國際貿(mào)易談判
 

在國際貿(mào)易中完成新一輪的成功談判的主要障礙是什么，（多哈發(fā)展部回應(yīng)）他們怎樣能從發(fā)展中國家的最佳角度解決？
 

目前世界貿(mào)易回合談判已經(jīng)于2001年十一月在卡塔爾的首都多哈正式啟動，經(jīng)過了大量的炒作與宣傳，它被稱為“發(fā)展回合”的談判。推出后不到兩個月，九月十一日開始了滿懷希望的全面會談。這一事件事實上的發(fā)生本身就是一種成就?？紤]到一九九九年在西雅圖舉辦的會談的崩潰，反全球化的抗議和暴亂分子在城市中被瓦解。
 

多哈的議程是雄心勃勃的，目的不僅針對切除農(nóng)業(yè)和高度受保護(hù)的服務(wù)業(yè)中的某些障礙，而且它也開始將投資和競爭政策領(lǐng)域納入全球化的范圍。它主要（最重要的意義）集中在扶貧，富國承諾對貧困國家嚴(yán)重依賴生存的行業(yè)像農(nóng)業(yè)和紡織業(yè)等領(lǐng)域開放市場。
 

International Trade Negotiations

 

"What are the main obstacles to a successful completion of the current round of negotiations on international trade (the Doha Development Round) and how could they best be resolved from the perspective of developing countries?" 

 

The current W.T.O trade round was launched, November 2001 in Doha Qatar. Amid much hype and fanfare, it was hailed as a "development round" of negotiations. Launched less than two months after the September 11th attacks the talks began with high hopes all round. The mere fact the talk took place at all was an achievement in itself, considering the debacle that was the 1999 talks in Seattle which collapsed amid anti-globalisation protests and rioters being tear gassed on the cities street's. 

 

Doha's agenda has been ambitious; aiming to not only cut certain barriers in agriculture as well as the highly protected services sector. It also set out to write new globalisation policies in areas such as investment and competition. Its main (and most significant) focus though was to help the poor. The rich promised to open their markets in area like farming and textiles to poor countries so heavily dependent on these sectors. They also promised to help not just with cash and debt cancellation but also with technical assistance. 

 

An analysis by the World Bank, published in its Global Economic Prospects on September 3rd 2003, predicted that the ambitious aims of the Doha round to reduce trade tariffs and barriers could boost global income by between $290 billion and $520 billion a year. Well over 50% of these gains would go to some of the world's poorest countries. By 2015, the World Bank predicts that a successful Doha round could lift 144 million people out of poverty. #p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

 

Unfortunately, despite these potential gains, governments in both rich and poor countries have gone back on promises and commitments made to the Doha agenda. The E.U in particular, well known for its heavy subsidisation of farming has gone back on numerous commitments it made towards freer farm trade. America also, with George Bush's raising of cotton and other farm subsidies have acted in a manner contradictory to the radical proposals they put forward at the outset of the Doha round. 

 

問題是什么-What is the problem? 

 

From the start many poor countries have been defensive. Instead of negotiating they are still prickly about what they regard as their unfair treatment at the Uruguay round of talks concluded in 1994. They focused on the American proposed idea of "Special and differential treatment for poorer nations" and seem to interpret it as; the rich should make more of an effort to help us than we should try to resolve the issues ourselves. 

 

This resulted in something of a stalemate, which caused the talks to stall. In farm trade, the area so crucial to the developing world, countries such as Australia and Argentina who want to tear down barriers (something that would suit developing nations) and the great farm subsidisers such as Japan and the E.U who want to minimise change reached something of an impasse. To the point where negotiators could not even reach a consensus on how to conduct their talks process. 

 

This resulted in a paralysis over the entire spread of the talks, as many of the poorer nations were reluctant to make concessions in other areas until the agricultural issues were resolved. Agreeing measures to cut industrial tariffs also stalled and were put off until the subsequent round of talks in Cancun, Mexico. 

 

Agriculture is at the crux of the issue with regard to the development of poorer nations. Reason being farm protectionism in both the developed and under developed worlds is a scandal. Over three quarters of the world's poor live in rural areas naturally dependent on agriculture. Yet the rich world spends over $300 billion per annum supporting its farmers. This constitutes an amount six times what they spend on foreign aid. Average agricultural tariffs in rich countries are many times higher than those on manufactured goods and services. On individual commodities, barriers or tariffs are often much higher. Japan for instance, puts tariffs of up to 1000% on rice. 

 

This amount of support and protection for domestic agriculture distorts prices and blocks market access for poor countries so dependent on agricultural exports. Cotton is a classic example of this imbalance. The U.S is the world's biggest exporter of cotton even though its production costs are higher than those of West African producers such as Burkina Faso. America has around 25,000 cotton producers who receive about $4 billion of government subsidies; in return they produce about $3 billion worth of cotton. This subsidisation pushes down world cotton prices, hugely affecting West Africa's 11 million or so cotton farmers. #p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

 

However on the other side of the coin (and often overlooked) is the fact that poor countries themselves engage in protectionism. These countries are too poor to afford subsidies so instead enforce tariff rates on imports that are often higher than similar tariffs in the developed world. While the reduction in wealthy countries subsidies would help create a fairer commodity price on world markets The World Bank reckons that 80% of the benefits reaped by developing nations from agricultural reforms would come from reductions in the huge tariffs and an increase in trade between these poorer nations. 

 

Another problem for the developing world is reducing tariffs imposed by industrialised countries on industrial goods. In this area too the focus of Doha has been on the rich to cut its barriers to the exports of poorer countries. While overall the developed world's barriers on manufactured goods are generally low, they are high in certain areas. On average the tariffs applied by rich countries on the types of goods produced by poorer countries (textiles and clothing) are four or five times higher than the tariffs imposed on goods imported from other rich countries. A recent study conducted by Oxfam points out that the tax rate the U.S applies to imports from Bangladesh is 14% while a comparative rate for France is 1%. Oxfam and others have rightly pointed out that if Doha is to succeed this issue must be addressed. 

 

However once again the biggest potential gains for the developing world would be to cut tariffs between developing nations. Over the last ten years, trade flows between poor countries have risen twice as fast as overall global trade, reason being many poor countries have been cutting tariffs. Trade between developing nations now makes up 11% of all global trade and is rising still. 

 

Nonetheless, tariffs between poor nations are still much higher than those between rich and poor nations. The maximum barrier allowed under W.T.O rules is often higher still (see graph). In the U.S, the average tariff on industrial goods is 4%. In Brazil by contrast the average tariff allowed is 30% and in India 40%! Though the actual tariffs applied are 14% and 30% respectively, this must be addressed. 

 

Problem is most poor nations are reluctant to expose their domestic industries to further international competition. India is the most extreme example with its tariff levels outlined above and deeply opposes any agreement, which would reduce these levels. China who has just cut its tariff levels to join the W.T.O is also deeply opposed to any further cuts. A further problem is that huge agricultural nations such as Brazil are reluctant to even contemplate industrial tariff changes until something is done about agricultural trade. 

 

應(yīng)該怎么做-What to do? 

 

Though the round of negotiations in Cancun were something of a failure, last July in Geneva a breakthrough was made. Trade ministers compiled a seven-page "framework for establishing modalities in agriculture". An agreement to scrap export subsidies, cut trade-distorting subsidisation and reduce tariffs, all the aims set out at Doha back in 2001. The difference this time is that this agreement gives a proper framework to eliminate these problems. The E.U for the first has agreed the help eliminate its export subsidies, and the U.S has promised to review its export credits programme. Poorer nations also, have agreed to play their part and been given an extended time frame over which to reduce their tariffs and barriers. 

 

For Doha to succeed this mercantilist mindset of tariffs and barriers has to change. The above framework goes some way towards doing this. However seeing it fully implemented may be an entirely different issue, rhetoric and talk are cheap. Although there is no formal date for concluding the negotiations, 2006 is the widely agreed deadline. Though the developed world must take a leading role in reducing tariffs and giving the exporters of developing nations a fairer chance so as to increase global wealth and income. Laying the blame for the current impasses must not be levelled squarely at them. The round of negotiations in Geneva when countries who came under the G20 (China, India and South Africa et al.) and those under the G90 (Rwanda, Bangladesh et al.) played a more active part in negotiations, and stopped (as at Doha and Seattle) moaning about how they had been hard done by, showed what can be done. 

 

Breaking the current impasse will require committed political leadership and that may be in short supply this year. The U.S, the W.T.O's most important participant is becoming more and more distracted by their own foreign and domestic policies. President Bush has not prioritised world trade by any stretch since his re-election last November. Another distraction for his administration is the formulation of C.A.F.T.A, which the president has signed, but congress not yet ratified. A further blow is the expected departure of Mr. Robert Zoellick, president Bush's chief trade negotiator who played such a central role in all meetings of the Doha round. 

 

Finally, another danger to Doha comes from within the W.T.O itself. Supachai Panitchpakdi's (the Thai national who is the organisations current head) term of office ends in August. Four candidates have been nominated to replace him. A replacement must be decided on by the world's trade minister's by May 31st. Previous races have been highly contested affairs, often leading to both political wrangling and espionage. As far as Doha is concerned, it is imperative that this does not affect it and that a leader strong enough to implement the necessary changes is put in place as soon as possible. Otherwise the disasters such as Darfur we see everyday on our television will continue to happen. #p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

 

Bibliography: 

 

1. International Economics: Krugman and Obstfeld, Addison Wesley: 6th edition. 

 

2. Europe on the Road to Doha: J. Peter Neary, CESifo Economic Studies, Vol. 50, 319-332 

 

3. The Doha Squabble: Economist Newspapers, Mar 27th 2003 

 

4. Now Harvest It: Economist Newspapers, Aug 5th 2004 

 

5. Delivering on Doha's promise: Economist Newspapers, Jan 6th 2005 

 

6. Ministerial Declaration: World Trade Organisation, Adopted on 14 Nov, 2001