion of Iranian gains from the War. Just
like  in  the  case  of  New York  Times,  when  these  two  topics  are  discussed,  Iran would
typically be  framed  as  a  “meddler  in  Iraq War”-  a  frame usually bolstered by  the White
House. Please see the graph below. Such framing is also typically procedural in nature and
hence the conclusion reached for The New York Times sample applies here as well. Still,
the  scarcity  of  the  geostrategic  frame  is  even  more  conspicuous  in  the  case  of  NBC
coverage. Likewise,  the stories  that would focus on Congressional debate or action  in  the
US  regarding  Iranian  involvement  also  outnumber  the  stories  that  discuss  Iranian
9 Figure 7, shows percentage of stories, for the total number of stories -289. 
56
geostrategic benefits and embody examples of procedural framing,  as it will be elaborated
on the descriptive analysis section.  
Share of Strategic frame in Iraq-linked stories
38.18
21.82
18.18
9.09
5.45
5.45 1.82
Supporting insurgency in Iraq
Involvement in Iraqi political process
US Congressional debate/action
Iran's strategic gains due to Iraq war
Discussion in US Presidential campaign
Other
Iraqi offical's visit to Iran (vise versa)
10Figure 8. Out of the total number of 289 news transcripts in the sample.
When the total number of stories is taken into consideration, even those that do not discuss
Iran  in  the  context  of  the  Iraq War,  the  frequency  of  Iranian  strategic  gains  amounts  to
barely  two percent of  the entire number of stories, which again  testifies  to  the scarcity of
geopolitical discussion and relevant framing.  Please refer to the graph below.
Share of Strategic frame in all stories
80.97
4.15
3.46
1.73
0.35
1.041.04
7.27 No mention of Iraq
Supporting insurgency in Iraq#p#分頁標題#e#
Involvement in Iraqi political process
US Congressional debate/action
Iran's strategic gains due to Iraq war
Discussion in US Presidential campaign
Other
Iraqi offical's visit to Iran (vise versa)
11Figure 9. Out of the total number of 289 news transcripts in the sample.
10 Figure 8, out of the total number of 289 news transcripts in the sample
57
 
When  comparing  the  number  of  stories  that  discussed  the  threat  of  nuclear  Iran  as  their
dominant frame, to those whose dominant frame had been Iran as a geostrategic winner, the
difference  in  frequency when observed  chronologically  is  even more  striking  than  in  the
case  of  The  New  York  Times-as  evidenced  in  the  graph  below.  Stories  where  the
geostrategic frame appears as the dominant one for the entire news piece appear only in the
last three years encompassed by coding- a striking difference from what can be said about
the prevalence of the nuclear frame.
0
11.11
13.89
39.29
50
47.06
36.92 37.5
0 0 0 0 0
2.94 3.08 4.17
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Nuclear threat Strategic benefactor of Iraq War
12Figure 10. Out of the total number of 289 news transcripts in the sample.
When we look into sustainability of the geostrategic frame over time and compare it once
again  to “Iranian  support  for  the  insurgency”  and “Iranian  involvement  in  Iraqi politics,”
two topics where Iran is repeatedly framed as a “meddler,” we can observe that in no single
year  does  the  topic  of  Iranian  geostrategic  gains  and  the  frame  of  Iran  as  geostrategic
11 Figure 9, out of the total number of 289 news transcripts in the sample
58
benefactor attain highest frequency. It does, however, assume parity for the year 2008, with
the  Iranian  involvement  in  Iraqi  political  process. However,  one must  point  out  that  in
terms of numbers in the sample, this occurrence amounts to only one story. Unlike in the
case  of  the  New  York  Times,  the  graph  below  displays  the  frequencies  not  only  for
“Iranian  involvement  in  Iraqi  political  process”  and  “Iranian  support  for  insurgency”
relative  to  the  “Iranian  strategic  gains,”  but  it  also  includes  yearly  numbers  for  stories #p#分頁標題#e#
whose  topical  focus was “US Congressional debate or action  in  the US regarding  Iranian
involvement” and “discussion in the US presidential campaign.” Stories coded under these
two  topics would  typically  focus  on  the  very  process  of  deliberation  and  not  on  issues
behind the policy debate and could hence be considered as instances of procedural and not
thematic  framing.  US  Congressional  debate  or  action  in  the  US  regarding  Iranian
involvement  in  Iraq  is  the most  frequent  topic  for  the  years  2003  and  2006;  stories  that
discuss “Iranian involvement in Iraq as part of the Presidential campaign” as their primary
topic are the most frequent ones for the year 2004. In New York Times coverage this was
never the case, which is why these two topics were not included in The New York Times
graph  presented  above,  but  were  presented  for  NBC  in  the  graph  below-  to  prove  the
greater degree of prevalence of procedural framing. 
12 Figure 10, out of the total number of 289 news transcripts in the sample.
59
0
27.27
0
66.67
63.16
0 0
18.18
57.14
0
21.05
0 0 0 0
10.53
50
36.36
44.44
5.26
42.86
11.11
22.22
16.67
50
22.22
16.67
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Percent of total
Supporting insurgency in Iraq Involvement in Iraqi political process
Iran's strategic gains due to Iraq war US Congressional debate/action
Discussion in US Presidential campaign Iraqi offical's visit to Iran (vise versa)
Figure 11. Shows percentage for the total number of stories 1200.
Finally, sources speaking about Iran were considered as well, as displayed in Table 4 below
for the nuclear frame. Much like in the case of the New York Times, the most commonly
quoted sources come from the White House, with a greater prominence of counterbalance
from Congressional elites than in the case of the New York Times. 
Nuclear frame: Table 4
Source 
Percentage of stories that contained a direct
quote from respective source when story
contained nuclear frame
(total number of stories for this category: 104;
out of the 289 stories in total for the sample) 
Bush  18
Congressional Democrat  18
Congressional Republican  18
Think tank scholar/non-military expert  18 #p#分頁標題#e#
Rice  9
Other administration official  9
Cheney  4.5
International official  4.5
 
The case of meddling frame, as displayed in Table 5, again shows a prevalence in sources
coming  from  the  administration,  followed by Congressional  elites. More  than half of  the
60
directly  quoted  sources  stem  directly  from  the  administration, which  should  confirm  the
proposition  that  these  sources  tend  to  promulgate  this  particular  frame,  which  seems  to
crowd out a sustained discussion of the geostrategic implications of the Iraq War. 
Meddling frame: Table 5
Source
Percentage of stories that contained a direct
quote from respective source when story
contained meddling frame
(total number of stories for this category: 33;
out of the 289 stories in total for the sample)33
Bush  33
Rice  11
Rumsfeld  11
Other administration official  11
Congressional Democrat  11
Congressional Republican  11
Think tank scholar/non-military expert  11
In  case  of  geostrategic  frame,  however,  as  shown  in  Table  6  below,  prevalent  directly
quoted  sources were  think-tank  scholars  and  non-military  experts, which  again  suggests
that such discussion would be independent from the official sources. 
Geostrategic frame: Table 6
Source  Percentage of stories that contained a direct
quote from respective source when story
contained geostrategic frame
(total number of stories for this category: 25;
out of the 289 stories in total for the sample)
Think Tank Scholar/non-military expert  40
Rice  20
Congressional Republican  20
Former military analyst   20
 
 
61
Descriptive Data Analysis 
What  follows  is  a  descriptive  analysis  of  The  New  York  Times  and  NBC  coverage,
intended  to provide additional nuance  to  the quantitative results. This descriptive analysis
seeks  to describe  the  findings  related  to hypotheses  testing  in more detail by  scrutinizing
the nature of the coverage already outlined in the quantitative analysis chapter. Descriptive
analysis particularly focuses on explaining the type of framing, categorized throughout this
study  as  “procedural”  or  “episodic”  and  explain  in  what  ways  the  domination  of  such #p#分頁標題#e#
coverage  acts  to  the  detriment  of  substantive  or  issue-oriented  framing.  The  primary
purpose of the analysis that follows is to explain how such coverage isolates news stories
from  one  another  and  from  the  larger  context,  thus  neglecting  to  convey  the  long-term,
strategic outcomes of the War in Iraq. One of the propositions of this thesis is that Iranian
geostrategic  gains  exemplify precisely  these more profoundly  negative news  that  are not
rooted  in  daily  events  and  are  often  outnumbered  by  news  reports  of  tactical  success  or
failures,  typically  triggered by daily acts of violence.   The  lack of geostrategic  frame and
abundance of “meddling  frame,” where  Iran  is  typically used by  the administration as an
excuse  for  the prolongation of US  involvement  in  Iraq, would also  indicate  the  reporters’
continuous dependence on official sources. Descriptive analysis hence seeks  to provide a
more  exhaustive way  of  detailing  the  premise  that  the  coverage  is  rarely  issue-based  or
thematic  in  nature  and  is  often  dependent  on  official  sources  for  cues,  when  Iranian
involvement in Iraq is concerned. 
The New York Times 
62
A common theme that exemplifies a lack of in-depth, issue-oriented coverage is the failure
to  define  Iranian  geopolitical  gains  from  the War  in  Iraq  as  problematic,  along with  an
explanation of causal attribution to the problem.  Instead, articles would often treat Iranian
gains as a normal and non-problematic occurrence. For  instance, an article would quote
foreign  minister  in,  at  the  time,  President  Khatami’s  government  who,  in  answer  to
accusations  that  Iran  is  sending money  to Moktada  al-Sadr  and other Shiite parties,  said
that Iran did not need to resort to such actions, since it already “wielded influence in Iran.” 
Such article would not attempt  to explain  in what way  Iran already exerts  influence over
Iraq and what might have led to such state of affairs. Instead of sounding an alarm bell for
this  potentially  dangerous  development,  the  article  treats  this  piece  of  information  as  a #p#分頁標題#e#
natural occurrence. It does not verbally indicate in any way that Iran has benefited from the
very  fact  that  the United States  is  involved  in  Iraq, nor does  it  explain  the nature of  the
Iranian  influence on  the  Iraqi government and  its  long-term benefits. Such articles would
typically  fail  to  point  out  apparent  contradiction  behind  the  purported  Iranian
simultaneous support for various Shiite factions that stand in opposition to each other. As a
matter  of  fact,  the  articles  would  often  not  even  specify  the  Shiite  parties  in  question. 
Numerous  stories  that  simply  report  individual  instances  of  apparently  contradictory
Iranian interference in Iraqi politics, without providing a broader context and explanation,
contribute to generation of disjointed, fragmented coverage referred to as one of the biases
in US media coverage  (Bennett, 2001).   One of  the properties behind “episodic”  framing
that was  referred  to  earlier,  is  that  it  tends  to  be  “non-interpretative,” which  is what  the
stories of this type exemplify. (Iyengar, 1994, p. 32)
63
Another  common  occurrence  is  the  instance  where  an  article  would  mention  Iranian
geopolitical gains only briefly and  then go on  to discuss another  topic at  length-typically
that  of  nuclear  Iran-thus  framing  Iran  primarily  as  a  nuclear  threat.  In  such  cases,  the
dominant  frame  of  Iran  for  the  whole  article  is  considered  to  be  nuclear  threat.  This
observation  relates  to  the  “salience”  aspect  of  framing.  Even  when  the  geopolitical
discussion  is  present  in  the  coverage,  other  topics  that  are  given more  space  or  greater
prominence overshadow its salience. Numerous articles dating back to 2004, for example,
would report fears that President Bush’s focus on Iraq is neglecting Iran as a nuclear threat.
This was  the  case even with  the  stories dating back  to  the beginning months of  the War
(March and April 2003), which focused on fears that Iran might be a more immediate threat
than Iraq because of its nuclear arsenal. Such stories, however, would not observe how Iran #p#分頁標題#e#
might gain geopolitically from prospective toppling of Saddam Hussein’s government. The
focus on nuclear Iran becomes even more prevalent in the later months of 2003 when the
International Atomic Agency became particularly vested in the issue, threatening with UN
sanctions.  In such cases,  the very driver behind  the story with  the  topic of “nuclear  Iran”
would be a round of negotiations, an international summit, or other type of event whereby
the  story would  focus on  the  very process of negotiations and  Iranian  regime’s motives,
and  not  on  background  information  or  more  complex  implications  of  a  certain  policy.
Hence, the coverage of nuclear Iran proved to be episodic in this respect. 
Framing Iran as a “contained threat”13 when geopolitical implications of the Iraq War were
discussed was another common observation  in  the articles dating back  to 2003.  Iran was
sometimes discussed as a potential ally  for  the US  in  the War  in  Iraq. A  telling example
64
would be an article from an outside columnist, suggesting that US should consider working
with  Iran as an ally  that could help with  Iraqi Shia.   Another opinion piece  from a guest
columnist, pointed out  that  the US kept Saddam Hussein  in place  for  the  fear of  Iranian
Shiite influence; however, the piece assessed that this policy had been flawed and went on
to  frame  Iran  as  a  contained  threat. Hence,  even  though  the geostrategic  discussion was
observed occasionally at this earlier time –the frame of Iran as a potential strategic winner
from the War was typically missing. The following example illustrates an article that would
also  frame  Iran as a potentially contained  threat: “Iraq  is envisioned as a  springboard  for
eliminating  the  Baath  party  in  Syria,  undermining  the  mullahs  in  Iran  and  enhancing
American  power  across  the  region.”  Furthermore,  the  articles  from  the  earlier  period
encompassed by coding -2001 and 2002- also tend to cite Iranian support for US efforts in
toppling  the  Taliban  in Afghanistan,  thus  suggesting  that  Iran might  be  a  new  force  for
stability in the region. 
A typical example of a story that would bring up Iranian geopolitical gains from the War
but would  give  greater  prominence  to  the  nuclear  issue, would  be  the  following  feature #p#分頁標題#e#
story that quoted Ms. Yaphe, referred to in the policy chapter of this thesis, who testified in
front of Congress about Iranian geopolitical gains from the War in Iraq. Apart from giving
greater  prominence  to  the  nuclear  issue,  the  article  did  not  attempt  to  examine  Iranian
nuclear ambitions in the light of growing Iranian influence in Iraq and how it might provide
greater  leverage  to  Iran  during  nuclear  negotiations-  as  several  reports  reviewed  in  the
policy  chapter  of  this  thesis  indicated.14  Ms.  Yaphe’s  testimony  before  Congress  also
13 Category under variable xi in the code sheet
14 For a sample of a rare article that actually discusses such gains, please refer to Appendix, Part I, excerpt: i)
65
outlined how newly established and thriving Iranian financial and trade relations with Iraq
present a strategic gain  from  the War  in  Iraq. Numerous articles examined  in  the content
analysis would report these newly established connections; yet the articles would not frame
these  connections  as  problematic,  nor would  they  attribute  the  cause  behind  this  newly
developed  situation  to  the  US  invasion.  For  instance,  an  article  would  report  that  Iraqi
airline  is  flying  again  and  that most of  the users were  Iranians, on  their way  to visit  the
Holy Shrines; or  the  fact  that  Iranian  goods  are  flooding  the  Iraqi market. Such  articles,
however, would mention these ideas as side-facts, without bothering to analyze their causes
and  implications.  It  is  in  this  respect  that  “episodic”  or  “non-interpretative”  reporting
contributes to further fragmentation of the coverage: by not defining separate instances of
Iranian gains as problematic; and by  failing  to piece  those  individual  instances  together
into a frame that would convey how Iran might have gained geopolitically from the war.
Failure  to  provide  a  clear  definition  of  Iranian  influence  and  an  explanation  behind  its
origin is best exemplified in articles that would repeatedly use the term “Iran-backed Shiite
parties”  almost  as  a  linguistic  collocation  –without  ever  framing  the  fact  that  parties  are #p#分頁標題#e#
“Iran-backed”   as potentially problematic. An unexamined repetition of this verbal phrase
could potentially create a sub-context that implies that Shiite parties in Iraq are by default
“Iran- backed”-  and  that  this  is  a normal  state of  affairs. Furthermore, numerous  articles
would mention Iran as the natural basis for the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI); yet
they  would  typically  fail  to  draw  any  conclusions  or  imply  any  connection  for  Iranian
stakes  in  the  Iraqi political process,  let alone go  into examining  the  relationship between
Prime  Minister  Maliki  and  ISCI.  On  numerous  occasions,  Moqtada  al-Sadr  would  be
described as the enemy, not ISCI, because his army was contributing to US casualties at the
66
given time. Such an article would sometimes even acknowledge that ISCI might not be an
ideal ally for the US, but would point out that it is much better than “volatile thug Sadr.”
Hence, the focus of the article would not be on Iran’s stake at supporting either of the two,
but  on whether  or  not  Iran  is  a  defacto  financial  backer  of  Sadr.  Such  an  article would
typically fail to provide a discussion of what backing of either of the two means for Iranian
influence  in  the  region or geostrategic gains  from  the war.15 Therefore,  the  article would
focus on Iranian support for insurgency, defining the problem behind Iranian involvement
in terms of US casualties and growing violence; not in terms of Iranian stakes in supporting
a  particular  Shiite  faction.  Numerous  articles  from  2003  and  2004  would  also  merely
mention  that  Iran  is  financially  supporting  the  insurgency  or  that  fighters  are  coming  in
from  Iran-without  placing  the  discussion  in  a  broader  context  and  trying  to  explain  the
nature of  the  Iranian  involvement. Articles  that discuss  Iranian  support  for violence  also
often do not portray  the  Iranian  influence  as problematic, but merely  state  it as  a neutral
fact by mentioning that certain bloodshed is committed by the “Iranian-trained militia”-the
Badr  brigades. Equally  rare were  the  articles  that  question  the  administration  line  about
Iranian meddling, much used to accuse Iran and spur support for US government policies.16  #p#分頁標題#e#
NBC Stories 
Perhaps  the most  important observation when comparing The New York Times coverage
to that of NBC  is the greater percentage of NBC stories that focus on the very process of
decision making in the United States when Iraq and Iran are concerned. The stories whose
15 For examples of such articles, please refer to Appendix , Part II (in this case excerpt:  i)
16 Please refer to the Appendix, Part II for excerpts that exemplify such reporting 
67
focus  of  Iran-Iraq  link17  is  “Congressional  debate  or  action  in  the  United  States”  or
“discussion of Iran and Iraq in the light of US presidential campaign,” which are typically
episodic in nature, are more prevalent in NBC than in The New York Times coverage. This
proposition was  confirmed  in  the  quantitative  content  analysis.  Descriptive  analysis  that
follows  seeks  to  provide  a  more  detailed  explanation  as  to  why  such  coverage  is
fragmented  (Bennett, 2001) and why  it  further disjoints “war policy outcomes  from each
other” and from “strategic goals,” thus further undermining public accountability (Entman,
Livingston, Kim 2009).   TV news  is also expected  to contain a greater number of stories
driven by visuals,  typically event-driven and more episodic  in nature,  than  the newspaper
coverage. These  propositions were  part  of  the  fourth  hypothesis  and descriptive  analysis
primarily seeks to shed further light on comparison between the two media. TV coverage
was  also  expected  to  be  focused  on  personalities-with  significant  implications  for
attributions of responsibility, as reviewed in the literature review chapter (Iyengar, 1994). 
Dependence on only one source for information and scarcity of issue-oriented and balanced
discussion was a common occurrence in the surveyed news stories. A typical story would
interview  an  official,  for  instance,  US  Ambassador Mr.  Zalmay  Khalilzad,  who  would
report that “some of the clerics who were opposed to Saddam Hussein were based in Iranso
 there is Iranian influence there is no question about that.” Yet, the news story would not
seek to explain the nature of this influence or raise questions about the Iraqi government’s
ties to Iran. What seems to be even more revealing of the episodic nature of the story is the
way  the  question  to,  in  this  case, Mr.  Khalilzad  was  phrased:  “Are  the  Shiite  clerical #p#分頁標題#e#
leaders  closer  to  Iran  or  to  the  United  States?”  the  anchor  asked.  The  focus  of  this
17 Variable V
68
question seems to be on the process of “winning and losing,” assuming the format of “who
is  in  charge”  and  “will  the  order  be  restored”-typical  of  media  bias  described  earlier-
without examining broader implications of Iranian involvement and what might have led to
the Iranian influence in the first place. Moreover, a typical story that would fail to provide
counterweight  to  the administration  line when discussing  Iran  in  the  light of geostrategic
outcomes would quote  an  administration official without  examining  the veracity or  facts
behind the quote. For example, one of the stories quoted the former Secretary of State Rice
saying  that  “the  notion  that  somehow  Iraq,  under  Prime  Minister  Maliki  and  his
government  is  something  akin  to  Iran  is  just  not  right.  I mean,  it’s  just  erroneous.” The
story fails to examine the viability of the quote any further. 
Framing  Iran  as  a  contained  threat  whose  regime  might  be  toppled  as  a  result  of  US
invasion of Iraq was a common topic prior to and at the beginning of the invasion in NBC
coverage as well. Here we could evidence an example of  inter-media agenda-setting. For
instance, NBC programs picked up from The New York Times the column from Thomas
Friedman  that  discussed  geopolitical  outcomes  of  the war  in  Iraq  in  a  positive  light  –in
terms of potential domino effect of toppling the regime in Iraq. This program only parroted
the words of Thomas Friedman. In fact, this geostrategic discourse that predicted positive
effects on  Iran  from  the  Iraq  invasion appeared on  several occasions  in  the coded  stories
right before and in the early stages of the War. When these early stories from 2003 discuss
Iranian influence, they would typically define the problem in theocratic terms -as a threat of
introducing  Iranian-style  theocracy  in  Iraq.  Such  stories would  heavily  focus  on  Iranian
revolution  in  1979,  and  on  iconic  personalities.  Typical  example  is  a  reference  to
Khomeini, in a very visual manner, harkening back to his accusations of the United States, #p#分頁標題#e#
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or drawing on very visual elements of the story-for instance, by saying that his photos are
for sale in Najaf “like posters of a rock star.” 
Stories pertaining to the 2004 period of time prior to the US elections would typically focus
on the discussion in the context of the US presidential campaign, and were more procedural
in nature-reporting which candidate  said what  about  Iran  and  Iraq-without examining  the
background information to what the candidates were saying. These stories would typically
discuss which of  the  two countries should  the US be according more attention  to:  Iran or
Iraq,  thus missing out on a substantive discussion of  the nature of  Iranian  involvement  in
Iraq.
Stories  reporting  Iranian  support  for  violence  in  Iraq  tend  to  focus  on  the  fact  that  the
weapons used as the support for insurgency were actually purchased in Iran. Yet, much like
the stories in The New York Times that simply referred to “Iran-backed parties,” some of
these  stories would merely mention  that  the weapons were  purchased  in  Iran  and  imply
Iranian  involvement,  without  even  defining  that  as  a  problem  or  making  further
investigations  as  to  why  this  might  be  the  case.  A  typical  story  that  frames  Iran  as  a
meddler would also simply cite President George W. Bush saying that “Iran is fueling the
insurgency in Iraq and that violence has entered a new phase but has not amounted to civil
war. Such a story would potentially go on to question the frame of “why we do not call it
[violence] a civil war,” but would  fail  to discuss  the nature and  the consequences behind
Iranian involvement. Such stories are typically episodic in the sense that they are triggered
by  daily  instances  of  violence  and would miss  out  on  issue-oriented  discussion. Perhaps
70
these stories could best be characterized in the following manner: who is winning in Iraq,
the United States or “Iran the meddler”?
Even when the elements of the geostrategic discourse appear in the news, they would give
voice to one prominent public figure, such as a US Congress representative, to express his
own  view  of  the  issue.  Such  stories would  also  typically  focus  on  personalities. For  the
stories  prior  to  Ahmadinejad’s  election,  this  was  predominantly  the  Supreme  leader #p#分頁標題#e#
Khamenei. The following story quotes a republican congressman from Florida who frames
Iranian support for insurgency as the problem, and blames it all on Khamenei in particular:
“I  think  Iran  is  a  major  player.  Ayatollah  Khamenei,  not  the  Iranian  people,  because
they’re not the problem. Ayatollah Khamenei is the problem.” Interestingly enough, such a
story  would  again  just  give  voice  to  this  representative  without  even  providing
counterbalance  by  quoting  someone  else with  an  opposing  view. Most  importantly,  the
news story did not provide any implication that Iranian influence might be the consequence
of US government invasion of Iraq. The blame is shifted solely on Iran-and it is arguably
quite a simplified blame-attached to one personality. The implications of such coverage for
attribution of responsibility could be inferred here from Iyengar’s writings discussed earlier
in this study (Iyengar, 1994). 
Other stories that imply an increase in Iranian influence in the region in connection to the
War in Iraq would also cast the debate in “who is in charge” format. These stories would
typically  pin  the  observation  of  growing  Iranian  influence  to  one  or  two  Congress
members,  White  House  officials  or  occasional  experts,  without  going  into  detailed
explanations  that would  shed  additional  light  on  their  statements.  Even  the  very  quotes
71
illustrate visually-oriented and dramatic nature of the coverage. For instance, the following
news piece quoted Senator Lieberman: “asking Iran and Syria to help in Iraq is about like
your local fire department asking a couple of arsonists to put out the fire.” This news piece
then provides a  statement  from Richard Perle who  said  that  if Bush  tried  to  seek  Iranian
assistance  and  cooperation  in  Iraq  it  would  be  seen  “as  an  indication  of  American
weakness.”  This  quote  also  reveals  little  about  the  issue  in  question,  but  focuses  on  the
“who is in charge” aspect of the issue.
Furthermore, quite often  the discussion  in such news pieces does not proceed  to examine
policy precursors that led to US regional weakness and rising Iranian influence. Instead, the
discussion of  Iran proceeds,  in  a very  typical manner,  to  focus on  Iranian nuclear  issue, #p#分頁標題#e#
and even emphasizes the fact that when analyzing problems with Iran, Iraq should not act
as  a  distracting  factor. This  type  of  reporting  presents  evidence  of  procedural  (Entman,
2004), or episodic (Livingston, 2007)  coverage  that contributes to further fragmentation of
news  environment  (Bennett,  2001)  by  failing  to  provide  a  comprehensive,  systematic
insight into the nature of the Iranian problem. Instead of looking into how different aspects
of the Iranian issue and increasing influence in the region relate to each other and to US
polices that might have contributed to such state of affairs, the coverage reports one issue
separately from the other.
Stories  that  frame  Iran  as  a  “meddler  in  Iraq War” would  typically  interview  an official
who  would  use  Iranian meddling  as  an  excuse  for  staying  in  Iraq.  The  following  story
quotes  a military  official who  cast  the  debate  about  Iranian  influence  into  “winning  and
losing”  script:  “Well,  we're  in  a  power  struggle  with  the  Iranians  over  who’s  going  to
72
exercise  influence  in  the  future  Iraq and  they want  to be  that power.”  In  terms of policyprescription
 or the remedy aspect of the frame, this news piece, indicative of the rest of the
coverage, emphasizes that the administration cannot afford to leave the country because of
Iranians. The story never seemed to even imply that the invasion of Iraq might have opened
the door to such state of affairs. On the contrary, Iranian influence was used to bolster the
administration’s remedy aspect of the frame. Even when the discourse, on occasions, goes
against the administration line, it questions the administration’s policies on the grounds of
not  having  the  adequate  military  policy  response,  and  not  on  the  basis  of  geostrategic
argument.18 
In  2007,  such  framing  of  “Iran  the  meddler”  pervades  the  stories  that  still  rely  on
administration officials for telling the whole story. Reporting focuses on the details of US
action regarding Iranian insurgency and hence exemplify procedural framing. The primary
problem is framed in terms of the fact that Iranian bombs are creating American casualties
and not the fact that this empowerment is an aspect of growing Iranian strength that might #p#分頁標題#e#
have  resulted  from  the US policy  in  the  first place.19 Furthermore, unlike The New York
Times, NBC abounds in news stories that, when discussing the insurgency, usually tie the
issue to Al Quds Force, in an equally episodic manner, focusing on the question of which
personality in the Iranian regime is directly involved in the provision of this support.  Such
stories  would  typically  focus  on  speculations  of  President,  Mahmud  Ahmadinejad’s
personal  involvement.    The  primary  concern  behind  covering  Iranian  support  for
insurgency  would  be  the  responsibility  for  killing American  soldiers.20  Therefore, what
18 Please refer to Appendix under “NBC Stories” for more examples 
19 Please refer to the Appendix section, NBC stories, example iii) 
20 Please refer to Appendix section, NBC stories, example iv) 
73
seems to be an overwhelming focus on reports triggered by daily violence, typically driven
by  concern  for  American  casualties,  seems  to  place  the  issue-orientated,  thematic
discussion  of  geopolitical  aspects  of  the  war  in  a  shadow.  Even  when  an  augmenting
Iranian  influence  is  acknowledged,  responsibility  is  rarely  attributed  to  US  government
policies,  but  cast  in  terms  of  “nefarious  Iranian meddling.”  Hence  the  cause  behind  the
problems tends to be attributed to individual, visible actors within the Iranian regime, and
not the US invasion. 
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Chapter 5: Concluding Remarks and Discussion
This  study  hypothesized  that  the mainstream media  in  the  United  States  underreported
Iranian  geopolitical  gains  from  the War  in  Iraq. With  slightly more  than 3% of  the  total
number of New York Times stories that framed Iran as a geopolitical winner from the Iraq
War, and less than 2% of the total number of examined NBC stories that contained such a
frame, the quantitative content analysis apparently supports the central premise. As a matter
of  fact,  the  very  low  number  of  stories  that  discuss  Iran  in  relation  to  Iraq War  can  be
considered  as  an  indicator  that  Iraq  is  not  perceived  as  central  to  the  coverage  of  Iran.
Those  stories  that  do  discuss  Iran  in  connection  to  Iraq War  typically  focus  on  Iranian #p#分頁標題#e#
support  for  insurgency or  interference  into  Iraqi political affairs. Such  stories would  then
frame  Iran as a “meddler  in  Iraq War”-a frame often supported by  the administration and
used as an excuse for a prolonged US presence in Iraq. Reporting in such instances tends to
be episodic in nature (Iyengar, 1994) - by focusing on the very process of Iranian supply of
weapons  or  financial  support  for  various  groups  in  Iraq  and  without  an  issue-oriented
discussion that would examine Iranian stakes behind the support for each of these groups.  
 
An  analysis  of  sources most  often  quoted  in  case  of  this  frame  for  both The New York
Times  and NBC  coverage  confirms  that  administration  officials  pervade  this  discussion,
promulgating  the  frame  whose  frequency  crowds  out  the  geopolitical  debate.  When
meddling  frame  is  concerned,  another pertinent  observation  regarding most often quoted
sources  is  the  rarity  of  appearance  of  the  “other  elites”  such  as  think  tank  scholars  and
experts outside of  the government, relative  to sources within  the administration. Even  the
75
Congressional  elites  are  quoted  less  frequently,  especially  in  the  case  of The New York
Times. Administration  officials  are  also  prevalent  in  the  case  of  nuclear  frame-the most
frequent frame in Iranian coverage, although in the case of NBC, Congressional elites tend
to balance out the discussion to a considerable degree. Nonetheless, most common sources
in both frames support the proposition that the frames that appear most frequently are those
that  can  be  traced  back  to  primarily  administration  officials  and Congressional  officials,
which could indicate that media reflect the discussion present in the official circles.  In the
case of geostrategic frame, on the other hand, most often quoted sources are precisely elites
outside  of  the  government-primarily  think-tank  experts  and  policy  analysts.  Even
Congressional  members  rarely  appear  as  directly  quoted  sources  when  this  frame  is
concerned. These observations are arguably relevant for the discussion on media capacity
to  develop  an  independent  counter  frame  in  circumstances  where  elites  outside  of  the #p#分頁標題#e#
administration failed to raise a strong voice of opposition. Such circumstances suggest that
media  failed  to  report  important  geopolitical  developments  because  of  the  lack  of
sufficiently relevant sources among “other elites,” which in turn left the public uninformed
about  this  issue.  Since  there was  no  incentive  for  the media  to  report  on  this  issue,  the
geopolitical message failed to cascade to the public, hence leaving Congressional officials
without  signal  from  both  public  opinion  and  the media  that  they  should  promulgate  the
geopolitical  discourse  on  Iran  more  forcefully.  Another  possible  explanation  for  the
reluctance  of  both  media  and  officials  outside  of  the  government  to  promote  the
geopolitical  discussion  on  Iran  could  reside  in  the  notion  of  cultural  congruence.
Conveying the idea that the United States has kept the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein in
power for years prior to his deposition in March 2003, is an idea that is not congruent with
76
the  self-image of both  journalists  and  the public  in  the United States. Hence,  such  frame
was not likely to be accepted by relevant parties in the media system in the first place.  The
relevance of  this situation resides  in  the fact  that  it bolsters  the proposition  that  the “very
paucity of media images may reduce pressure on officials to consider changing problematic
policy,”  (Entman,  Livingston  and  Kim,  2009,  p.  701)  Coupled  with  the  fact  that  the
coverage  focuses  on  violence  and  other  tactical  outcomes  of  the  War  that  are  more
convenient  for  journalists  in  the  light  of mounting  commercial  pressures,  the  public  is
arguably  deprived  of  crucial  information  necessary  for  holding  the  government
accountable. Iran-supported Iraqi Shiite faction that causes the largest number of American
casualties or violence at any given time is the one that typically garners media attention; a
more complex discussion about multiple levels of Iranian support of Shiite factions is also
rarely examined or  lost amidst  the prominence of  reports of military deaths and violence.
This  type  of  coverage  contributes  to  the  neglect  of  long-term,  strategic  outcomes  of  the #p#分頁標題#e#
War:  instead of being used as a case for demonstrating  the strategic policy failure behind
US government’s decision to invade Iraq, Iranian influence is repeatedly used as an excuse
for the lingering US presence in the country. 
 
Coverage  that  predominantly  frames  Iran  as  a”meddling  force”  without  conveying
geopolitical outcomes of the Iraq War, and relies on official sources for information should
also  demonstrate  the  presence  of  “authority-disorder”  bias  in media  coverage  (Bennett,
2001).  Furthermore,  even  when  Iranian  support  for  different  Shiite  factions  seems
contradictory, as exemplified in the reports of simultaneous backing of Nouri al-Maliki and
Moqtada al-Sadr for instance, the news media would fail to point that out, reporting these
77
individual  instances  of  support  in  a  disjointed  manner  and  thus  contributing  to  further
fragmentation  bias  in  media  coverage  (Ibid).  Stories  that  managed  to  capture  the
geopolitical discourse were those that were expected to provide ample space for an issueoriented
  discussion  not  triggered  by  daily  events,  and  typically  exemplified  via  thematic
framing. The fact that not a single hard news story reported Iranian geostrategic gains from
War in Iraq, and that more than half of the stories that did report the geopolitical gains were
features,  “characterized by  their  timeless quality”  (Livingston  and Bennett, 2003)  should
confirm  this  hypothesis  as  well.  The  frame  was  also  expected  to  appear  in  story  types
typically  less  dependent  on  official  sources-such  as  editorials  and  columns.  This
proposition was also confirmed through quantitative content analysis and should act as an
indicator that lack of geostrategic frame presents an instance of media tendency to default
to official sources, especially when the ambiguity of the topic is considerable, which could
be  argued  for  the  case  of  Iranian  influence  in  Iraq. Whereas  stories would  occasionally
examine  Iranian  gains  in  Iraq  in  terms  of  growing  Shiite  influence  in  the  country,  they
would  rarely  point  out  Iranian  geostrategic  empowerment  from  the  growing  Shiite #p#分頁標題#e#
influence  in  the  region. Occasional  reports  of  Iranian  support  for  Hezbollah were  never
examined  in  the  light  of  Shiite  empowerment  in  Iraq  and  growing  Shiite  unrest  in  the
region, as examined  in  the policy section of  this study. The relevance of Shiites of Saudi
Arabia, Bahrain, or Lebanon are hardly ever discussed  in  the  light of  the  Iranian  regional
gains  and  US  involvement  in  Iraq.  Hence  Iranian  geostrategic  gains  were  lost  in  the
fragmented  coverage,  overly  reliant  on  debate  pushed  on  the  agenda  by  administration
officials, and occasionally counterbalanced by Congressional members. 
 
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The content analysis has also demonstrated that the news media often seem to fail to even
define Iranian influence in Iraq as problematic, as the coverage abounds in episodic-in the
sense  of  “non-interpretative”  (Iyengar,  1994)  reports  of  growing  Iranian  influence  that
neither  defines  the  problem,  nor  conveys  a  cause,  moral  judgment  and  hence  policy
treatment  thereof.  Thus,  substantive  framing  is  conspicuously  scarce  in  the  coverage,
giving way to procedural framing that typically focuses on attributing responsibility for US
predicaments  in  Iraq  to what  could  be  described  as  “nefarious  Iranian  influence,”  often
pinned  to visible personalities within  the  Iranian  regime, such as  the President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, the Supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei, or to the loosely defined notion of
“Iranian  regime.” We  could  then  infer  consequences  of  such  episodic  coverage  for  the
attribution of responsibility effect on public opinion (Iyengar, 1994).  We could also infer
the negative  influence of  such  framing of  Iranian  involvement  in  Iraq on  public opinion
from  the  proposition  that  procedural  framing  often  fails  to  equip  the  public  with  tools
necessary  to become  involved  in political deliberation as  it depresses  their motivation for
political engagement (Entman, 2004, p. 6).
 
The study also showed a prevalent focus on Iranian nuclear threat, which is the frame that #p#分頁標題#e#
appears most  frequently  in  the  coverage  of  Iran.  Since  this  frame  is  given  considerably
greater  salience  than  any  other,  as  shown  in  the  results  from  the  quantitative  analysis,  a
sustained  discussion  about  Iranian  geopolitical  gains  from  Iraq  War  is  arguably
overshadowed by seeing Iran primarily as a nuclear threat. Other two germane observations
can be attached to the examination of the coverage of Iranian nuclear influence. Firstly, just
like the frame of “Iranian meddling,” the frame of nuclear Iran is to a great extent episodic
79
in nature-focusing on the very process of placing pressure on Iran, usually on behalf of the
international community; and secondly, stories rarely connect the two issues by examining
how Iranian position on the nuclear issue might have been bolstered by the establishment
of  an  Iran-friendly  Shiite  government  in  Iraq,  as  suggested  in  the  policy  review  of  the
thesis. The coverage hence fails to even raise the possibility that Iranian gains from the War
in Iraq might further empower Iran geopolitically. Such coverage again exemplifies failure
to  analyze  issues  in  relation  to  one  other,  thus  contributing  to  a  fragmented  coverage  of
Iran. 
Researchers  point  out  that  a  “coherent,  resonant  frame,  that  emphasized  policy  failure
would have potential significance for accountability” (Entman, Livingston and Kim, 2009
p.  701).  The  analysis  of  sources  suggests  that  lack  of  voices  who  would  raise  the
geopolitical  issue  both  from  the  government  and  Congressional  elites,  precluded  this
discussion from the coverage. Such situation, coupled with the proposition that geopolitical
frame  is  incongruent  for  the  US  journalists  and  the  public,  might  have  reduced  the
incentive to pursue this debate further; and hence the scarcity of geopolitical frame would
exemplify  a  failure  to  develop  a  sustainable  independent  counter  frame.    Important
implication  from  this  conclusion  stems  from  the  fact  that  it  leads  to  the  situation where
potentially  poorly  conceived  policies  do  not  receive  public  scrutiny  and  a  neglect  of #p#分頁標題#e#
strategic  outcomes  of  the  War  helps  frame  government  policies  as  success,  thus
incapacitating  the  public  to  scrutinize  the  government  and  ultimately  diminishing  the
incentives for the government to consider altering its course of action. Yet, one must point
to  the  limitations of basing  the  study  solely on  the  content  analysis. This  thesis does not
introduce a way  to  test  the effects of  the missing geostrategic  frame on public opinion  in
80
the  United  States.  Nor  does  this  study  conduct  an  experiment  or  a  survey  that  would
examine the effects of hitherto described media framing of Iranian influence. Inquiries that
would  explore  the  effects  of media  framing  described  in  this  thesis  would  constitute  a
recommendation for future research. 
 
 
 
81
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http://www.aei.org/paper/27526 
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90
_in_irans_backyard/    
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2009Retrieved: 
 
92#p#分頁標題#e#
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Appendices 
(Emphases  in  italics  is  added  by  the  author  to  highlight  the most  relevant  parts  of  the
stories)
i) The following is an excerpt from an article that contains Iranian geostrategic gains
from the War in Iraq examined in the light of the nuclear build up (an extremely rare
occurrence of an article that would tie the nuclear issue to Iranian geopolitical gains
from the Iraq War and place the two issues together in a broader context instead of
examining them as two separate and even disparate topics. 
(The New York Times -year 2006):
“[….]  Iran’s  mullahs  aren't  feeling  much  pain  from  the  Americans  next  door.  In  fact,
officials at all levels of government here say they see the American presence as a source of
strength for themselves as they face the Bush administration. In almost every conversation
about Iran's nuclear showdown with the United States and Europe, they cite the Iraq war
as a  factor  Iran  can play  to  its own advantage.    “America  is  extremely vulnerable  right
now,” said Akbar Alami, a member of the Iran's Parliament often critical of the government
but on  this point hewing  to  the government  line.  ''If  the U.S.  takes any unwise action''  to
punish  Iran  for  pursuing  its  nuclear  program,  he  said,  ''certainly  the  U.S.  and  other
countries will  share  the  harm.''  […]  In  addition,  the  Iranians  have  longstanding  ties  to
influential  Shiite  religious  leaders  in  Iraq,  and  at  least  one  recently  promised  that  his
militia would make  real  trouble  for  the Americans  if  they moved militarily against  Iran.  #p#分頁標題#e#
94
All  of  those  calculations  have  reduced  Iranian  fears  of  going  ahead  with  their  nuclear
program -a prospect that frightens not just the United States, Europe and Israel, but many
of the Sunni Muslim-dominated nations in the region, including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and
Egypt.”
ii) (The New York Times-year 2006):
“Yet  this  is all going on not  in  Iraq, but here  in  the  religious capital of  Iran. As  the Bush
administration  seeks  simultaneously  to  stabilize  Iraq,  in  part  by  empowering  its  Shiite
majority, and contain Iran, it must carefully navigate the complex relationship between the
countries.  It  is not  just  Iran's  influence  in  Iraq  that  the United States must  confront, but
Iraq's connection  to  Iran, as well. While Ayatollah Sistani  is viewed  suspiciously by  the
leadership  of  Iran  -  he  opposes  clerics'  involvement  in  politics  -his  relations  with  the
Iranian people have deepened and spread since the American occupation of Iraq. Divisions
that once stood between  the Shiites of  Iraq and  Iran, animosity  fed by  the eight-year war
between the countries, have become less relevant as Iraq's Shiites re-establish their identity
after decades of oppression under Saddam Hussein.”
iii) The New York Times, year 2006
“Iran's power is also newly apparent in Iraq, where the government is led by Shiites with
close  ties  to  Iran's  religious  hierarchy. On Wednesday,  Prime Minister Nuri Kamal  al-
Maliki  forcefully denounced  Israel's bombing  campaign  in Lebanon, a position deeply at
odds with  the Americans whose  invasion allowed  the Shiites  to gain power. One of  Iraq's
most powerful leaders, the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr, has gone farther, hinting that he
95
might  actively  support  his  Shiite  brethren  in  Hezbollah.  Iran's  influence  has  economic
ramifications,  too.  ''If  Iran emerges as a more powerful state,  it will make other states  in
the region, and external powers like Russia and China, more willing to cooperate with Iran
on energy despite U.S. objections,'' said Flynt Leverett, a former director of Middle Eastern
affairs at the National Security Council and a former C.I.A. analyst.”
iv)  Exemplifies  those  articles  that  contain  the  geopolitical  discussion  and  cite  an #p#分頁標題#e#
expert or refer to a book on the subject- a common occurrence when the geostrategic
frame  eventually  appears-hence  confirming  the  expectation  that  in  order  to  convey
geostrategic  frame  the article would  typically attain a degree of  independence  from
official sources. The following is an example from an opinion piece:
“First, we break Iraq and hand it over to the Shiites, putting in a puppet who leans toward
Iran  and  is  aligned with  the  Shiite militias  bankrolled  by  Iran. Then,  as  Peter Galbraith
writes  in The New York Review of Books, President Bush  facilitates  ''the  takeover of  a
large part of  the country by an  Iranian-backed militia,'' with  the  ironic  twist  that  ''there  is
now substantially more personal freedom in Iran than in Southern Iraq.  ''Reagan was able
to help the Soviet Union -- and world communism -- to fall apart. All W. has managed to
do is destroy the country he wanted to turn into a democracy and make Iran more powerful
than it was before.  In a sad testimony to how bollixed up things are in Iraq, Prime Minister
Nuri Kamal  al-Maliki  told  the Council  on  Foreign Relations Monday  that  civil war  has
been averted in Iraq -- not! -- and that Iranian intervention has ''ceased to exist.'' Gen. David
Petraeus recently said that Iran was providing ''lethal'' support to Iraqi militias.”
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v) The following excerpt from an article from 2007 is a rare example of an article that
would notice and point out the contradictory nature behind US support for the Iraqi
government: 
“Iran certainly is helping arm and train Shiite militias. But the administration is certainly
exaggerating the salutary effect of any cutoff as long as these militias enjoy the protection
of Iraq’s Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki. If Mr. Bush is genuinely worried –and he
should be-he needs to be as forceful in demanding that Mr. Maliki cut ties to these groups
and clear about consequences if he refuses.”1 
vi) Consider  the  following  letter  to  the editor as an example of a response  to a New
York Times  editorial  that  accused  Iran  of meddling  in  the  Iraqi  affairs-and  hence
essentially agreed with the administration’s accusations of Iran. It was written by the
press  secretary  of  the  Mission  of  Iran  to  the  United  Nations  in  February  2007.
Relevant question  to be entertained here  is: what  is  the position of  the Times  then-by #p#分頁標題#e#
choosing  to  raise  this  issue  in  a  letter  to  the  editor?  Is  it  a  statement  against  the
administration’s accusations of meddling? Can it be seen as an attempt of the New York
Times to point out that Iran is gaining geostrategically in peaceful ways? How come that
this letter to the editor failed to spur an increased amount of more elaborate reporting on
this topic?
To the Editor:
  Re ''Bullying Iran'' (editorial, Feb. 1):
97
“The United  States  has  now  resorted  to  the  soft  power  of  disinformation  about  Iran  by
leveling false charges regarding Iran's behavior toward Iraq. While Iran has fully supported
the  new  government  in  Iraq  and  has  signed  various  trade  and  energy  agreements with
Baghdad,  the  United  States  government  continues  to  demonize  Iran  and  blame  it  for
America's own failures.  Contrary to your assertion that Iran is sowing chaos in Iraq, Iran is
concerned about  the growing chaos and  the unwanted consequences of spill-over conflict
and  masses  of  refugees.  Iran  favors  a  strong,  unified  Iraq  whose  sovereignty  is  not
constantly  trampled  upon  by  the  intrusive  Western  powers.  To  this  effect,  Iran  has
responded favorably  to  Iraq's call for a  regional forum  to discuss  the country's dangerous
crisis.”
M. A. Mohammadi Press Secretary, Mission of Iran to the United Nations, New York, Feb.
1, 2007
Part II 
Excerpts from The New York Times stories that frame Iran as a “meddler in Iraq War”
What follows are excerpts from stories  that frame Iran as a meddling force  in Iraq:
(articles that typically report the administration’s accusations of Iran as a supporter
for insurgency or any type of violence in Iraq). They would typically simply reiterate
the administration line, used as a justification for lingering US efforts in Iraq. Articles
that report on Iranian attempts to obstruct the work of Iraqi government also tend to
frame Iran as a “meddler.” 
1 (article 973)
98
i) The New York Times, year 2007
The following article is an apt example of episodic coverage that casts any discussion
of Iranian  involvement  in Iraq  in  terms of American deaths and procedures behind
military  operations.  A  discussion  that  would  discuss  the  nature  of  Iranian #p#分頁標題#e#
involvement is typically missing. 
The  group  was  also  ''known  for  facilitating  the  transport  of  weapons  and  explosively
formed penetrators, or E.F.P.'s, from Iran to Iraq, as well as bringing militants from Iraq to
Iran for terrorist training,'' the military said in the statement. The Bush administration has
criticized  Iran's  government  for  failing  to  shut  off  the  flow  of E.F.P.'s  into  Iraq,  though
officials  have  conceded  that  they  have  no  conclusive  intelligence  that  senior  officials  in
Tehran are behind the smuggling. The penetrators use explosives to fire a molten slug that
is able to penetrate even the strongest armor plating, and they are responsible for dozens of
American  and  Iraqi  military  deaths  every  month,  according  to  military  officials.
Ambassador  Ryan  C.  Crocker,  in  remarks  to  reporters  on  Thursday,  underscored  the
American concern about  smuggling of  the devices  from  Iran.  Iran's  ''support  for militias,
their  involvement  in  the development  and  transfer of  E.F.P.'s  that are  killing our  forces,
these are not good  things,'' said Mr. Crocker, who  is scheduled  to hold  talks with  Iranian
officials next Saturday in Baghdad.
ii)  Excerpt  from  a  typical  article  reporting  the  administration’s  justifications  for
staying in Iraq on the basis of growing fear of Iranian influence:
99
“Mr.  Bush  has  previously  warned  Iran  about  its  involvement  in  Iraq  and  its  nuclear
programs, but his remarks on Tuesday were especially forceful, and suggested that he was
blending the justification for staying in Iraq with fears held by members of both parties in
Congress that Iran could emerge as a threat.”
iii) The  following article would present an  epitome of  such  reporting:  repeating  the
administration  line  without  examining  it:    Please  note  the  article  does  include  a
comment clearly added by the journalist that Maliki is “an Iraqi Shiite who was in exile
in  Iran  while  Saddam  Hussein  led  Iraq.”  However,  the  article  does  not  proceed  to
discuss this point further.
“Mr. Bush questioned  Iranian reports  that Mr. Maliki had  thanked Mr. Ahmadinejad  for #p#分頁標題#e#
Iran's  ''positive  and  constructive''  role  in  Iraq  and  said  he  awaited Mr. Maliki's  report.
''Now if  the  signal  is  that  Iran  is  constructive,''  the president  said,  ''I will have  to have  a
heart  to  heart  with  my  friend  the  prime  minister,  because  I  don't  believe  they  are
constructive.' United States military officials  said  this week  that attacks on American-led
forces using a lethal roadside bomb said to be supplied by Iran set a record last month. Mr.
Bush said he was confident that Mr. Maliki, an Iraqi Shiite who was in exile in Iran while
Saddam Hussein led Iraq, shared his view that Iran has had a destabilizing role in Iraq.
iv) The  following  article  is particularly  interesting because  it provides  an  elaborate
explanation  for  reports  of  Iranian  influence  from  the  mouth  of  a  politician  who
supports Maliki. The article exemplifies a case of straight-forward reporting that does
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not proceed to examine the facts behind the quotes even when it provides an elaborate
discussion about the nature of Iranian influence-a rare instance of such reporting. 
“Iran generally supports many groups simultaneously, including some Sunni ones, so that it
can benefit from any eventuality, said Sami al-Askari, a Shiite member of Parliament who
works closely with Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki.  ''Iran intervenes in many ways,
with many methods,'' Mr. Askari  said.    In  the case of  the Mahdi Army, he  said,  Iran has
recognized  its  diffuse  nature,  sprinkling  support  at  high  and  low  levels.  Some  support
comes  through  ties  to Hezbollah,  the Shiite militia  in Lebanon  that  also  receives  Iranian
support. Beirut now has a Sadr office, and Mahdi commanders say they have been sending
fighters to Hezbollah at least since last summer, when Hezbollah battled  Israel.   Iran also
provides institutional assistance to Iraq, mainly to the Health Ministry, which is run by Mr.
Sadr's political bloc. Three days after bombs killed more than 140 people in Sadr City last
fall, for example, 50 Iraqi ambulances carried some of the wounded to the Iranian border.
They were transferred to Iranian ambulances and taken to Iranian hospitals, with much of
the cost covered by organizations in Iran. 
Sample NBC stories 
i) Excerpt from a story that focuses on personalities, frames Iran as a meddling force #p#分頁標題#e#
and does not examine Iranian increasing influence as an outcome of US policy:
(Quoting a Congressional Republican who had visited Iraq): “In fact, as we talked with the
Iraqi  officials  and  we  met  with  the  speaker  of  the  parliament,  the  prime  minister,  the
defense minister,  the  two  generals  in  charge  of  the  Iraqi military,  the  chairman  of  the
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constitutional writing authority, we heard a common theme, that Syria may have the largest
number from outside of Iraqi country, but Iran overwhelmingly has the quality behind the
insurgency. And we've got to come to grips with that. And what's startling to me is that at
one  of  our  briefings  at  the  classified  level  in  Iraq  reinforced  that  when  one  of  our
commanding officers  looked  to  Iran on  a map  and  said,  "It's  a black hole. We  just don't
have  the  intelligence  that we  need  about  Iran's  involvement." That,  to me,  is  absolutely
outrageous. I've been raising this issue for the past two years. I think Iran is a major player.
Ayatollah Khamenei, not  the  Iranian people, because  they’re not  the problem. Ayatollah
Khamenei's the problem. […]”
ii) Story that relies solely on administration official who uses Iranian influence in Iraq
as the rationale for endorsing the Surge policy 
Secretary Rice:  “Well, what we're  prepared  to  do  is  to  complete  the  security  gains  that
we've  been making,  to  create  circumstances  in which  an  Iraqi  government  and  the  local
officials can find political accommodation, as they are doing in Anbar, and to be able then
from Iraq, with allies in the war on terror, to resist both terrorism and Iranian aggression” 
iii)    A  sample  story  that  exemplifies  numerous  cases  where  reports  of  Iranian
involvement  in  Iraq  are  reduced  to  descriptions  of  operational  procedure  behind
potential US military response
[Military official]:  “The US  is going  to be  throwing  an  awful  lot of muscle  at  Iran. The
Navy is going to be sending a second aircraft carrier, the Stennis, into the Persian Gulf. The
Army will soon have two Patriot anti-missile batteries in both Kuwait and Qatar. And the
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Navy's going  to be conducting military  exercises with  friendly nations  in  the gulf. Now, #p#分頁標題#e#
this  is  all  part  of  a  new  strategy  that  the  administration  is  calling  its  anti-Iran  strategy,
designed to keep the heat on Iran and reassure US allies in the gulf that the US intends to
keep Iran in a box.”
iv)  Excerpt  from  a  story  that  exemplifies  numerous  instances  of  episodic  framing
where  any  discussion  of  Iranian  influence  is  reduced  solely  to  discussion  of
responsibility behind deaths of American soldiers.
Anchor:  Iran  claims  they're  diplomats.  The  US  says  they're  members  of  Iran's
Revolutionary  Guard  responsible  for  killing  American  soldiers.  The  new  aggressive
military  strategy  is aimed at  stopping  the  flow of  sophisticated  IEDs  from  Iran  into  Iraq.
Now  those  roadside  bombs  are  the  number-one  killers  of  Americans  in  the  war.  And
despite all that, US military officials insist there are still no active plans to launch military
strikes inside Iran.”
留學生dissertation網提供美國華盛頓大學媒體學留學生畢業dissertation定制Coding Scheme for the New York Times and NBC
I  Story date
Enter as follows:
1a (for page 1), 10a, 3b etc
II Headline
Blank= Iran not mentioned in headline
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1=Iran mentioned in headline
III Lead
Blank=Iran not mentioned in first three paragraphs
1=Iran mentioned in first three paragraphs
IV Iran-Iraq link 
Blank= no mention of Iraq
1= passing mention of Iraq (e.g. only present in one or two sentences and not in the first
few paragraphs)
2= More than passing reference to Iraq
V Substance of the Iran-Iraq link
1= focus on Iran supplying weapons or otherwise supporting the Iraqi insurgency/Al
Qaeda in Iraq/ etc
2=focus on Iran’s involvement in Iraqi political process
3= Focus on Iraqi officials’ visit to Iran (vise versa) or meetings with Iraqi officials
outside of Iraq
4= Focus is on Iran’s strategic gains from the Iraq war 
5= Congressional debate or action in the US about Iran
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6= Discussion of Iran in the context of US Presidential campaign
7=other
VI Subtheme (enter 1 for any of the above topics)
VII Non-Iraq related discussion of Iran
For a story that discusses Iran more than superficially, it is primarily interested in  #p#分頁標題#e#
1= Iranian nuclear ambitions/threat
2=Iranian official’s speech or international appearance
3= domestic political situation in Iran (including protests)
4= Iranian sponsorship of international terrorism
5= Everyday life in Iran
6= Iranian arts and culture
7= Iranian influence in the region
8=Congressional debate or action in the US about Iran
9= Discussion of Iran in the context of the US Presidential campaign
10=Other
105
VIII  Subtheme: For any of the above topics (1-10 above) enter 1 if discussed in the
story, leave blank if not.
IX Whether Ahmadinejad was mentioned:
Blank- not mentioned
1= named but not quoted
2= named and quoted
X Other Iranian official named:
Blank: no
1=yes (please name in comments)
XI Frame of Iran:
0=no clear frame of Iran
1= Regional threat
2= Meddling in Iraq War
3=Nuclear Threat
4= Threat to US home front
5= Strategic Benefactor of Iraq War
106
6=Theocracy
7=Contained Threat
8=Other (please specify)
XII Sources: who is speaking about Iran?
1-Bush
2=Cheney
3=Rice
4=Powell
5=Rumsfeld
6=Gates
7=Other Administration Official
8=US Military Officer/Coalition military officer
9=Congressional democrat
10= Congressional republican
11= Think tank scholar/other non-military expert analyst
12= Former military analyst
107
13= Iraqi government official
14 =Iraqi cleric
15=International official (not including coalition military official)
16= Ahmadinejad
17=other Iranian official
18=Iranian citizen
19=Iraqi citizen
20- Other Iraqi official
21= other
XIII Substance of each quote:
1= Iran is supplying weapons/otherwise supporting Iraqi insurgents
2=Iran is meddling in Iraqi pol. Affairs
3=Iran is a regional threat
4=Iran is a nuclear threat
5= Iran is benefiting from us war in Iraq
6=Iran is not as much of a threat as many claim
108
7=comment on Ahmadinejad
8=Iran supports terrorism
9=the us should engage Iran diplomatically
10=the us should take an aggressive militaristic approach to Iran
11=other