研究伊朗革命

 

1979年2月巴列維被推翻→1979年12月霍梅尼成為伊朗的最高領(lǐng)袖→1980年薩達(dá)姆襲擊伊朗→1980年9月- 1988年阿拉伯國(guó)家進(jìn)入戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)沖突的意識(shí)形態(tài)。

 

以上的時(shí)間線(xiàn)作為一個(gè)基本結(jié)構(gòu)，以時(shí)間順序排列事件，塑造了我們現(xiàn)代阿拉伯世界的聯(lián)盟。本文將重點(diǎn)放在伊朗革命期間，特別是在1980伊朗伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)期間。這將對(duì)媒體進(jìn)行分析，通過(guò)仔細(xì)觀(guān)察在海灣地區(qū)兩國(guó)在不同的政治體制下的差異。

 

阿拉伯媒體在這段時(shí)間內(nèi)跟我們現(xiàn)有了解的有些不同。它在網(wǎng)點(diǎn)和內(nèi)容上面經(jīng)歷了一個(gè)嚴(yán)重的增長(zhǎng)。 今天我們看到的各種民營(yíng)報(bào)紙公開(kāi)反對(duì)自己國(guó)家的政權(quán)，如Al基法阿拉比黎巴嫩報(bào)紙。 然而，在幾年后，大多數(shù)媒體都將是國(guó)有化的。即使不屬于國(guó)家所有,個(gè)人私有財(cái)產(chǎn)也不會(huì)反對(duì)。周而復(fù)始,獨(dú)家消息與他們的利益有著密切相關(guān)聯(lián)系。由于國(guó)家規(guī)定的限制，反對(duì)黨在其境內(nèi)施加影響面臨挑戰(zhàn)。

 

Post-Islamic革命時(shí)代:

 

1979年阿拉伯地區(qū)政治動(dòng)蕩,尤其是墨西哥灣。 伊朗世俗政權(quán)的國(guó)王穆罕默德•禮薩•巴列維剛剛被取代，史'ism的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)傾向于更伊斯蘭。 對(duì)于海灣地區(qū)，這是一個(gè)危險(xiǎn)的威脅，什葉派滲透到他們遜尼派統(tǒng)治的國(guó)家。本文提出了一個(gè)案例研究，在海灣不同的政治制度對(duì)媒體的影響，反過(guò)來(lái)說(shuō)，媒體提供給海灣觀(guān)眾的產(chǎn)品。 

 

A Study On Iranian Revolution Media Essay

 

February 1979 Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi is overthrown → December 1979 Ruhollah Khomeini becomes Supreme Leader of Iran → September 1980 Saddam attacks Iran → 1980 - 1988 The Arab states enter a war of clashing ideologies.

 

The timeline above serves as a basic structure to the chronological sequence of events that shaped the alliances of our modern day Arab world. This paper will focus on the time period of the post Iranian Revolution, specifically during the 1980 Iran-Iraq war. It will present an analysis of the media by taking a closer look at two states in the Gulf, each with a different political regime.

 

Arab Media during the time frame above was one very much different than what we have today. It has experienced a serious growth in its outlets and their content. Today we see various privately owned newspapers openly opposing their country's regime such as the Al-Kifah Al-Arabi Lebanese newspaper. Going back a few decades, however, most of the media was state-owned. What wasn't owned by the state was, moreover, private property of individuals that did not oppose the state. Circulation of news was, therefore, exclusive to states and coinciding with their interests. Opposition groups faced a challenge in exerting influence within their borders because of the restrictions imposed by the state.

 

Post-Islamic革命時(shí)代-Post-Islamic Revolution Era

 

1979 marked a period of political unrest in the Arab region, especially the Gulf. Iran had just replaced the secular regime of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi with a more Islamic-oriented leadership leaning toward Shi'ism. For the Gulf, this presented a perilous threat of Shiite infiltration into their Sunni-ruled states. This paper presents a case study of two different political systems in the Gulf, their effect on the media and in turn, the product the media delivers to its audience in the Gulf. 

 

In particular, the media in Saudi and Kuwait will be looked at on a more analytical level. Both of these countries are located in the Gulf; yet, they represent two different ways in dealing with a similar problem; Kuwait with its democratic media and privately owned newspapers vs. the state-operated media of Saudi Arabia. It aims to show how even democratic regimes can impose censorship when they feel that national security is in jeopardy and Kuwait is such an example. These two countries, although far from being an exact representation of the Arab Media, give a general impression of how countries may change both their domestic and foreign policy in times of crisis. The Arab media, hence, becomes a market place of different ideas and ideologies waiting to be sold to the consuming Muslim and Arab public.

 

From the Iranian Revolution was born an ideology that contested with the pan-Arab flag which Iraq “sought to uphold after Egypt's fall from grace.”[1] This ideology aimed for a purely Islamic state to emerge as a leader and thus aimed to export this Islamic Revolution to other Arab countries. “Iran's claims to leadership of the world's oppressed Muslims put it at odds with Iraq”[2] and the rest of the Arab world causing shifts of alliances and critical changes in foreign policy. The Revolution was at first able to move the Arab masses through appealing to their religious pride and frustration with the Arab governments. Arab states, however, were unpleased with this turn of events. Hence, they embarked on an internal war with their own people whose public opinion was generally pro the Islamic Revolution. The Arab world saw that the dominance of the radical Shiite movement in Iran posed a threat to their own regimes. According to Maryam Panah's Global Dimensions of the Iranian Revolution, “It is the drive of revolutionary regimes to export revolution and change the configuration of the international system that threatens the vital interests of those who wield social and political power.” [3] The social and political power in the Gulf belongs to the Elite, comprised of Sheikhs and wealthy families. Thus, these government officials were faced with the dilemma of competing with the Iranian government to win their people's support. It is during the period of the Iran-Iraq war that the media comes to present itself as the optimal weapon for the containment of the Islamic Revolution.#p#分頁(yè)標(biāo)題#e#

 

埃及霸權(quán)思想的垮臺(tái)-Downfall of Egyptian Hegemony of thought

 

Anwar Al-Sadat's signature of the Camp David Accord with Israel shifted the polarities of the Arab World and marked a grave turning point for Egypt's hegemony of thought over the Arab nations. After years of listening to “Sawt Al-Arab” on the radio and its calls for Arab nationalism, people were struck to find themselves without a hero to rally around. The slogans of Arab unity and anti-Zionism were now mere empty phrases voiced out from a land of hypocrisy. In fact, “the vacuum created by Egypt's eviction from the Arab League begged for a new leader to fill the void left by Sadat.”[4] Ayatollah Khomeini, hence, chose the right timing to sell his Islamic ideologies to the vulnerable Arab public. He portrayed himself as the savior of the oppressed Muslims who were suffering under the corrupt regimes of their colonized states. This Islamic framing of the Iranian Revolution, however, did not impress many of the Arab governments. “Iran's efforts to challenge the status quo turned it into a pariah state, shunned by most and feared by all.”[5] Thus, Arab states utilized their state-owned and controlled media to win back the populace of the “Arab-street”. Instead of using a strategy of counter-framing the revolution, Arab states chose to fight fire with fire and re-frame their own image to the public. Unfortunately for Iran, there was another competitor for Islamic domination on the scenes.

 

Wahabism框架:控制和擴(kuò)張的一種手段-Wahabism as a frame: a means of containment and expansion.

 

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is known to most Muslims and Arabs as the holy land which Mecca, the House of God, is located in. At the time of the Iranian Revolution it was home to a majority of a Sunni population and still is. Its politics, location and history gave Saudi an advantage of credibility over many other states. The Saudi government was able to mobilize the Wahabi ideology as a religious belief that would unite the people domestically and allow Saudi to expand regionally. The battle of ideologies in the Saudi media, however, started even before the Iranian Revolution.

 

During the days of Jamal Abdel-Nasser's Arab Nationalism, Saudi was first to present an Islamic Nationalism dogma. Kingdom without Borders, edited by Madawi Al-Rasheed, highlights the development of the Saudi media's rhetoric in light of each challenge it faced. “In the era of Nasser, the government began to promote wataniyya (nationalism) and Islamic solidarity in opposition to Nasser's Arab nationalist plans for the region. In the era of the Islamic Revolution, the government combined its Wahabi credentials with an emphasis on its wataniyya form of nationalism.”[6] Hence, at first Nasser's pan Arab nationalism was the enemy, which they fought against using Islamic Nationalism. After that, during the era of the Islamic Revolution, they shifted toward emphasizing Wahabism and distinguishing it from any other sect in Islam. In stressing Wahabism, Saudi stressed its anti-Shiism and thus was anti Iranian Revolution. The Wahabi rhetoric in the media was filled with “heavy Islamist terminology that permeates the political rhetoric of the Kingdom, especially in Arabic.” [7] Arabic is the language of the Qura'an as well as the whole of the Saudi population. The Saudi media targeted its own people as the main audience it needed to influence. The Islamic Revolution, however, posed a challenge to the Islamist terminology of the Saudi state because it required them to show a clear distinction between Shiite Islam and Wahabi Islam.

 

The battle with Nasser was much simpler than that with Khomeini. This time it was Islam on both sides of the spectrum and each was on an extreme end. Saudi feared the infiltration of Shiite thought and practice into its homes and streets, who were welcoming any sort of Islamic revival. Hence, Saudi Arabia needed to assert its credibility and justify its aid for Iraq. It is here that Wahabism presents itself as machine of Islamic slogans and sound-bits. Some of the innovative rhetoric they used was words such as “fatwa”[8] and “umma”[9]. “Fatwa” is a process by which religious leaders distinguish between all that is Hallal or Haram. It is, hence a way of regulating religious laws and rules. “Umma”, on the other hand, was a slogan used to denote a nation. It can also be thought of as “Umat Mohammed” or the Nation of Prophet Mohammed. Placing the word “Umma” in a Wahabi context enabled the Saudi administration to create a sense of patriotism and loyalty toward the leader because it was the duty of the people to follow him. Using this analogy, the Saudi officials were able to secure the support of their people. Saudi officials used this word to create a feeling of belonging to the Islamic nation by replacing the feeling of I with a we-feeling. It was no longer the Saudi government alone but the Saudi people alongside it.

 

Although these words are not exclusive to Wahabism they were constantly used by the Saudi state media. This repetition was brought by religious Sheikhs and ulama who were religious leaders revered and honored by the Saudi populace. Thus, Wahabi thought and “fatwas” now became a form of newsbeat that a great number of Saudis relied upon. From here on, Saudi Arabia was able to start its anti-Shiism movement. The “Saudi state has found it convenient to continue to draw on the ideological arsenal of Wahabiya, especially as the government [embarked on its] blatant campaign against Shi'ism.”[10] Wahabiya, therefore, can be viewed as a tool for Agenda setting, which will later come in handy during the policies Saudi initiates in regards to the Iran-Iraq war. It is in this case religious propaganda vs. religious propaganda we see on the scenes. Hence, “Wahabi ideology may serve more as the language of policies than as their actual determinant;”[11] becoming only a way of presenting Saudi foreign policy instead of actually legislating it.

 

Religion, in this case, was a mean to serve Saudi political interests. “In this regard, Wahhabiyya can be quite useful in campaigns of sectarian agitation against Shi'ism given its doctrinal position against all “others”, especially Shi'ites.”[12] The other-ing of Shiites was so extreme that it indirectly placed them in the ranks of Kufar or those who do not follow the right ways of Islam. Therefore, this solemnly justified the support Saudi provided to Iraq.

 

Saudi Arabia did not limit its Wahabi doctrines to the Kingdom itself but attempted to ward off Iran's export of their revolution by fighting it with Wahabism. “Saudi organizations subsidized and assisted Arab Mojahedin from conservative Wahabi and Muslim Brotherhood groups to fight in the Afghan resistance and challenge Iranian influence there.”[13] Hence, the war of religious ideologies between Iran and Saudi was fought on international soil as a means to proliferate each country's interpretation of Islam in other Islamic countries. Saudi relations with Iran at that time have been characterized as a “cold war”[14]

 

Another country aided by Saudi was Iraq. “Sadam Hussein's Iraq rose as a regional power in the late 1970s and 1980s. The Saudi government utilized Saddam's power for its own ends vis-à-vis Iran. Along with other oil-rich Arab countries of the Gulf, it funded Saddam's growing power, [without objecting] to the protracted nature of the Iran-Iraq war.”[15] Saudi's funding of Iraq was legitimized through the Saudi media as an act of jihad against those who were trying to blemish the right ways of the Prophet's Islam. There were no signs of Wahabism being exported into Iraq, however. Presumably, Saudi preferred to aid Iraq financially in order to rid itself of an enemy threatening its religious ideals and geopolitics.

 

The Saudi media formed a strong case for its opposition to Iran when “in November 1979 the regime faced domestic opposition in the form of demonstrations against the ruling family as the Grand Mosque in Mecca was seized and occupied.”[16] The strategic location of the Shiites in Mecca aroused the fear of a great many Saudis. The safety of the people, as well as the holy sites was in jeopardy. This threat was not only felt in Saudi but encompassed the whole of the Gulf States. It, in fact, “served to shape the evolution of policies forged in regard to their relations with both the Islamic Republic and Iraqi regime”[17] and cause the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Trita Parsi also finds that the GCC, comprised of Saudi, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman was formed as “a security body essentially aimed at balancing Iran.”[18]

 

The GCC started out in 1981 by funding Iraq indirectly “without forthrightly condemning the Iranian regime or declaring alignment with Iraq.”[19] In November 1982, the GCC held a third meeting in which it decided to come out openly in support of Iraq after the numerous attacks the Gulf States witnessed from Iranian militants and its own Shiite minorities of Iranian origins. “A Saudi radio commentary in the same month announced that there would be: ‘no way to thwart those (Iranian) plans and foil them except by supporting Iraq financially and militarily in order to destroy the Iranian war machine.'”[20] As the Saudi officials become more open about their strategies toward Iran, so did the media. The hazard Saudi government felt was implied through its various media outlets of newspapers, magazines, radio and television.

 

The danger was made clear through Saudi state-television during the 1986 attacks on Mecca by the Iranian pilgrims. The Saudi channel provided a full coverage of the attack showing in detail how the Iranians almost smuggled in the C4 explosives wanting to place them next to the Haram or Ka'aba and thus cause the death of pilgrims in Mecca. The Saudi reporter presented the issue in the following manner:

 

“This is how, brother Muslims, the Iranian leaders and officials view Islam, which they have veiled themselves behind in their unjust revolution. This is how the religious leaders of Iran view the disturbance of the holy act of pilgrimage in the holy house of Allah and the killing of hundreds of thousands of Muslims as an Islamic act and ritual, when they allegedly claim that they are Islam's sons and protectors.”[21]

 

The report on the smuggling of C4 explosives, furthermore, included a detailed segment by Saudi policemen on how the found the explosives in the pilgrim's bags, the airport security measures taken to ensure safety of the pilgrims, what would have happened if the C4 bags have had exploded in Mecca. This was followed with a brief demonstration of two cars blasting into flames after the Saudi policeman placed the equivalent of only 1 kg in one of these cars with an estimated 85% of deaths within 10 meters per 1 kg blown up. This demonstration showed the size of the damage that could be brought by the explosion of the full 51kg of C4 that were found in 95 bags of the Iranian pilgrims. There was an emphasis, moreover, on the fact that this chemical is only produced in military factories and that it cannot be provided in the common marketplace. Therefore, there was a clear and direct tie between the Iranian attackers and the Iranian government. This gave the impression that Iran is currently a belligerent state that has entered a state of war with Saudi Arabia and that Saudi is entitled for any act of self defense towards it.

 

科威特:愛(ài)國(guó)的框架-Kuwait: A Patriotic Frame

In looking at Kuwait we must first examine the politically democratic conditions, which enabled a “Kafil” system to emerge. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Kuwait is a democratic monarchy with a National Assembly of whose members are voted in by the Kuwaiti people. Kuwait, moreover, is a country which allows freedom of speech and press. These rights encouraged the formation of several privately owned newspaper agencies in Kuwait.

 

The Kafil-system used in the context of the media, according to Mamoun Fandy's (Un)Civil War of Words, is a sponsor who enables the newspaper or television channel to initiate. “Every individual in the Arab world is under the tutelage and a client of a sponsor prince, sheikh or a member of the ruling elite.”[22] It, therefore, becomes hard to have any opposition to the ruling regimes of the state. Newspaper agencies have to work within a specific context without crossing any red lines. Another aspect of Arab culture, especially in the Gulf, is the amount of respect individuals have toward their leaders. It is one thing when they criticize the ruler's policies at home but another when they do so openly. The Kafil system, however, is there to ensure the consistency of loyalty and respect towards the leading figures of the state. “Thus the system of Kafil, clientalism, permeates the whole social and political order.”[23] Such is the case in Kuwait.

 

The media in Kuwait was and still is privately owned by Kuwaiti families. These families can be thought of as the Kafils of the Kuwaiti newspapers and magazines. Although privately owned, newspapers in Kuwait seldom report on anything against the ruling authorities. Al-Qabas newspaper is an example of a privately owned Kuwaiti newspaper “owned by four Kuwaiti commercial families: Al-Kharafi, Al-Sager, Al-Sadoun and Al-Nisif;”[24] much like it is the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Anba'a owned by the Al-Marzoug family. More examples include Al-Watan newspaper, owned by Ali Al-Sabah, Al-Budai family's Al-Rai Al-Aam and Ahmad Al-Jarallah's Al-Seyyassah. These newspapers “rarely [cross] the redline or [break] taboos because the welfare of these families depend on the largess of the ruling family.”[25] Moreover, their political system of thought is usually similar to that of the ruling family because they are usually government officials.

 

In times of crisis the media in Kuwait has been known to operate as an instrument in communicating to the public the government's policies. This instrument was put to test in the post-Iranian revolution era. During the 1980s the Shiites in Kuwait represented a large minority of 25% of the citizen population. This minority, however, was feared by Kuwait's leadership who viewed the “joyous and supportive”[26] reaction of the Kuwaiti Shiite minority as risk to internal political stability. They were considered to be dormant cells awakened by the Iranian revolution and contesting with the Al-Sabah Family's Sunni regime.[27]

 

Both the media and the state worked together in this regard to penetrate through the riot and the planned disturbances. In early September of 1979, after the Islamic Revolution in a few months “Kuwait reportedly became privy to information that Iran was organizing protests and the distribution of subversive literature in the region in cooperation with local residents, with the aim of destabilizing the Arab Gulf rulers.”[28] In response to this, Al-Watan newspaper published, on the 10th of September, which was the day of the alleged demonstrations, a declaration by the Crown Prince and Prime Minister Sheikh Sa'ad Al-Abdallah Al-Sabah stating the following:

 

“The government will no longer be lenient toward and will strike hard at anyone who tries to disturb the country's security and stability. The government also knows the identity of the troublemakers, and they [will] be disciplined if their disruptive activities continued.”[29]

 

The media working alongside the government attempted to thwart the successful feedback the revolution gained within Kuwaiti mainstream. A clear distinction was made between the Revolution belonging exclusively to Iran and not the rest of the Islamic world. Lori Boghardt makes a critical point in her book, Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution , about the “Shiite-ization” process of the revolutionary challenge on the Kuwaiti government. The government practiced what seems to be an act of divide and concur amongst its Sunni and Shiite population. For fear of the Iranian revolution sprouting into an Islamic revolution and encompassing the Sunni majority in Kuwait, the government chose to question the loyalties of Shiites causing Sunnis to denounce any previously made alliances. [30]

 

The media played a substantial role in planting a barrier in front of a Sunni-Shiite union in Kuwait. This can be dated back to the very start of the revolution in February 1979 when Al-Rai Al-Amm newspaper “questioned the true motives of the Kuwaiti Shiite demonstrators, suggesting that their conduct was not entirely free of defiance to Kuwait.”[31] Instantaneously, these comments put the Sunni majority back in check, openly aligning themselves with no other than the Al-Sabah regime and declaring their loyalties toward it. These commentaries in the media created a ripple effect within the Gulf States. “By November, Arab Gulf information ministers had formally agreed upon national media guidelines that encouraged demoting the Iranian revolution from the status of a general Islamic one, to a specifically Shiite one.”[32] Here is where the patriotic frame is brought to life.

 

Kuwaiti citizens were expected to prioritize Kuwait over any other country. On the 18th of February in 1984, Al-Anba'a daily newspaper published an article condemning Iranians who held a Kuwaiti nationality for their funding of riot and opposition groups in Kuwait. The article clearly distinguished those people as being Iranians with a Kuwaiti passport and not Kuwaitis of Iranian origins.[33] The significance of this play on words rests in the media and government's mutual attempt of drawing a clear line between Iran and Kuwait, thus, causing those in the middle to choose sides.

 

Those in the middle, unfortunately, were pushed from two sides. Iran felt the necessity of exporting its revolution through recruiting Shiites in other countries, especially the Gulf. Public opinion of Shiites was generally pro the Islamic Revolution. In Kuwait, Shiites “generally admired and felt proud of the Iranian people for their success.”[34] This admiration and pride stemmed into “active support for the new Iran by Kuwaiti Shia and Iranian residents immediately distinguished these groups for the Kuwaiti authorities as the most threatening elements of society in relation to the revolution.”[35] Shiite's activities developed into rebellious actions that actually went against the Kuwaiti leadership. “Cassette tapes of Khomeini's speeches, radio broadcasts from Iran and Libya, and political leaflets attacking the Kuwaiti leadership for subordinating the country's Shia, fueled anti-al-Sabah sentiments.”[36] These propagandistic sermons and talks were preached in Shiite mosques and husayniyyas.[37] The fact that these Shiite groups were taking instructions and being commanded from the Iranian leaders caused much fear to trickle within the Kuwaiti administration. “Khomeini himself described Kuwait's ruler and those of the other Gulf peninsula states as “mini shahs,” equating their leaderships with the former Iranian ruler's oppressive and corrupt regime.”[38] This posed a serious threat to the Kuwaiti regime and required a plan for action to opposition groups from expanding.

 

The Kuwaiti government felt the urge to take charge against the opposition it met through clarifying to the people the consequences they will meet in allying themselves with someone other than the al-Sabah family. The media worked in accordance with implementing the government's policies. It served as a means of communication between the government and the people. On various occasions local newspapers published articles calling for the people to keep a wary eye on the current situation of events.

 

“Al-Anba, for example, wished the fate of the Shah to be a lesson “for those who through his overthrow gained the right to inherit his imperial mentality without his throne and medals” Al-Rai Al-Amm warned against the establishment of “political papacy” in Iran to subjugate Arab Muslims.”[39]

 

The message both the media and the government were trying to send the people is one of deliberate and calculated meaning. Both Al-Anba and Al-Rai al-Amm attempted to inform the public that Iran only appears to be an Islamic success whereas, in reality, it is a weapon those “Islamic leaders” use in order to subjugate the Arab masses and, hence, reach their own political ends.

 

The joint coalition between the media and the state in Kuwait cause the opposing Shiite groups much concern and worry. The optimal solution for these worries was to weaken one of the previous institutions. On 12 July, 1980 the bombing of two bombs in the offices of Al-Rai Al-Amm newspaper were reported. The damages caused to the printing press estimated around 12 million dollars and caused the newspaper's temporary closure.[40] Shiite groups feared the circulation of the articles published by al-Rai al-Amm, which were anti-Iran and Shi'ism. The attack on al-Rai al-Amm was not viewed as an assault on a separate institution but “against the Kuwaiti establishment in general, as al-Rai al-Amm was the national daily newspaper most closely aligned with government views.”[41] This incident, however, brought Kuwaiti individuals together and allowed them to identify a common enemy.

 

Newspapers continued to write about the violence, aggression and suicidal actions which threaten national security and political stability in Kuwait. On the front page of the al-Anba newspaper, dated back to 18th of February, an article titled “organizations of suicidal violence” took up the upper half of the page. This article listed the names of the Iranian military leaders in Iran and the Gulf; also, giving a detailed description of the “corruptive intentions of these organizations to infiltrate through the regimes of Iraq, Kuwait, the other Gulf countries and the Arabian Peninsula.”[42] The rest of the page included an article of the disagreement between Riyadh and the United States. On the bottom center was another article, one that actually talk about the proceedings of the Iran-Iraq war. This article was titled “Iraq continues to break through Iranian attacks.”[43] The support for Iraq in the war was quite evident but the opposition to Iran was even more dominant. This is well perceived through the amount of coverage the media placed on portraying Iran as an enemy.

 

The amount of coverage and the portrayal of Iran as a common enemy of the Gulf and Arab countries multiplied tenfold on the 26th of May 1986 as Kuwaiti newspapers rushed to report on the attempted assassination of Sheikh Jaber al-Sabah. Cries for national unity and collective unison against a common enemy were screamed out in bold ink on the front pages. The culprit was quickly identified as one of Iranian origins or having been influenced by Iran. Al-Anba was one of the news agencies which condemned the attacks on the Amir of Kuwait in the main article titled: “May the Hands of the Perpetrators Be Paralyzed”[44] alongside many other articles, pictures of the damaged cars and of the Amir after the attack. Furthermore, “Kuwaiti newspapers including Al-Anba and al-Rai al-Amm described the attack as one on all of Kuwait.”[45] A brief address to the Kuwaiti people by Sheikh Jaber, broadcasted on Kuwait state T.V., reassured the Kuwaiti public of his good health, “[marking] strength in the face of great personal danger.”[46] This stirred the emotions of the Kuwaiti masses and caused them to unite against a common enemy.

 

The incident created a patriotic response from the side of the Kuwaiti public. Al-Rai Al-Amm newspaper insisted that Tehran had a hand in the assault; in one of their articles they wrote:

 

“It is strange that through the Iranian charge' d'affaires Iran has denounced this incident, sent a bouquet of flowers to the amir, and extended ‘congratulations' to him on his escape. That is how they kill somebody and participate in his funeral.”

 

Newspapers, therefore, turned into a patriotic front; they were the battleground where the flag of Kuwait was raised. The Amir was considered a national symbol to the Kuwaitis, one which they admire and rally around. Even for those who did not greatly esteem him, acts against the highest authority of the country meant that all the citizens were vulnerable to such an attack and are, in fact, at great risk; thus, highlighting the necessity of identifying with the state against the enemy. If not in any of the circumstances stated before, then now was one of the most critical times during the Iran-Iraq war where Kuwaitis had to choose where their loyalties will fall.

 

對(duì)伊拉克或伊朗反對(duì)派的支持-Support for Iraq or Opposition of Iran

 

It was mentioned at the beginning of the paper that material being analyzed will be taken from a specific time frame, that being the 1980 Iran-Iraq war. It has already been established that during the Iran-Iraq war most of the Arab states, especially those of the Gulf, were supporting Iraq. In analyzing and closely searching through the media archives of two of the Gulf States, Kuwaiti and Saudi media have shown a tendency to report more on the Iranian plans of expansion in the Gulf instead of the support provided for Iraq by the Gulf. It seems that the Gulf countries found it necessary to confirm to the public that Iran was the enemy and because Iran is the enemy Iraq becomes the ally. Thus, the states support for Iraq is only secondary to their opposition of Iran.

 

In this case, the motives of the Gulf countries in the Iran-Iraq war become evident. Fear of their Sunni pro-U.S. regimes being removed by a fervent Islamic public can be read between the lines of the articles published by the media. The state in both cases utilized its media, whether privately or state-owned, in order to retain a firm grasp over society. Funding for Iraq, hence, is due to the state's fear of Iran. Yet, that funding and support was seldom mentioned within the borders of each country, not because the people did not accept it but because the state had another focus and priority on its agenda. Whether using the frame of Wahabism or Patriotism, both the Saudi and Kuwaiti states were able to ward off the main threat that endangered their leaderships. It is to their advantage, moreover, that the media of the Arab World can be controlled by the state. Hence, we find the media in this situation serving as a weapon of the state and enabling the leaders to contain the proliferation of opposition groups within their country.

 

參考書(shū)目-Bibliography

 

Boghardt, Lori Plotkin. Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution: 1979-1991 and New Challenges (St. Antony's). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

 

Fandy, Mamoun. Uncivil War of Words. London: Greenwood Pub Group, 2007.

 

Panah, Maryam. The Islamic Republic and the World: Global Dimensions of the Iranian Revolution. London: Pluto Press, 2007.

 

Parsi, Trita. Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S.. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.

 

Kingdom Without Border: Saudi Arabiaµs Political, Religious, and Media Frontiers. Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2009.

 

"Iranians holding Kuwaiti Nationalities in Support of Violence Organizations." Al-Anba 18 Feb. 1984: 9.

 

"Iraq Continues to Break through Iranian Attacks." Al-Anba 18 Feb. 1984: 1.

 

"May the Hands of the Perpetrators Be Paralyzed." Al-Anba 26 May 1985: 1.

 

“Organizations of suicidal violence." Al-Anba 18 Feb. 1984: 1.

 

[1] Parsi, Trita. Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S.. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.p. 97.ar"ations with Iran at that time have been characterized as a "hallenge Iranian influence there."ey are usually government

 

[2] Parsi, Trita. Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S.. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007. P. 97.

 

[3] Panah, Maryam. The Islamic Republic and the World: Global Dimensions of the Iranian Revolution. London: Pluto Press, 2007. p. 11.#p#分頁(yè)標(biāo)題#e#

 

[4] Parsi, Trita. Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S.. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007. Pp. 97-98.

 

[5]Parsi, Trita. Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S.. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007. P. 97

 

[6] Kingdom Without Border: Saudi Arabiaµs Political, Religious, and Media Frontiers. Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2009. P. 83.

 

[7] Kingdom Without Border: Saudi Arabiaµs Political, Religious, and Media Frontiers. Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2009. P. 80.

 

[8] Kingdom Without Border: Saudi Arabiaµs Political, Religious, and Media Frontiers. Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2009. P. 80.

 

[9] Kingdom Without Border: Saudi Arabiaµs Political, Religious, and Media Frontiers. Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2009. 101

 

[10] Kingdom Without Border: Saudi Arabiaµs Political, Religious, and Media Frontiers. Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2009. p. 81.

 

[11] Kingdom Without Border: Saudi Arabiaµs Political, Religious, and Media Frontiers. Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2009. p. 81.

 

[12] Kingdom Without Border: Saudi Arabiaµs Political, Religious, and Media Frontiers. Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2009. P.81.

 

[13] Panah, Maryam. The Islamic Republic and the World: Global Dimensions of the Iranian Revolution. London: Pluto Press, 2007. p. 94.

 

[14] Panah, Maryam. The Islamic Republic and the World: Global Dimensions of the Iranian Revolution. London: Pluto Press, 2007. P. 85.

 

[15] Kingdom Without Border: Saudi Arabiaµs Political, Religious, and Media Frontiers. Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2009. p.82.

 

[16] Panah, Maryam. The Islamic Republic and the World: Global Dimensions of the Iranian Revolution. London: Pluto Press, 2007. pg 83

 

[17] Panah, Maryam. The Islamic Republic and the World: Global Dimensions of the Iranian Revolution. London: Pluto Press, 2007. pg 84

 

[18] Parsi, Trita. Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S.. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.p 99.

 

[19] Panah, Maryam. The Islamic Republic and the World: Global Dimensions of the Iranian Revolution. London: Pluto Press, 2007. pg 85

 

[20] Panah, Maryam. The Islamic Republic and the World: Global Dimensions of the Iranian Revolution. London: Pluto Press, 2007. pg 85.

 

[22] Fandy, Mamoun. Uncivil War of Words. London: Greenwood Pub Group, 2007. p.17#p#分頁(yè)標(biāo)題#e#

 

[23] Fandy, Mamoun. Uncivil War of Words. London: Greenwood Pub Group, 2007. p. 17

 

[24] Fandy, Mamoun. Uncivil War of Words. London: Greenwood Pub Group, 2007. p. 4

 

[25] Fandy, Mamoun. Uncivil War of Words. London: Greenwood Pub Group, 2007. p. 4

 

[26] Boghardt, Lori Plotkin. Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution: 1979-1991 and New Challenges (St. Antony's). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. P. 29.

 

[27] Boghardt, Lori Plotkin. Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution: 1979-1991 and New Challenges (St. Antony's). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. P. 29.

 

[28] Boghardt, Lori Plotkin. Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution: 1979-1991 and New Challenges (St. Antony's). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. P. 33.

 

[29] Boghardt, Lori Plotkin. Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution: 1979-1991 and New Challenges (St. Antony's). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. P. 33.

 

[30] Boghardt, Lori Plotkin. Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution: 1979-1991 and New Challenges (St. Antony's). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.pp. 29-31.

 

[31] Boghardt, Lori Plotkin. Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution: 1979-1991 and New Challenges (St. Antony's). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.pp. 30-31

 

[32] Boghardt, Lori Plotkin. Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution: 1979-1991 and New Challenges (St. Antony's). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.p. 31

 

[33] "Iranians holding Kuwaiti Nationalities in Support of Violence Organizations." Al-Anba 18 Feb. 1984: 9.

 

[34] Boghardt, Lori Plotkin. Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution: 1979-1991 and New Challenges (St. Antony's). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.pp. 29.

 

[35] Boghardt, Lori Plotkin. Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution: 1979-1991 and New Challenges (St. Antony's). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.pp. 30.

 

[36] Boghardt, Lori Plotkin. Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution: 1979-1991 and New Challenges (St. Antony's). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.pp. 32.

 

[37] Boghardt, Lori Plotkin. Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution: 1979-1991 and New Challenges (St. Antony's). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.pp. 33.

 

[38] Boghardt, Lori Plotkin. Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution: 1979-1991 and New Challenges (St. Antony's). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Pp. 29.

 

[39] Boghardt, Lori Plotkin. Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution: 1979-1991 and New Challenges (St. Antony's). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Pp . 34.#p#分頁(yè)標(biāo)題#e#

 

[40] Boghardt, Lori Plotkin. Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution: 1979-1991 and New Challenges (St. Antony's). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. pp. 42.

 

[41] Boghardt, Lori Plotkin. Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution: 1979-1991 and New Challenges (St. Antony's). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. pp. 42.

 

[42] "Organizations of suicidal violence." Al-Anba 18 Feb. 1984: 1.

 

[43] "Iraq Continues to Break through Iranian Attacks." Al-Anba 18 Feb. 1984: 1.

 

[44] "May the Hands of the Perpetrators Be Paralyzed." Al-Anba 26 May 1985: 1.

 

[45] Boghardt, Lori Plotkin. Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution: 1979-1991 and New Challenges (St. Antony's). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.p. 89.

 

[46] Boghardt, Lori Plotkin. Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution: 1979-1991 and New Challenges (St. Antony's). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.p. 89