留學(xué)生essay代寫范例-學(xué)習(xí)曲線和經(jīng)驗(yàn)曲線。本文是一篇由本站代寫服務(wù)提供的essay代寫參考，主要內(nèi)容是講述本文將試圖區(qū)分學(xué)習(xí)曲線和經(jīng)驗(yàn)曲線，并提出這些不同的曲線如何產(chǎn)生競爭優(yōu)勢。必須觀察為什么許多人會得出這兩條曲線是相同的結(jié)論。James P.Gilbert（Experience and Learning Curves，2010）提供了經(jīng)驗(yàn)和學(xué)習(xí)曲線的基本概念，指出：“經(jīng)驗(yàn)和學(xué)習(xí)曲線模型是在個(gè)人和組織通過工作獲得知識的基本前提下發(fā)展起來的。通過重復(fù)獲得經(jīng)驗(yàn)，組織和個(gè)人在行為或?qū)W習(xí)方面會產(chǎn)生相對永久的變化。隨著服務(wù)中發(fā)生額外的交易，或是制造商生產(chǎn)更多的產(chǎn)品，單位成本往往會以遞減的速度下降。這種現(xiàn)象遵循指數(shù)曲線。”下面就一起來看一下這篇留學(xué)生essay代寫范例。

This essay will attempt to distinguish between the learning and experience curves and propose how each of these distinct curves may give rise to competitive advantages.

It is imperative to observe why many individuals may come to the conclusion that these two curves are one and the same. James P. Gilbert (Experience and Learning Curves, 2010) provides the basic notion of experience and learning curves, stating that:

“Experience and learning curve models are developed from the basic premise that individuals and organisations acquire knowledge by doing work. By gaining experience through repetition, organisations and individuals develop relatively permanent changes in behaviour or learning. As additional transactions occur in a service, or more products are produced by a manufacturer, the per-unit cost often decreases at a decreasing rate. This phenomenon follows an exponential curve.”

本文將試圖區(qū)分學(xué)習(xí)曲線和經(jīng)驗(yàn)曲線，并提出這些不同的曲線如何產(chǎn)生競爭優(yōu)勢。

必須觀察為什么許多人會得出這兩條曲線是相同的結(jié)論。James P.Gilbert（Experience and Learning Curves，2010）提供了經(jīng)驗(yàn)和學(xué)習(xí)曲線的基本概念，指出：

“經(jīng)驗(yàn)和學(xué)習(xí)曲線模型是在個(gè)人和組織通過工作獲得知識的基本前提下發(fā)展起來的。通過重復(fù)獲得經(jīng)驗(yàn)，組織和個(gè)人在行為或?qū)W習(xí)方面會產(chǎn)生相對永久的變化。隨著服務(wù)中發(fā)生額外的交易，或是制造商生產(chǎn)更多的產(chǎn)品，單位成本往往會以遞減的速度下降。這種現(xiàn)象遵循指數(shù)曲線。”

The frequent interchangeable use of the terms learning curve and experience curve can be easily disproved upon examination of their respective definitions, which differ. John L. Colley (1991, p.1) postulates that “the learning curve expresses graphically the observable exponential increase in the cumulative volume of production as costs are reduced due to a reduction in labour input hours as workers learn their jobs (i.e. cumulative learning experience)”. Contrastingly, the experience curve applies to process orientated as well as labour intensive production methods, as according to Hall and Howell (1985, p.197-212) “the experience curve is an analytical tool designed to quantify the rate at which experience of accumulated output, to date, affects total lifetime costs”. Gilbert (Experience and Learning Curves, 2010) best summarises the differences between learning and experience curves: “the experience curve is broader than the learning curve with respect to the costs covered, the range of output during which the reductions in costs take place, and the causes of reduction”.

The cost leadership aspect of Porter’s (1980) two dimensional strategic choice leading to competitive advantage model is substantiated by the learning curve. Sami Daniel (Strategic Assets, 2003, p.7) elaborates specifically on the cost leadership aspect of Porter’s (1980) model, stating that “Cost leadership: producing the same product at lower cost creating barriers to entry through economies of scale and experience”. When a firm has the cost advantage associable to the reduction in its costs of production as a result of a reduction in the number of hours of labour it employs (due to workers increasing their familiarity of production methods), it moves along the learning curve and experiences increased cumulative frequency of output. As a result, such a firm has the competitive advantages of economies of scale and barriers to entry into the industry.

John L. Colley (1991, p.2) exemplifies this further with Grumman Aerospace Corporation during 1970, stating that:

“Grumman Aerospace Corporation was successful at realising the learning curve effect. Grumman began with a massive cost-cutting campaign in 1970 when severe overrun problems developed with their newest aircraft, the F-14 Tomcat. Grumman had everyone in the manufacturing organisation question costs and developed a special ‘productivity’ group with people who had nothing to do but challenge costs. As a result, Grumman was able to achieve a reduction in the cost per plane and number of manufacturing hours per plane, making the F-14 Tomcat the staple fighter aircraft in the US Air force during the 1970’s, thus giving rise to barriers to entry and economies of scale (due to cost advantage)”.

The Boston Consulting Group (BCG) observed a distinct and consistent relationship between the costs of production and the cumulative volume of output during the 1960’s, production costs declined as the cumulative volume of output increased. Sami Daniel (Strategic Assets, 2003, p.5-6) elaborates upon this example in relation to competitive advantages:

“The Boston Consulting Group saw two processes at work that led to a cost based competitive advantage, process innovation: repetitive task mastery and continuous minor improvements in production methods by management, and product refinement: standardisation of components, redesign of product to incorporate less expensive materials, or better focus on consumer needs. Economies of scale were also experienced: capital costs do not increase at the same rate as capacity, hence unit costs fall. These effects led to barriers to entry and the aggressive acquisition of market share.”

In conclusion, the experience and learning curves are divisible based upon their respective definitions. Firms who are on such curves can acquire competitive advantages such as cost advantages, economies of scale and barriers to entry.

WORD COUNT = 726 (Not including the title/question)

5. Does the Boston Consulting Group’s product life-cycle view of company diversification satisfactorily answer scepticism about the portfolio explanations of this phenomenon? Explain your answer.

This essay will systematically individually ascertain what the portfolio explanation and the Boston Consulting Group’s (BCG) product life cycle view of company diversification is and in doing so, will examine whether the latter view satisfactorily answers scepticism about the former postulation (i.e. when accounting for synergy).

The risk reduction approach to company diversification is as Sami Daniel (Diversification, 2003, p.6) infers, “an extension of a theory developed in the field of finance: the portfolio theory of investment. It deals with the risks of holding different financial assets or stocks.” The portfolio theory of investment was postulated by the economist Harry Markowitz (1952) in his paper “The Utility of Wealth”, which changed the way people perceive diversification. The general axioms of Markowitz’s (1952) paper are best summarised by Pickford (2001, p.92-93), who states:

“Markowitz said that shareholders could reduce the variance of their investment returns by holding a diversified portfolio. Markowitz’s Portfolio Theory shows that diversification by investors potentially eliminates the risk associated with the unique attributes that are specific to any given company.”

The linkage between the portfolio theory and corporate diversification is elaborated upon by Daniel (Diversification, 2003, p.6) who declares that:

“This model (portfolio theory) has been used to explain conglomerate diversification – in this instance, firms are merely insuring against unique risks by diversifying into unrelated activities”.

The portfolio (hedging) theory has a degree of scepticism associated to it when it accounts for synergy (payoff). Daniel (Diversification, 2003, p.6) states that “if the market costs of exploiting synergy between a number of firms are high, added value will be created by linking activities in a single organisation, which is consistent with shareholder wealth maximisation. Neil Kay (1982) believes that synergy and correspondence will lead to interrelatedness. Kay coins the term ‘catastrophe’, defined as “the phenomenon external to the firm (i.e. government policies, technological progress and consumer habits) which directly precipitates the decline and obsolescence phase of the product life cycle” (1982, p.72). Bouvier (1984) analyses the coinage ‘catastrophe’ further:

“For firms that operate within turbulent technological environments, subject to rapid acceleration of the rate of technological change, catastrophe always beckons. In this situation, synergy, once a blessing, now becomes a curse. The vaunted interconnections now can help bring down the firm, for if one product fails, others may follow, given synergistic bonds.”

Firms in such a scenario have a trade off dilemma between hedging and synergy. BCG’s life cycle view of corporate diversification can help such firms make this difficult decision.

A firm’s preferred scenario is illustrated in Daniel’s (Diversification, 2003, p.6) proposition that “the prime concern at corporate level is the achievement of a balanced portfolio of businesses that assures an adequate cash flow with which to finance the growth of the firm”. BCG’s non-traditional approach to diversification is a fusion of its experience curve analysis (market share, economies of learning and cost based advantages) and the product life cycle (market growth rate), whereby a matrix approach is undertaken (the Boston Box). The BCG matrix offers an answer to the puzzle of the portfolio view of diversification. Ricky Griffin (2008, p.218-219) evaluates the BCG matrix approach to the life cycle model of corporate diversification as follows:

學(xué)習(xí)曲線和經(jīng)驗(yàn)曲線這兩個(gè)術(shù)語的頻繁可互換使用，在檢查它們各自不同的定義時(shí)，很容易被推翻。John L.Colley（1991年，第1頁）假設(shè)，“學(xué)習(xí)曲線以圖形方式表示了隨著工人學(xué)習(xí)工作（即累積學(xué)習(xí)經(jīng)驗(yàn)），勞動力投入時(shí)間減少，成本降低，累積產(chǎn)量的可觀察指數(shù)增長”。相反，經(jīng)驗(yàn)曲線適用于以過程為導(dǎo)向的以及勞動密集型的生產(chǎn)方法，根據(jù)Hall和Howell（1985，第197-212頁）的說法，“經(jīng)驗(yàn)曲線是一種分析工具，旨在量化迄今為止累積產(chǎn)出的經(jīng)驗(yàn)對總壽命成本的影響率”。Gilbert（Experience and Learning Curves，2010）最好地總結(jié)了學(xué)習(xí)曲線和經(jīng)驗(yàn)曲線之間的差異：“在所涵蓋的成本、成本降低期間的產(chǎn)出范圍以及降低的原因方面，經(jīng)驗(yàn)曲線比學(xué)習(xí)曲線更寬”。

Porter（1980）的二維戰(zhàn)略選擇導(dǎo)致競爭優(yōu)勢模型的成本領(lǐng)先方面通過學(xué)習(xí)曲線得到了證實(shí)。Sami Daniel（《戰(zhàn)略資產(chǎn)》，2003年，第7頁）具體闡述了波特（1980）模型的成本領(lǐng)先方面，指出“成本領(lǐng)先：以較低的成本生產(chǎn)相同的產(chǎn)品，通過規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)和經(jīng)驗(yàn)創(chuàng)造進(jìn)入壁壘”。當(dāng)一家公司因其雇傭的勞動力小時(shí)數(shù)減少（由于工人對生產(chǎn)方法的熟悉程度提高）而具有與生產(chǎn)成本降低相關(guān)的成本優(yōu)勢時(shí)，它會沿著學(xué)習(xí)曲線前進(jìn)，并經(jīng)歷累積產(chǎn)出頻率的增加。因此，這樣一家公司具有規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)和進(jìn)入該行業(yè)壁壘的競爭優(yōu)勢。

John L.Colley（1991年，第2頁）在1970年與格魯曼航空航天公司進(jìn)一步證明了這一點(diǎn)，并指出：

“格魯曼航空航天公司成功地實(shí)現(xiàn)了學(xué)習(xí)曲線效應(yīng)。格魯曼公司在1970年開始了一場大規(guī)模的成本削減活動，當(dāng)時(shí)他們的最新飛機(jī)F-14雄貓出現(xiàn)了嚴(yán)重的超支問題。格魯門公司讓制造組織中的每個(gè)人都質(zhì)疑成本，并成立了一個(gè)特殊的‘生產(chǎn)力’小組，成員除了挑戰(zhàn)成本外別無選擇。因此，格魯曼能夠降低每架飛機(jī)的成本和每架飛機(jī)制造的小時(shí)數(shù)，使F-14雄鷹成為20世紀(jì)70年代美國空軍的主要戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)，從而（由于成本優(yōu)勢）增加了進(jìn)入壁壘和規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)”。

波士頓咨詢集團(tuán)（BCG）觀察到，生產(chǎn)成本與累計(jì)產(chǎn)量之間存在明顯且一致的關(guān)系。在20世紀(jì)60年代，生產(chǎn)成本隨著累計(jì)產(chǎn)量的增加而下降。Sami Daniel（《戰(zhàn)略資產(chǎn)》，2003年，第5-6頁）闡述了這個(gè)與競爭優(yōu)勢相關(guān)的例子：

“波士頓咨詢集團(tuán)看到了兩個(gè)過程，這兩個(gè)過程產(chǎn)生了基于成本的競爭優(yōu)勢，即過程創(chuàng)新：重復(fù)的任務(wù)掌握和管理層對生產(chǎn)方法的持續(xù)微小改進(jìn)，以及產(chǎn)品改進(jìn)：部件標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化，重新設(shè)計(jì)產(chǎn)品以采用更便宜的材料，或更好地關(guān)注消費(fèi)者需求。還經(jīng)歷了規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)：資本成本的增長速度與產(chǎn)能的增長速度不同，因此單位成本下降。這些影響導(dǎo)致了進(jìn)入壁壘和市場份額的積極獲取。”

總之，經(jīng)驗(yàn)曲線和學(xué)習(xí)曲線可以根據(jù)它們各自的定義進(jìn)行分割。處于這種曲線上的公司可以獲得競爭優(yōu)勢，如成本優(yōu)勢、規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)和進(jìn)入壁壘。

字?jǐn)?shù)=726（不包括標(biāo)題/問題）

5.波士頓咨詢集團(tuán)關(guān)于公司多元化的產(chǎn)品生命周期觀點(diǎn)是否令人滿意地回答了對這一現(xiàn)象的投資組合解釋的懷疑？解釋你的答案。

本文將系統(tǒng)地單獨(dú)確定投資組合解釋和波士頓咨詢集團(tuán)（BCG）對公司多元化的產(chǎn)品生命周期觀是什么，并在這樣做的過程中，檢驗(yàn)后一種觀點(diǎn)是否令人滿意地回答了對前一假設(shè)的懷疑（即，當(dāng)考慮協(xié)同效應(yīng)時(shí)）。

公司多元化的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)降低方法正如Sami Daniel（diversification，2003，p.6）所推斷的那樣，是“金融領(lǐng)域發(fā)展起來的一種理論的延伸：投資組合理論。它處理持有不同金融資產(chǎn)或股票的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。”投資組合理論是經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家Harry Markowitz（1952）在其論文《財(cái)富的效用》中提出的，它改變了人們對多元化的看法。皮克福德（Pickford，2001，p.92-93）對Markowitz（1952）論文的一般公理進(jìn)行了最好的總結(jié)，他指出：

“Markowitz說，股東可以通過持有多元化的投資組合來減少投資回報(bào)的差異。Markowitz的投資組合理論表明，投資者的多元化可能會消除與任何特定公司特有的獨(dú)特屬性相關(guān)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。”

Daniel（diversification，2003，第6頁）闡述了投資組合理論與公司多元化之間的聯(lián)系，他宣稱：

“這一模型（投資組合理論）已被用于解釋企業(yè)集團(tuán)多元化——在這種情況下，企業(yè)只是通過將業(yè)務(wù)多樣化到不相關(guān)的活動來防范獨(dú)特的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”。

投資組合（對沖）理論在考慮協(xié)同效應(yīng)（回報(bào)）時(shí)有一定程度的懷疑。Daniel（Diversification，2003，第6頁）指出，“如果利用多個(gè)公司之間協(xié)同作用的市場成本很高，那么將通過將單個(gè)組織中的活動聯(lián)系起來來創(chuàng)造附加值，這與股東財(cái)富最大化是一致的。Neil Kay（1982）認(rèn)為協(xié)同作用和對應(yīng)關(guān)系將導(dǎo)致相互關(guān)聯(lián)。Kay創(chuàng)造了“災(zāi)難”一詞，定義為“公司外部的現(xiàn)象（即政府政策、技術(shù)進(jìn)步和消費(fèi)者習(xí)慣），直接導(dǎo)致產(chǎn)品生命周期的衰退和過時(shí)階段”（1982，第72頁）。Bouvier（1984）進(jìn)一步分析了鑄幣的“災(zāi)難”：

“對于那些在動蕩的技術(shù)環(huán)境中運(yùn)營的公司來說，隨著技術(shù)變革速度的快速加快，災(zāi)難總是在召喚著他們。在這種情況下，協(xié)同作用曾經(jīng)是一種祝福，現(xiàn)在卻變成了一種詛咒。現(xiàn)在引以為豪的相互連接有助于摧毀公司，因?yàn)槿绻环N產(chǎn)品失敗，其他產(chǎn)品可能會緊隨其后，形成協(xié)同紐帶。”

在這種情況下，企業(yè)在對沖和協(xié)同之間存在權(quán)衡困境。波士頓咨詢公司對企業(yè)多元化的生命周期觀可以幫助這些企業(yè)做出這一艱難的決定。

Daniel（Diversification，2003，p.6）的主張說明了公司的首選方案，即“公司層面的首要關(guān)注點(diǎn)是實(shí)現(xiàn)平衡的業(yè)務(wù)組合，確保有足夠的現(xiàn)金流為公司的增長提供資金”。波士頓咨詢集團(tuán)的非傳統(tǒng)多元化方法融合了其經(jīng)驗(yàn)曲線分析（市場份額、學(xué)習(xí)經(jīng)濟(jì)和基于成本的優(yōu)勢）和產(chǎn)品生命周期（市場增長率），從而采用矩陣方法（波士頓盒子）。BCG矩陣為多元化投資組合觀的困惑提供了答案。Ricky Griffin（2008，第218-219頁）對企業(yè)多元化生命周期模型的BCG矩陣方法進(jìn)行了如下評估：

“The BCG matrix suggests that fast growing markets in which a company has the highest market share are more attractive business opportunities than slow growing markets in which a firm has small market share. The matrix classifies the types of businesses in which a diversified firm can engage as dogs (businesses that do not hold much economic promise), cash cows (businesses that have large share of market that isn’t expected to grow substantially), question marks (businesses that have a small share in a quickly growing market) and stars (businesses that have the largest share of a rapidly growing market). The BCG matrix suggests that “dogs” shouldn’t be invested in, and that a firm should sell them as soon as possible as they have little economic promise. “Cash cows” generate high profits and a firm should use this to support “question marks” and “stars”. If the performance of “question marks” doesn’t live up to expectations, they should be reclassified as “dogs” and divested (i.e. BMW’s purchase and subsequent sale of Rover). Thus cash generated by “cash cows” should be invested in “stars” to ensure their preeminent position.”

In conclusion, BCG’s product life-cycle view of company diversification can satisfactorily answer scepticism about the portfolio explanations (i.e. when accounting for synergy) of corporate diversification by providing a solution to the portfolio view puzzle.

Word Count = 750 (Not including the title/question)

7 How far can the success of Japanese firms be accounted for by superior ability to create an effective ‘organisational knowledge spiral’ (Nonaka and Takeushi, 1995)?

This essay will determine the extent to which the success enjoyed by Japanese firms can be accounted for by their superior ability to create an effective ‘organisational knowledge spiral’.

The success of Japanese firms is characterised by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, p.3), who state:

“The success of Japanese companies is not due to their manufacturing prowess; access to cheap capital; close and cooperative relationships with costumers, suppliers, and other agencies, or lifetime employment, seniority system, and other human resources management practices-although all of these factors, of course are important. Instead, we make the claim that Japanese companies have been successful because of their skills and expertise at ‘organisational knowledge creation’. By organisational knowledge creation we mean the capability of a company as a whole to create new knowledge, disseminate it throughout the organisation, and embody it in products, services, and systems.”

The ability of Japanese firms to create an ‘organisational knowledge spiral’, involves the two dimensions of organisational knowledge creation as derived by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) – epistemological (tacit and explicit) and ontological (individual-team-firm) knowledge.

Daniel (Innovation and Competition, 2003, p.7) summarises from Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) that “Japanese firms view knowledge as being tacit i.e. inherently difficult to communicate and share, largely because it is context-specific and based upon intuition, personal experience and beliefs.”

Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, p.4, 59, 62-63) argue the existence of four modes of knowledge creation or conversion that gives rise to the innovative and successful outcomes of Japanese firms’ activity and operation:

“The first mode of knowledge conversion is from tacit knowledge to tacit knowledge, or the process of socialisation, whereby individuals within a firm acquire tacit knowledge from others within the firm by way of face-to-face exchanges such as mentoring, Honda’s brainstorming sessions and apprenticeships. The second mode of knowledge conversion is from tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge, or the process of externalisation, which involves metaphors and analogies, such that previous tacit knowledge can be written down (i.e. becomes tangible), like when Canon used the disposal drum in its new mini-coppier. The third mode of knowledge conversion is from explicit knowledge to explicit knowledge, or the process of combination, whereby individuals in a company would combine discrete explicit pieces of knowledge into new forms such as a report, like Kraft’s micro-merchandising of consumer instore behaviour. The fourth and final mode of knowledge conversion is from explicit knowledge to tacit knowledge, or the process of internalisation, whereby individual’s ‘internalise’ what they have experienced, ready to pass on this knowledge to someone else.”

Combining these four modes of knowledge conversion or creation, whereby one knowledge type is converted into another, leads to “the organisational knowledge spiral, which emerges when the interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge is elevated dynamically from a lower

ontological level to higher levels” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 57) .

In his review of ‘Nonaka and Takeuchi’s theory of organisational knowledge creation’

D. McLean (2004) summates the final procedural aspects of Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) theory of knowledge creation and the Japanese firm:

“Their theory also explains how individual knowledge is “amplified” into and throughout the organisation through these four modes of knowledge conversion and under five conditions that enable and promote organisational knowledge spiral creation. These conditions include Intention (organisational aspiration), Autonomy (to examine unexploited scenarios), Fluctuation and Creative Chaos (managers deliberately upsetting the routine of the office to break down barriers to learning and efficiency), Redundancy (promoting socialisation), and Requisite Variety (information available to workers to help them deal with any impromptu situations). Finally, the theory consists of a five-phase organisational knowledge creation process. These five phases are: 1) sharing tacit knowledge, 2) creating concepts, 3) justifying concepts, 4) building an archetype, and 5) cross-levelling knowledge.”

The successes enjoyed by Japanese firms such as Toyota, Honda and Sony are quite substantially explainable via by the postulations of Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) about the superior ability of Japanese firms to create an effective organisational knowledge spiral and in doing so, being able to quickly disseminate this newly created or converted forms of knowledge through organisation, into new systems, products, technologies and methodologies. There will however, always exist a small degree of the success associable to Japanese firms that isn’t attributable to a superior ability to effectively create an organisational knowledge spiral; this is success or failure due to market risk and forces. It should be noted that the examples of knowledge creation given above prove that Nonaka and Takeuchi’s theory isn’t culturally specific; it is universal in its application.

Word Count = 749 (Not including the title/question)

“BCG矩陣表明，公司市場份額最高的快速增長市場比公司市場份額較小的緩慢增長市場更有吸引力。該矩陣將多元化公司可以參與的業(yè)務(wù)類型劃分為狗（沒有太多經(jīng)濟(jì)前景的業(yè)務(wù)）、搖錢樹（市場份額較大但預(yù)計(jì)不會大幅增長的業(yè)務(wù)），問號（在快速增長的市場中份額較小的業(yè)務(wù)）和明星（在快速發(fā)展的市場中占有最大份額的業(yè)務(wù)）。BCG矩陣認(rèn)為，不應(yīng)投資“狗”，公司應(yīng)在幾乎沒有經(jīng)濟(jì)前景的情況下盡快出售它們。“搖錢樹”能產(chǎn)生高利潤，公司應(yīng)該用它來支持“問號”和“明星”。如果“問號”的表現(xiàn)沒有達(dá)到預(yù)期，它們應(yīng)該被重新歸類為“狗”并被剝離（即寶馬收購和隨后出售羅孚）。因此，“搖錢樹”產(chǎn)生的現(xiàn)金應(yīng)該投資于“明星”，以確保他們的卓越地位。”

總之，波士頓咨詢集團(tuán)關(guān)于公司多元化的產(chǎn)品生命周期觀可以通過提供投資組合觀難題的解決方案，令人滿意地回答人們對公司多元化的投資組合解釋（即當(dāng)考慮協(xié)同效應(yīng)時(shí)）的懷疑。

字?jǐn)?shù)=750（不包括標(biāo)題/問題）

7日本企業(yè)的成功在多大程度上可以通過創(chuàng)造有效的“組織知識螺旋”的卓越能力來解釋（Nonaka和Takeushi，1995）？

本文將確定日本公司所享有的成功在多大程度上可以通過其創(chuàng)造有效的“組織知識螺旋”的卓越能力來解釋。

Nonaka和Takeuchi（1995年，第3頁）是日本企業(yè)成功的特點(diǎn)，他們指出：

“日本公司的成功并不是因?yàn)樗鼈兊闹圃炷芰Γ猾@得廉價(jià)資本的機(jī)會；與客戶、供應(yīng)商和其他機(jī)構(gòu)的密切合作關(guān)系，或者終身雇傭、資歷制度和其他人力資源管理實(shí)踐，盡管所有這些因素當(dāng)然都很重要。相反，我們聲稱日本公司之所以成功，是因?yàn)樗鼈冊凇M織知識創(chuàng)造’方面的技能和專業(yè)知識。我們所說的組織知識創(chuàng)造是指公司作為一個(gè)整體創(chuàng)造新知識、在整個(gè)組織中傳播新知識并將其體現(xiàn)在產(chǎn)品、服務(wù)和系統(tǒng)中的能力。”

日本企業(yè)創(chuàng)造“組織知識螺旋”的能力涉及Nonaka和Takeuchi（1995）提出的組織知識創(chuàng)造的兩個(gè)維度——認(rèn)識論（隱性和顯性）和本體論（個(gè)體團(tuán)隊(duì)企業(yè)）知識。

Daniel（Innovation and Competition，2003，第7頁）從Nonaka和Takeuchi（1995）總結(jié)道：“日本公司認(rèn)為知識是隱性的，即天生難以溝通和分享，主要是因?yàn)樗翘囟ㄓ诃h(huán)境的，基于直覺、個(gè)人經(jīng)驗(yàn)和信念。”

Nonaka和Takeuchi（1995年，第4頁，第59頁，第62-63頁）認(rèn)為，存在四種知識創(chuàng)造或轉(zhuǎn)化模式，這些模式導(dǎo)致了日本企業(yè)活動和運(yùn)營的創(chuàng)新和成功成果：

“知識轉(zhuǎn)換的第一種模式是從隱性知識到隱性知識，或社會化過程，即企業(yè)內(nèi)的個(gè)人通過面對面的交流，如輔導(dǎo)、本田的頭腦風(fēng)暴會議和學(xué)徒制，從企業(yè)內(nèi)的其他人那里獲得隱性知識。知識轉(zhuǎn)換的第二種模式是由隱性知識到顯性知識，或外部化過程，包括隱喻和類比，這樣以前的隱性知識就可以寫下來（即變得有形），就像佳能在其新的迷你直升機(jī)上使用處理滾筒時(shí)一樣。第三種知識轉(zhuǎn)換模式是從顯性知識到顯性知識，或組合過程，即公司中的個(gè)人將離散的顯性知識片段組合成新的形式，如報(bào)告，如卡夫?qū)οM(fèi)者店內(nèi)行為的微觀營銷。知識轉(zhuǎn)換的第四種也是最后一種模式是從顯性知識到隱性知識，或內(nèi)化的過程，即個(gè)人將他們所經(jīng)歷的‘內(nèi)化’，準(zhǔn)備將這些知識傳遞給他人。”

將這四種知識轉(zhuǎn)換或創(chuàng)造模式相結(jié)合，即一種知識類型轉(zhuǎn)換為另一種知識，會導(dǎo)致“組織知識螺旋”，當(dāng)隱性知識和顯性知識之間的互動從較低的水平動態(tài)提升時(shí)，就會出現(xiàn)這種螺旋

本體論層次到更高層次”（野中和竹內(nèi)，1995年，第57頁）。

在他對“野中和竹內(nèi)的組織知識創(chuàng)造理論”的評論中

D.McLean（2004）總結(jié)了Nonaka和Takeuchi（1995）的知識創(chuàng)造理論和日本公司的最后程序方面：

他們的理論還解釋了個(gè)人知識是如何通過這四種知識轉(zhuǎn)換模式以及在五種條件下“放大”到組織內(nèi)部和整個(gè)組織的，這五種條件能夠促進(jìn)組織知識的螺旋式創(chuàng)造。這些條件包括意圖（組織愿望）、自主性（檢查未開發(fā)的場景）、波動和創(chuàng)造性混亂（管理者故意打亂辦公室的日常工作，以打破學(xué)習(xí)和效率的障礙）、冗余（促進(jìn)社交）和必要的多樣性（工作人員可獲得的信息，幫助他們處理任何即興情況）。最后，該理論由五個(gè)階段的組織知識創(chuàng)造過程組成。這五個(gè)階段是：1）分享隱性知識，2）創(chuàng)造概念，3）證明概念的合理性，4）建立原型，以及5）交叉知識。”

Nonaka和Takeuchi（1995）假設(shè)日本公司有卓越的能力創(chuàng)造有效的組織知識螺旋，并在這樣做的過程中，能夠通過組織將這種新創(chuàng)造或轉(zhuǎn)換的知識形式迅速傳播到新的系統(tǒng)、產(chǎn)品、技術(shù)和方法中，這在很大程度上可以解釋豐田、本田和索尼等日本公司所取得的成功。然而，總有一小部分成功和日本公司有關(guān)，并不能歸因于有效創(chuàng)造組織知識螺旋的卓越能力；這是市場風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和力量造成的成敗。值得注意的是，以上知識創(chuàng)造的例子證明了野中和竹內(nèi)的知識創(chuàng)造理論不具有文化特異性；它在應(yīng)用上具有普遍性。

本站提供各國各專業(yè)留學(xué)生essay格式范文，essay代寫以及essay寫作指導(dǎo)，如有需要可咨詢本平臺。