腐敗的影響超出了行賄和經濟效益低，主要影響低資金基礎設施施工質量差是由于建設涉及大量的復雜的，非標準的活動，質量評估很難。項目可以涉及眾多的投資者，客戶，顧問工程師，建筑師和主要承包商。雖然工作轉包給當地企業，大型建設項目經常吸引國際承包商。他們在那里有好的單位的建設成本，看來他們是有時可用一般腐敗的措施，腐敗的經濟學的方法提出了一個額外的洞察力可以有比行賄方式避免例如競標過程腐敗更糟糕的事情相關，將所有合同的唯一來源一個單一的公司但這不太可能提高整體發展的成果。這可以很差，說明了建設確實的證據，我們對該行業的高腐敗成因的實證知識是非常有限的。我們可以說，更多的富裕國家似乎有更少的腐敗承包許可和許可程序的平均水平。

 

Construction industry is corrupt or is it; looking at the mentioned industry we see that it is the most booming industry. The sector role in economic development is undeniable for things like housing, roads, hospitals, school and most utility networks

 

METHODOLOGY 方法論

 

The impact of corruption goes beyond bribe payment to poor quality construction of infrastructure with low economic returns alongside low funding for maintenance and the major impact of corruption is felt Construction involve large ,complex ,non-standard activities in which quality can be very hard to assess. Project can involve a multitude of players the client, consultant engineer and architect and main contractor. The large construction projects frequently attract international contractors although much of the works is subcontracted to local firms. Where we have good units for the cost for the price of construction, it appears that they are sometimes correlated with available general corruption measures An economic approach to corruption suggests an additional insight there can be worse things than a bribe payment One way to avoid corruption in competitive bid processes for example, would be to sole source all contract to a single firm but this would be unlikely to improve overall development outcomes .This can be very poorly illustrated by evidence from construction indeed, our empirical knowledge about the causes of high corruption in the sector is extremely limited. All we can say some certainty is that more wealthy countries appear to have less corrupt contracting permitting and licensing procedures on average, but even here there is significant variation between countries at similar income.

 

CONCLUSION 結論

 

Governments are and will remain major regulators of infrastructure services and consumers of construction services. Reducing unnecessary activities of the government in the sector may play a role in controlling corruption, but improving governance will remain central to any effort to reduce the development impact of corruption in construction industry. Our knowledge- base regarding effective interventions to reduce corruption is limited, in considerable part because the act is usually well hidden#p#分頁標題#e#

 

RECOMMENDATIONS 建議

 

At the same time, despite the industry status as one where corruption is both widespread and potentially very economically damaging, international construction companies surveyed by control risks were some of the least active in revising procedures in response to new ant bribery legislation stemming, and some of the least likely to have strong existing procedure in place governing condition such as ant bribery clauses in agent contracts. And activities that work to limit the harmful outcomes of corruption in term of shoddy construction or the commissioning of low- return investments- may go a long way towards reducing the harm done by failures in governance.

 

Chapter one presents a brief background of the Malawian construction industry and the politics that surround it. The status of the problem is elaborated and divided further into four sub-problems; the four hypotheses, which form the basis of the study, emanate from the four sub-problems. This chapter further outlines the importance of the study, the objectives, and the assumptions made to conduct the research.

 

Chapter two illustrates the political background of the country. The chapter

 

further discusses the effect and impact of corruption: its corruptive measures; the multiplier effects, and the anti-corruption measures and costs. The flaws in policy formulation and the governance of the rules and regulations are discussed. The chapter studies the economic hardships in third world and developing countries, with reference to the Malawian setting. Furthermore, political greed is analysed and discussed in detail.

 

Chapter three delineates the research design and the criteria used to collect

 

data. The admissibility of the data collected is discussed. The chapter also

 

addresses research methodology, the scope of the study, and case studies.

 

Furthermore, sampling is strategised, discussed and quantified. Lastly, the

 

results of the pilot survey are summarised and the recommendations arising from the study are implemented.

 

In Chapter four the statistics are presented in Tables, and the results and

 

findings of the research are discussed. The Chapter further outlines the response and non response bias; incentives and cut off dates, and the sponsorship of the survey. Lastly, the biographical data is recorded and tabulated.

 

1.1 INTRODUCTION

 

Politics plays a major role in governing a country, state or constituency. Political leaders attain power from the respective political positions when elected into government. Consequently, this power is used to the good or abused to influence decision making, perceptions and overviews of the populace, investors and other concerned stakeholders.#p#分頁標題#e#

 

1.2 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

 

1.2.1 THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

 

The construction industry in Malawi is negatively influenced by political greed, corruption, flaws in policy formulation, and the poor economy

 

1.2.2 THE SUB-PROBLEMS

 

The inequitable distribution of development projects;

 

Certain contractors dominate over others;

 

The construction industry has retrogressed, and

 

Resource limitations to standard building specifications

 

2.2 CORRUPTION

 

2.2.1 BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION

 

The construction industry in Malawi is ranked as one of the most corrupt

 

industries. Large payments are made to gain or alter contracts and circumvent regulations. Kenny (2007: 49) corroborates that the impact of corruption goes beyond bung payments, to poor quality of constructed infrastructure with low economic returns, alongside low funding for maintenance.

 

2.2.2 CORRUPTION MEASURES

 

Transparency International, an organisation which measures the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians using the corruption perception index, rates Malawi at 2.29. Given that the scale reads from 10 as the least corrupt to 0 as the most corrupt, this is a very high ratin

 

2.2.3 CORRUPTION IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY

 

Looking at business perceptions, Transparency International's 15-country poll ranked construction as the most corrupt industry (Figure 2.2). High numbers indicate relatively low corruption, whereas lower numbers indicate relatively high corruption.

 

2.2.6 MULTIPLIER EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION ON DEVELOPMENT

 

Different forms of corruption carry significantly different `multiplier effects' in

 

terms of their development impact. For instance, the impact of stealing one dollar�s worth of supplies from a road construction project is four times higher

 

than the impact of a dollar increase in contract costs due to collusio

 

CHAPTER 3

 

3.0 THE RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

 

3.1 INTRODUCTION

 

An evaluation of the impact of political influence on the construction industry with respect to the Malawi setting required an exploratory design sequence. To achieve this sequence both quantitative and qualitative approaches were used in the formulation of the research design.#p#分頁標題#e#

 

3.2 THE RESEARCH DESIGN

 

Yin (2003: 23), defines research design as a logical sequence that links empirical data collection to initial research questions and the eventual conclusion. Yin (2003: 25) states that a research design should deal with at least four problems: what questions to study; what data are relevant; what data to collect, and how to analyse the results.

 

3.2.1 THE QUALITATIVE RESEARCH

 

The qualitative research approach was designed to investigate and describe

 

perceptions, beliefs, norms and phenomenon which lead to political influences on the industry

 

3.3 THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.

 

The post survey qualitative phase aimed at deepening the understanding of the themes generated during the first qualitative phase. It also deepened the

 

understanding of the qualitative findings.

 

3.3.1 FINDINGS

 

The methods of data collection in the pilot survey were the oral interview and

 

the questionnaire. The response was overwhelming as participants were

 

motivated by the fact that the study is a positive step towards addressing

 

eminent problems faced in these projects. The interest shown by the

 

participants and the interviewees and the quality of the data collected was up

 

to standard as set by the researcher.

 

3.3.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

 

From the pilot survey, it was noticed that there is significant political interference. The four sub-problems raised in this study were further substantiated by the findings in this pilot survey.

 

CHAPTER 4

 

4.0 RESULTS AND FINDINGS

 

4.1 RESPONSE RATE

 

140 Questionnaires were circulated to civil professional individuals at the NCIC, NRA, MASAF, City councils and to political stakeholders, public works officers and district development committee members. Each questionnaire was circulated with a request for their participation in the survey.

 

4.1.1 RESPONSE AND NON-RESPONSE BIAS

 

A demographic study relative to respondents investigated by Willowick (2004:

 

113) reports that demographic characteristic of non-respondents and respondents such as: age; education, and employment status are similar. Most researchers view non-response bias as a continuum, raging from fast responders to slow responders; with non-responders defining the end of the continuum#p#分頁標題#e#

 

4.2.1 RESULTS OF CORRUPTION AND ITS EFFECTS

 

4.2.2.1 Likelihood of corrupt activities relative to contractor registration

 

The responses to Question 1, which investigates the likelihood of corrupt

 

Activities relative to the registration of contractors, are summarised in Table

 

CHAPTER FIVE

 

5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 SUMMARY

 

The construction industry in Malawi, as evaluated, is negatively influenced by

 

political greed; corruption; flaws in policy formulation, and the poor economy. The role players in this statement of the problem are political stakeholders; public works officers; city council officers; DDC members; MASAF officers; NCIC officers, and NRA officers.

 

5.2 CONCLUSIONS

 

In conclusion, inequitable distribution of development projects is principally due to political greed. The degree and extent of greed regarding these unscrupulous politicians may not be abated by any study, but highlighting the situation in studies and reports will bring awareness of this selfish and out of character behaviour.

 

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

 

Management of political greed is the root solution to the inadequate distribution of development projects. The role players relative to this scenario are political stakeholders, these include: the President; MPs; ministers, and community heads. The results and findings relative to the aforementioned role players leads to the deduction that there is a mandatory requirement to change the mindset of individuals. This can be achieved by frequent education in construction management.

 

CHAPTER ONE

 

INTRODUCTION

 

Politics play a major role in governing a country, state or constituency. Political leader attain power from the respective political position when elected into government. Consequently, this power is used to the good or abused to influence decision making, perception and overviews of the populace investors and other concerned stakeholder.

 

This report contains examples and analysis of relatively common corrupt practices in relation to construction project. The examples include both bribery and fraud. Corruption to an outsider to the construction industry is normally seen in reasonably simplistic items namely : cash being paid to an individual in return for him arranging for a contract to be awarded . The reality is for more complex and diverse.

 

The construction industry in Malawi is negatively influence by the political factor; political greed, corruption, flaws in policy formulation, the poor economy. The report also state that the chances of Malawi Social Action Fund, which is a grant aided community based and managed project fund evolving into a development institute depended on the Incumbent President�s authorisation.#p#分頁標題#e#

 

Corruption has negative impact on the construction industry in the form of influencing the word of contracts for personal gain which results in particular contractors dominating others. The monotonous use of one contractor over other creates a belief of indispensability and arrogance which leads to the selected contractor to the Client�s / Consultants quality procedures.

 

Malawi is a country is divided into three regions of approximately the same area in magnitude Northern, Central and Southern region. Most area in the Northern region are not as developed as counterpart area in either the commercial southern region or the administrative central region. The Northern region received a budget allocation for construction in August 2001.The project commenced and was abandoned four months later ,where it was reported that the funding was diverted to a prioritised project in the southern region (Lunda 2005). This attitude of prioritising the central and southern region has led to emigration of people from the Northern region to the more developed and populous Central and Southern region.

 

Because the construction industry is heavily regulated and construction firms compete for government contracts to build infrastructure, corruption can be a serious concern for firms in this industry. Construction firm are more likely to pay bribes than other firms and pay more as a percent of sales when they do. Many construction contractors report that bribes are needed when bidding on government contracts. The cost of this can be high. In Afghanistan, the county that is the focus of this study, construction contractors that said bribes were needed to secure government contracts reported median payments of 20 percent of the contract value.

 

Corruption during the procurement process affects development in several ways. First, it is likely to have a direct impact on cost. If firms have to pay bribes to win government construction contracts, the government is likely to have to pay more than they would have otherwise so that the firm can recoup those costs.

 

But this is not the only cost. Corruption can affect the quality of construction particularly when firm bribe inspectors and regulators to avoid meeting contract provisions building standards. If firm can pay bribes to avid meeting technical requirements specified in the building documents, quality will also suffer. Finally, when corruptions possible, firms are likely to invest scarce management resources in cultivating government contracts rather than in other more productive measures. Because bribes are illegal and therefore risky to offer and receive and unenforceable if the other side fails to delivered promised services firm managers and bureaucrats will usually want to know their counterparts during corrupt transactions.

 

There is some evidence that corruption undermines the quality of construction and therefore can affect death tolls during natural disasters. Corruption in public contracting and bribes paid to building inspectors were blamed for the high death toll and the destruction of many public buildings and much public infrastructure during the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Widespread destruction of property during natural disasters has also been partly blamed on corruption in other countries such as Turkey (Kenny,2007).#p#分頁標題#e#

 

A final concern is the impact on competition and the outcome of the bidding process. If firm efficiency was the only thing that affected how much the firm was willing to pay in bribes, then corruption might not have a serious impact on competition or the outcome of the bidding process. That is, the most efficient firm would presumable be willing to pay the most in bribes and, therefore, firm would mostly compete over the size of their bribe payments rather than the size of their competitive bids.

 

However, other things not related to efficiency might also affect firm� propensities to bribe. One reason why different firm might have different propensities to bribe is that some managers might be more averse to either breaking the law or committing acts seen more immoral than others are. Another reason that some firms might be more willing to pay bribes than others is some might have better connected managers than others. Offering and accepting a bribe is risky for bribe takers and bribe givers. Both parties risk being caught, especially when they do not know the other party that they are dealing with well. Moreover, bribe payer cannot be sure that the service will be delivered after the bribe has been paid and have no legal recourse if it is not. Person connections will therefore be important since they are likely to lessen these concerns.

 

THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

 

The construction industry in Malawi is negatively influenced by political greed, corruption, flaw in policy formulation, and the poor economy.

 

THE SUB � PROBLEM

 

The inequitable distribution of development projects

 

Certain contractors dominate over others

 

The Construction industry has retrogressed

 

Resource limitation to standard building specification

 

THE HYPOTHESES

 

Political greed affects the distribution of development project.

 

Corruption does create a dominance of particular contractor over others.

 

Retrogression in the construction industry is due to the flaws in the formulation of construction industry policies.

 

The economy limits the standard specifications used during construction.

 

THE IMPORTANCE OF STUDY

 

This study provides an analysis on the award of contracts by the central body

 

and assesses the capacity of contractors commonly assigned to projects and

 

determines the flaws in governance of projects. Therefore, the study established ways to improve the standard of structures constructed and methodology of the construction process. Bearing in mind the contingency theory, which states that there is no one way to manage a project, it is dependent upon the problem; in this case, sub-standard works in hand (Kast & Rosenzweig, 2003: 74). In-depth investigations were conducted to determine the selection criteria of contract award based upon resources. The rational distribution of contractors to the given scales were considered and thereby creating a wider range of contractors eligible for tender pre-qualification phase. Currently, development structures favour certain areas and this study determined the reasons, and how to improve the equitable distribution of development projects throughout the country.#p#分頁標題#e#

 

Grant aided projects are normally accompanied by their own specifications and conditions for contract award. This study analysed the detrimental conditions and specifications, which accompany such grant aided projects. The construction of the Murmur Gaddafi memorial hospital, which is a joint venture between the Malawian and Libyan governments, was halted as the two governments failed to reach a compromise regarding the way forward in terms of price fluctuations and pegging the Malawian Kwacha to the US Dollar. Among other complications, some pundits state the fall out of the previous head of state from government dented the relationship between the two governments (Lunda, 2005: 2).

 

In terms of performance by civil engineering contractors, the objective was to find ways and means to improve general performance, and to highlight corruption and the effects thereof on the industry. The access and availability to loans and overdraft facilities from financial institutions to small scale contractors was analysed. Such a financial achievement will assist small scale contractors to develop into larger scale contractors. The practices of financial institutions relative to providing performance bonds to small scale contractors is highly questionable as it is a prerequisite for the contractors bank account to have an equivalent of the contract sum for the performance bond to be issued (Ballard, 2000: 737).

 

In general the aim of the study was to identify and analyse ways to improve the management of construction works thereby realising economically viable projects for all stakeholders as well as quality assured structures nationwide (Kerzner,2003:58.

 

THE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

 

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

 

The aim of this study was to determine the extent to which politics influences the civil engineering sector of the Malawian construction industry.

 

The study provided solutions to biased distribution of development projects, in order to attain equity in distribution of projects nationally.

 

The study analysed the effects of corruption, how it creates a dominance of particular contractors over others and its related influence on the standard of construction works.

 

Furthermore, flaws in the formulation of construction development policies were investigated in this study and the recommendations on ways to abate these flaws were analysed.

 

Lastly, the study compared and related the poor state of the economy to the negative impact thereof on the built environment.

 

GENERAL GOALS

 

Lederman and Soares (2005: 14) agree that construction is the core to

 

developing a nation. The built environment, as a product, authenticates a#p#分頁標題#e#

 

civilised way of carrying out activities. Thus, the ease of the construction process and the quality of the product will lead to an economically feasible and structurally developed nation.

 

The Malawian construction industry has evolved considerably over the past two decades. This evolution has taken place both in a positive and negative manner. Political influence and interference being the major contributing factor to the significant evolution of the industry; this study evaluated the impact of politics on the industry.

 

Firstly, it was imperative to conduct this research to expose and evaluate the political greed in the distribution of development projects. Devereux et al. (2006: 16) argue about the conditions set in determining the allocation of development projects, the community participation, and the politicians� involvement. Results show that political greed influenced the distribution of the projects.

 

Secondly, as much as the vested interest of corrupt politicians is unlikely to be abated by any study, this study determined the effects of corrupt politicians and corruption on the construction industry. The intensity of corruption in Malawi led to the formulation of the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) by an act of parliament in 1996.

 

Moreover, the study determined flaws in the formulation of policies regarding

 

construction and the improvements thereof. As noted for the well being of the

 

nation; policies passed by act of parliament have a leniency towards the benefit of the electorate and very little professionalism and etiquette to the discipline involved.

 

Lastly, the study examined ways in which the construction industry may improve the standard of the management of the construction process so as to improve the quality of the desired built environment.

 

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

 

In May 1994, Malawi held multi-party elections after 30 years of authoritarian one party rule. The decision of the ruling Malawi Congress Party (MCP) to hold elections arose after a sustained period of political mobilisation. The MCP lost power and a new government was elected. The new ruling party, the United Democratic Front (UDF) did not have the majority of seats in parliament, but had to establish itself as representing national commitments (Kaspin, 1995: 2).

 

As stated by Bloom (2004: 23), the government had to overcome several

 

obstacles in meeting these national commitments. The UDF led government

 

faced disastrous economic situations. The country had experienced two major droughts in the early 1990�s and the impact of these shocks was exacerbated by major reductions in donour support in response to governance problems.#p#分頁標題#e#

 

GOVERNANCE ON EXPENDITURE AND FUNDING

 

The MCP led government had increased public expenditure during the run up to the 1994 elections and Malawi as a country experienced a �full-blown

 

Macroeconomic crisis� in 1994 (World Bank, 2006: 27). District administrative

 

systems were fragmented, with parallel structures accountable to the President�s Office and to local councils. Elected councils had been dissolved and district development committees (DDC), on which traditional leaders and Members of Parliament convened, were the de facto decision-making bodies.

 

In 1994, the government organised a stakeholders� workshop to discuss the

 

emerging ideas of a social fund and the findings suggested that communities

 

trusted traditional authorities much more than government extension workers

 

(Bloom, 2004: 12). The Malawi Social Action fund (MASAF) was structured as a World Bank project and formulated in 1995 tasked to implement community development.

 

CHAPTER TWO

 

CORRUPTION

 

BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION

 

The construction industry in Malawi is ranked as one of the most corrupt

 

industries. Large payments are made to gain or alter contracts and circumvent regulations. Kenny (2007: 49) corroborates that the impact of corruption goes beyond bung payments, to poor quality of constructed infrastructure with low economic returns, alongside low funding for maintenance.

 

Corruption plays a major role in awarding of contracts in terms of bribery. Guash (2005: 47) concurs that for some contractors to be awarded contracts the norm of bribing does occur. These bungs may actually be a percentage of the total contract sum, which is on the higher side accordingly. Informally, the bung sum is known as and will be referred to as a bung.

 

The National Construction Industry Council (NCIC) has more than 5 000

 

registered contractors whom are capable of carrying out construction projects

 

relative to their scales (Baneli, 2004: 34). Nevertheless, construction projects tend to be awarded to the same group of contractors despite the poor performance.

 

CORRUPTION MEASURES

 

Transparency International, an organisation which measures the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians using the corruption perception index, rates Malawi at 2.29. Given that the scale reads from 10 as the least corrupt to 0 as the most corrupt, this is a very high rating. This perceptive index as shown in figure 2 below shows Malawi�s level in relation to corruption indexes of the countries in the world (Anonymous, 2004). Measuring corruption in the statistical sense is naturally not a straight-forward matter, since the participants are generally not forthcoming about it. Denker (2008: 39) concurs with Transparency International, a leading anti-corruption#p#分頁標題#e#

 

which provides three measures, updated annually:

 

A Corruption Perception Index - based on experts' opinions of how corrupt different countries are;

 

A Global Corruption Barometer - based on a survey of general public

 

attitudes toward and experience of corruption, and

 

A Bribe Payers Survey, looking at the willingness of foreign firms to pay bungs. The World Bank collects a range of data on corruption, including a set of Governance Indicators.

 

CORRUPTION IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY

 

Looking at business perceptions, Transparency International's 15-country poll ranked construction as the most corrupt industry (Figure 2.2). High numbers indicate relatively low corruption, whereas lower numbers indicate relatively high corruption.

 

However, the control risk survey results revealed weak propensity by firms to

 

react on the tender procedure in cases where they considered themselves

 

victims of corruption. If competitors pay bribes, companies lose not only their fair chance of gaining the contract, but also the cost of taking part in the tender; often a significant amount of time and, for large firms, it can amount to several million dollars. In spite of these losses, they prefer not to complain or claim for compensation.

 

Consequently, the most plausible explanation is the lack of proof in these cases. It will often be impossible to verify that corruption has taken place, and there is, a general reluctance to accuse individuals of being �corrupt� without clear evidence. However, firms that have participated in a tender where the outcome has most likely been affected by corruption will often have a justified suspicion. They may have been asked for bribes themselves, they pick up reliable rumours, or by other means they realise that the tender procedure is flawed.

 

Features on the extent of corruption

 

Kenny (2006) cited by Lee and Lanermark (2007: 45) states that there are three features on the extent of corruption in construction:

 

First, there is significantly no correlation between cross-industry general estimates of corruption and estimates of corruption given by the subset of construction industries at the national level;

 

Secondly, it appears that there is considerable variation within countries as to the comparative level of corruption in different parts of construction related regulation, and

 

The third feature of survey results worth noting is that there is a significant variation even within a sector in a given country in terms of the level of corruption occurring in a particular process.#p#分頁標題#e#

 

Furthermore, corruption can have a particularly invasive effect if it skews

 

incentives such that the impact of corrupt payments is felt far beyond the project itself. It appears that corruption is likely one factor behind the pressure to overspend on new construction rather than maintenance of existing infrastructure (Kenny, 2006: 16).

 

MULTIPLIER EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION ON DEVELOPMENT

 

Different forms of corruption carry significantly different `multiplier effects' in

 

terms of their development impact. For instance, the impact of stealing one dollar's worth of supplies from a road construction project is four times higher

 

than the impact of a dollar increase in contract costs due to collusion (Kenny,

 

2006: 18).

 

In Indonesia, Olken (2004: 45) estimates that a marginal dollar of materials

 

stolen from a road project reduces the discounted benefits from the project by $3.41 because of the shorter life span of the road when built with inadequate material.

 

If the impact of corruption is to skew expenditures towards low-return projects or to reduce expenditures on maintenance, the multiplier effect may be many times higher. Table 2.1 presents estimates of the size of corrupt payments in various steps of the project cycle as well as the likely `multiplier impact' of payments in terms of development outcomes.

 

CHAPTER THREE

 

THE RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

 

INTRODUCTION

 

An evaluation of the impact of political influence on the construction industry with respect to the Malawi setting required an exploratory design sequence. To achieve this sequence both quantitative and qualitative approaches were used in the formulation of the research design.

 

This chapter examines: the procedures and instrumentation, and data analysis methods used in the survey. The chapter also provides the reader with detailed explanations on methods and procedures to either replicate or further the study

 

THE RESEARCH DESIGN

 

Yin (2003: 23), defines research design as a logical sequence that links empirical data collection to initial research questions and the eventual conclusion. Yin (2003: 25) states that a research design should deal with at least four problems: what questions to study; what data are relevant; what data to collect, and how to analyse the results.

 

THE QUALITATIVE RESEARCH

 

The qualitative research approach was designed to investigate and describe#p#分頁標題#e#

 

perceptions, beliefs, norms and phenomenon which lead to political influences on the industry. The qualitative information was obtained using the following methods:

 

A) Interviews

 

Information and data was gathered by:

 

A standardised scheduled interview, which was uniform and repetitive

 

thereby asking the same questions to all;

 

A standardised interview without a schedule, which involved asking

 

different questions to different people, and

 

An unstructured interview, which had no set order of wording thereby

 

enquiring different views of different people i.e. in government, private

 

sector, or community based.

 

B) Participant observation

 

This information was obtained by the researcher�s judgment on observations and happenings in consideration of the course of action of events.

 

THE QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH

 

This approach was designed to obtain numerical data which could be figuratively expressed. The main tool designed to resource such data was the questionnaire. The development of the questionnaire comprised of the initial design set up, the pre-testing and finally the administering of the structured questionnaire.

 

The set up of the questionnaire was designed to provide data on:

 

Section A: Corruption

 

Section B: Policy formulation

 

Section C: Economic hardships

 

Section D: Political greed

 

The researcher for this study used the first four of the above sources as the other three sources were not relevant to the study. The primary data was collected over a limited time period between September 2009 and October 2009.

 

THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

 

In this study qualitative and quantitative data was obtained and evaluated. Leedy and Ormrod (2001: 49) entail three phases of data collection:

 

Qualitative phase;

 

Quantitative phase, and

 

Post survey qualitative phase.

 

These phases lead to an exploratory design sequence which explored the

 

political factors influencing the construction industry in Malawi. Researchers

 

conduct exploratory research for three interrelated purposes: diagnosing a

 

situation; screening alternatives, and to discover new ideas (Zikmund, 1997: 26). The qualitative study aimed at investigating and describing perceptions, beliefs and norms leading to the political interference on construction projects in Malawi. The post survey qualitative phase aimed at deepening the understanding of the themes generated during the first qualitative phase. It also deepened the understanding of the qualitative findings.

 

The main survey took place in Lilongwe District, which habitats the Lilongwe

 

CBD which is the Capital city of Malawi; due to the fact that this is where the

 

principal respondents are located namely the NCIC and the Ministry of Public

 

Works. The data collection period took 8 weeks.

 

PARASTATAL PROJECTS

 

These are projects which constitute both public and private funds and are run by the board of the parastatal organisation. The board members for these

 

parastatals are appointed yearly by the President of the country and approved by parliament.

 

The scope of this study only dealt with:

 

Public sector projects;

 

Grant aided Projects, and

 

Parastatal projects.

 

The reason being, as analysed by Baneli (2004: 39) in the procurement statutes, Malawi CPAR volume 2; states that public, private and parastatal projects constitute 70% of the construction projects in Malawi

 

PARASTATAL PROJECTS

 

These projects entail public private partnerships and the case study survey was the Malawi College of Medicine recreational complex.

 

SAMPLING

 

The focus of the study was on in-depth information, analysis of projects impacted most by political interference and the most economical in administering the research. The sampling technique used to adequately furnish such information was the non-probability sampling approach

 

Based upon Yin (2003: 102), as agreed in Nyagwachi (2007: 89), non probability sampling provides required in-depth information without making inferences and generalisations. In this research projects were selected, because of the magnitude, influence, availability of information on e-files and other characteristics considered necessary for this study.

 

On each project there was a target population which was interviewed. Gay and Airasian (2003: 47), cited in Leedy and Amrod (2001: 56), state the following guidelines in the identification of a sufficient sample size:

 

For a small populace < 100 people, no need for sampling;#p#分頁標題#e#

 

If the populace is around 500, 50% of the population should be sampled;

 

If the populace is around 1 500, 20% of the population should be sampled, and

 

Beyond a certain point (approximately 5 000 and more), a sample size of 400 people is adequate.

 

PILOT SURVEY

 

The pilot survey was carried out between the months of September 2009 and

 

October 2009. This survey was conducted on a reduced scope to spearhead and examine the main study.

 

This prototype study was conducted in Malawi, which is located in the SADC

 

region of Africa and is surrounded by Mozambique, Zambia towards the

 

Northwest and Tanzania towards the North. Blantyre City, located in the southern region of Malawi was the town in which this pilot survey was conducted.

 

FINDINGS

 

The outcomes of the pilot survey were threefold

 

The responsiveness to the interviews:

 

The methods of data collection in the pilot survey were the oral interview and

 

the questionnaire. The response was overwhelming as participants were

 

motivated by the fact that the study is a positive step towards addressing

 

eminent problems faced in these projects. The interest shown by the

 

participants and the interviewees and the quality of the data collected was up

 

to standard as set by the researcher.

 

The admissibility of the data collected:

 

The personnel / interviewees with the relevant education and experience as

 

set by the researcher were available. Archived data and records were

 

available upon request. Confidentiality was paramount and ethical considerations were practiced when conducting the data collection.

 

The analysis of the data and its interpretations.

 

a) Qualitative Data

 

The qualitative data was obtained from participant observations, structured

 

interviews, and documented literature.

 

This data contained information on political greed, flaws in policy making and

 

the lack or availability of resources during the project. The qualitative data

 

was partly opinionated and idealistic; this information was grouped and sorted using Primavera 6 data management software package.#p#分頁標題#e#

 

The results were interpreted in comparison to the sub-problems investigated

 

and its severity was interpreted into graphs, pie charts and histograms to

 

show the interrelationships, the cause and effect , and the impact the political

 

factors studied have in general on the projects.

 

b) Quantitative Data

 

This data was obtained mainly from the questionnaire response and archived

 

records. The data was computed into an excel spreadsheet, an analysis was

 

undertaken for each project in relation to evaluating the distribution of projects in the constituencies, corruption and its statistical impact, and the rationale amount of politicians in the building committee under taking the project.

 

RECOMMENDATIONS

 

From the pilot survey, it was noticed that there is significant political interference.

 

The four sub-problems raised in this study were further substantiated by the

 

findings in this pilot survey.

 

There are major flaws in the policy formulations which need to be investigated.

 

Corruption is rampant, therefore its cause and effect needs to be studied. The lack of resources and its relationship to the poor economy was substantially stipulated during the pilot survey. Information on political greed has been documented and its impact has to be evaluated.

 

The recommendation is that this research is viable and that the sub-problems

 

can be evaluated and the findings interpreted accordingly

 

SUMMARY

 

This chapter discussed the research design; the primary data and secondary

 

data, the approach taken to achieve the required information. The criterion

 

governing the admissibility of the data was evaluated. The study scope, case

 

studies and the pilot survey were discussed and recommendations were given

 

CHAPTER FOUR

 

RESULTS AND FINDINGS

 

RESPONSE RATE

 

Questionnaires 140 were circulated to civil professional individuals at the NCIC, NRA, MASAF, City councils and to political stakeholders, public works officers and district development committee members. Each questionnaire was circulated with a request for their participation in the survey.

 

RESPONSE AND NON-RESPONSE BIAS

 

A demographic study relative to respondents investigated by Walonick (2004:#p#分頁標題#e#

 

113) reports that demographic characteristics of non-respondents and

 

respondents such as: age; education, and employment status are similar. Most researchers view non-response bias as a continuum, raging from fast responders to slow responders; with non-responders defining the end of the continuum. The demographic study also determined that late responders answer differently to early responders: the differences were due to the levels of interest in the subject matter. Questions in the latter half of the questionnaire were more likely to be omitted and contained fewer extreme responses.

 

INCENTIVES AND CUT OFF DATES

 

A variety of non-monetary incentives were provided to motivate quick and

 

accurate responses, these incentives included gift tokens such as: mini coffee packs; key rings; ball-point pens, and hair pins. Most of the questionnaires were hand-delivered and only those individuals in remote areas were mailed; inclusive with a self addressed stamped reply envelop.

 

One notable constraint on cut off dates was the impact of dissuading

 

procrastinators from completing the questionnaire after the deadline date. The advantage was that it provided a planning tool in setting a continuum between the mailing times and the response returns. The cut off date did not impact the response rates.

 

RESULTS OF THE SURVEY

 

A number of questions in the questionnaire entailed responses to a five-point

 

Likert scale. The differences between the lower and upper ends of the five point continuum thereon are as indicated below:

 

1 Very rarely;

 

2 Rarely;

 

3 Neutral;

 

4 Often, and

 

5 Very often.

 

However, the extent of ranges was determined by dividing the number of

 

continuums, which is 4.00, by the 5 relative points. Therefore the ranges between the relative points equates to 0.80.

 

RESULTS OF CORRUPTION AND ITS EFFECTS

 

The responses indicate that there is a likelihood of bribery and its associated

 

impacts on all the individuals. However, given that the related MSs are > 3.00, the midpoint of the range, more so relative to NCIC officers and inspectors than the other individuals, namely referees, NCIC management, and the NCIC board Therefore, it can be deduced relative to bung related findings that NCIC officers and the inspectors are the two most likely groups of individuals to be bunged. NCIC officers and inspectors have a similar entrance qualification grade, which is at technician band level. The salary range of this band is not as competitive; thus the likelihood of bung victimisation.#p#分頁標題#e#

 

The board members and NCIC managers have the same minimum grade of

 

qualification and professional registration status. This criterion enhances the

 

construction etiquette and work ethics amongst this band of employees; thus

 

rendering them as a lower potential target for bribery.

 

CHAPTER 5

 

TESTING OF THE HYPOTHESES

 

BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

 

This research entitled �An evaluation of the impact of corruption, economic status and political influence on the Malawian construction industry� was structured by outlining the statement of the problem. In this case, the statement of the problem was that the construction industry in Malawi is negatively influenced by political greed, corruption, flaws in policy formulation and the poor economy.

 

The statement of the problem was then sub-divided into four sub-problems,

 

namely:

 

The inequitable distribution of development projects;

 

Certain contractors dominate over others;

 

The construction industry has retrogressed, and

 

Resource limitations to standard building specifications

 

DERIVATION OF THE HYPOTHESES

 

Preliminary studies relative to the statement of the problem and sub-problems, taking into account existing phenomena, resulted in the evolution of the following hypotheses relative to the sub-problems:

 

There is a significant negative bearing of political greed in the distribution of development projects;

 

Corruption does create a dominance of particular contractors over others;

 

Retrogression in the construction industry is due to the flaws in construction industry policy formulation, and

 

The economy limits the standard specifications used during construction

 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 

SUMMARY

 

The construction industry in Malawi, as evaluated, is negatively influenced by

 

political greed; corruption; flaws in policy formulation, and the poor economy. The role players in this statement of the problem are political stakeholders; public works officers; city council officers; DDC members; MASAF officers; NCIC officers, and NRA officers.

 

The target group of these role players is workable in order to deduce a turn

 

around in the construction industry. This research has depicted: the problem in the industry; the sub-problems there of; the role players of the problem, and the proposed solutions. These four parameters provide a workable basis, in construction management, to improve the state of the construction industry.

 

CONCLUSIONS

 

In conclusion, inequitable distribution of development projects is principally due to political greed. The degree and extent of greed regarding these unscrupulous politicians may not be abated by any study, but highlighting the situation in studies and reports will bring awareness of this selfish and out of character behaviour.

 

Regarding certain contractors dominating over others, the study deduced that

 

corruption in the form of bribery is rampant. Contractors take advantage of low income personnel, such as NCIC officers and inspectors, who play a pivotal role regarding contractor qualification for tender award. The dominance of contractors is not necessarily based upon performance, as evaluated in this study; politician owned contracting firms relative to their below par performance still dominate with regards to the award of public projects.

 

In terms of the retrogression of the construction industry, flaws in the construction industry policy formulation and governance thereof are at fault. The personnel entrusted in these responsibilities are not capable, with regards to their: education; profession; experience; expertise, and etiquette. The decision makers in this case ministers or MPs are appointed as figure-heads, but due to the power and authority vested in that office, decisions are made over-looking advice from construction management professionals.

 

Finally, relative to resource limitations regarding standard building specifications, the economy limits technical specifications used during construction. Low-cost commodities are used, and on a cost-benefit criterion the standard of the final

 

built environment regarding: durability; quality; timely completion, and fitness for purpose for use by the community is normally below par. Relaxing of technical specifications need to be revisited.

 

In conclusion, relative to the statement of the problem, the construction industry in Malawi is negatively influenced by political greed, corruption, flaws in policy formulation and the poor economy.

 

RECOMMENDATIONS

 

Management of political greed is the root solution to the inadequate distribution of development projects. The role players relative to this scenario are political stakeholders, these include: the President; MPs; ministers, and community heads. The results and findings relative to the aforementioned role players leads to the deduction that there is a mandatory requirement to change the mindset of individuals. This can be achieved by frequent education in construction management.#p#分頁標題#e#

 

Regarding corruption, there is lack of enforcement regarding mitigation

 

measures, as studied. The study concluded that mitigation measures are in

 

place; laws and regulations governing corruption are well outlined, but there is lack of implementation. Double standards are applied regarding mitigation and punishment of individuals involved in corrupt practices. Dominance of

 

unscrupulous contractors over others due to bungs and hand outs may be abated by enforcing the law. Regarding flaws in policies and their formulation, government has to include professional and qualified construction managers to drive the policy formulation and its implementation. These individuals should also be in the fore-front of the governance of these policies. The role players in this case are MPs and ministers.

 

Lastly, regarding the poor economy driving resource limitations and standards of the built environment; the role players are clients, in this case the community. A change in mindset is required to uplift the community. This is achievable through a national training initiative regarding community awareness.

 

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES

 

This study was not exhaustive of all the parameters to be evaluated regarding the extent of political influence in the Malawian construction industry. Further studies or research can be undertaken regarding:

 

Evaluation of the Malawian construction industry flaws relative to

 

construction management principles;

 

The impact of corruption on the Malawian construction industry;

 

Rules of engagement to optimise contractor performance relative to the Malawian construction industry;

 

An analysis of politicians and political role players responsibilities in the Malawian construction industry, and

 

An evaluation of the impact of construction project management on

 

Malawian construction projects.

 

It is of the researcherïs interest to pursue some of the recommended studies in either a doctoral study or ad-hoc studies.