在通訊的政治經濟學角度看，通過媒體，通訊系統和內容所進行的電力分配被”所有權，保障機制（如公告）和政府政策所影響。本文將討論一系列國家和泛歐層面的電力配置方針政策，總體上是關于歐盟尤其是英國從1990到2005年的電視業發展。因此，將主要采用一種類似政策分析的分析方法，其注重個人問題及解決方案，但同時元政策策略也將被用做”解釋政策過程的背景因素“。（布等巴特利普，1993）

首先，通過歐委會的行動來考慮在泛歐層面的政策是非常重要的。遵循持惠特的觀點，我認為，因為技術改革使運營商在泛歐層面得以發展，歐委會對于視聽服務的傾向呈遞增長。在此情況下，就電力分配而言，歐盟面臨著雙重挑戰。另一方面，在全球市場水平下，歐洲電視產業過于弱小，不具有國際競爭力。這是由于對頻道和開播時間需求增長，通過進口物美價廉的美國產品來保持平衡。從社會角度看，歐盟也認為這是對傳統歐洲核心價值和優勢諸如多元化，文化和語言的多樣性，版權保護，答覆權和未成年人保護權等的威脅挑戰。

In the perspective of the political economy of communication, the distribution of power through ‘media, communication systems and content’ is influenced by ‘ownership, support mechanism (e.g.: advertising) and government policies’ (McChesney 2000:109). This essay will discuss a series of policy approaches, both at national and pan- European level to the distribution of power, in relation to the television industry in the European Union in general and in the United Kingdom in particular, from 1990 to 2005. For this purpose, an analytic approach to policy analysis will preponderantly be employed, focusing on individual issues and their solution, but also meta- policy considerations will be applied to ‘explain the contextual factors of the policy process’ (Bührs et Bartlett, 1993).

To begin with, it is important to consider the provision of policy at Pan- European level, through the actions of the European Commission. Adhering to Wheeler’s opinion (2004: 349), I consider that because of ‘technological reforms [that] enabled operators to develop at pan- European level’, the European Commission’s aptitude for ‘audio-visual services has incrementally grown’. In this context, the European Union faced a double challenge, as far as the distribution of power is concerned. On the one hand, at global market level ‘the European television industries were too small to compete internationally’ (Wheeler, 2004: 351). This was due to an increase in demand for channels and airtime, counterbalanced by the import of cheap U.S. productions. From social perspective, the E.U. also perceived this as a threat to ‘traditional [European] core values and strengths’, such as ‘pluralism, cultural and linguistic diversity, copyright protection, the right to reply and the protection of minors’ (Wheeler, 2004: 352).#p#分頁標題#e#

On the other hand, the E.U. had to counteract the oligopoly of a ‘smaller group of well- capitalized broadcasters who control[ed] electronic delivery systems’, competing with numerous low- budget organisations that were threatened by fragmentation and loss of power (ibid). Such a powerful player in Europe, but also ‘one of the top ten global media groups’ is Bertelsmann Ag, that had a turnover of more than 42% in Europe (excepting Germany) from its cross- media ventures (European Federation of Journalists, 2005: 10). More exactly, through its RTL Group it owned 31 television stations in ten European countries. Also, RTL’s subsidiary Fremantle Media offered audio- visual content for 40 countries globally (ibid). Ultimately, these issues affected consumers’ wellbeing, by limiting diversity and freedom of information.

To begin with, an important area to regulate has been the concentration of media ‘in a converging communications market’ (Wheeler, 2004: 357). In order to defend open competition in Europe from the threat of ‘vertically integrated conglomerates’, the only satisfactory measure taken by the E.C. has been Article 5 of the TWF Directive, ‘that established ten per cent quota for independent production’ (ibid). Nevertheless, some critics have argued that the Directive’s purpose was in fact to promote a single European audio- visual market, rather than to ‘safeguard pluralism’ (Levy, 1995: 51, cited in Wheeler, 2004: 357).

Further on, the essay will discuss the policy and regulation approach to competition, at pan- European level. In this sense, the E. U. Competition Directorate established rules concerning:

‘The definition of state aid with regard to Public Service Broadcasting’ (Wheeler, 2004: 361). As far as this aspect is concerned, the goal was ‘to prevent the implementation of anti- competitive agreements and the abuse of dominant market positions’ by PSBs (ibid). In this sense, the Directorate published the Communication on the Application of State Aid Rules to PSBs, through which the E.C. acted as an arbiter between private and state broadcasters.

E. U. members had the right to decide the amount of state funding deserved by public service broadcasters, as long as the process was transparent and did not disrupt competition. Conversely, the E.C. held the right to ‘assess the proportion of state funding and control possible abusive practices’ (ibid). For example, in 1998 the Directorate ruled in favour of two German thematic channels, Kinderland and Phoenix, run by the ARD and 2DF, that had been legally challenged by private organisations.

‘The sale of sports rights to broadcasters’ (Wheeler, 2004: 361). The purpose of this policy approach was to avoid ‘unjustified restrictions for competition in the sale of rights by sports bodies to broadcasting companies’ (ibid). However, the Directorate was confronted with some particularities specific to this area. Respectively, these were ‘the collective selling and purchasing of broadcasting rights’ and the exclusivity gained through the sale. In order to counteract this, the Directorate decided to audit the way in which the European Football Union sold Champions League broadcasting rights. In June 2002, the result of the audit showed that UEFA ‘distorted competition between broadcasters, encouraged media concentration and barred access to key content for the development of Internet and mobile telephony based sport services’ and this disadvantaged both supporters and consumers (ibid 363-4). As a result, the Football Union decided to ‘sell several packages of rights for shorter periods of time’, instead of one ‘bundle to only one broadcaster per nation’ (ibid: 364).

‘Mergers to stem cross- media and communication concentration’ (ibid). Due to the existence of media conglomerates with turnovers exceeding €5 billion globally, the Competition Directorate proposed new merger control rules. As a result of this, between 1994 and 1998 it refused the alliance between ‘leading German commercial television owners, Bertelsmann and the Kirch group’ and German telecommunications monopoly Deutsche Telekom on anti- competitive grounds. This would have resulted in the creation of Media Services Gesellschaft, offering pay- TV channels and video- on- demand.

Through these policy approaches, the E.U. sought to overcome market fragmentation and secure more access for the European television producers in the global market place. In addition to this, it tried to address the inherent issues of power and unregulated market. Nevertheless, some critics (Curran and Seaton, 2010: 379) argue that the E.U.’s initiatives failed into protectionism, in the form of unrealistic ‘production quotas, restrictions on foreign ownership and subsidies designed to support domestic media production and control’.

For example, despite a compliance percentage of 63 per cent to sourcing television programmes locally, there are wide differences across Europe: while in France the rate peaks 96 per cent, in neo- liberal Britain it only reaches 45 per cent (ibid). Also, as Curran and Seaton point out, the Union still lacks a shared ‘media sphere’ to nurture European identity (2009, 378: 80). Last, but not least, the Commission’s attempts to regulate the broadcasting market across the Union resulted in on-going tension between dirigistes and liberalizers (Wheeler, 2004: 366). Acknowledging the evolution of the current technological environment, I consider that the leading bodies of the E.C. should be wary at the emergence and development of new media. Also, by aiming to promote a unique, cross- continental audio- visual market, the E.U. encourages conformism and fails to acknowledge the importance of treating the aspect of power distribution of a case- by case basis, depending on the socio- cultural characteristics of each member state.

Further on, the essay will continue by discussing the provision of policy in the United Kingdom. Firstly, it is important to assess the television portfolio in the U. K. According to Tench and Yeomans (2009:70), ‘there are five national terrestrial channels: BBC1 and BBC2, ITV1, Channel 4 and Channel 5’. In addition to this, the ITV has 15 regional licences, as a result of mergers with local television providers in the 1990s, but also with Granada Media and Carlton Communication in 2003, resulting in a market share of almost 24% (European Federation of Journalists, 2005: 157). According to the European Federation of Journalists (2005:158), at the time of the research, the provision of cable television was secured mainly by Telewest and NTL. As far as satellite television is concerned, the most successful player was BSkyB, with a reach of 7.3 million subscriptions, while ‘ITV Digital used to be the sole British terrestrial digital television broadcaster’ (ibid). More importantly, the White Paper on Communication (DCMS- DTI 2000) mapped these changes through an increase in viewing hours from 400 per week in December 1980, to 40,000 in 2000 (Tench and Yeomans 2009:70).

Therefore, the alliances between large companies and mergers (for example, Carlton and Granada merging to form ITV Plc. resulted in them owning 11 channels of the ITV franchise) have led to concentrated, uneven distributions of power (Quail, 2001:91-2). My view is that, despite the benefit of uniformly informing segments of the population, this unequal distribution of power nurtures scarcity of information and enables biased views to influence the masses more easily. In order to prevent this and ‘to enhance competition, diversity and pluralism’, states, among which the United Kingdom, took the following approaches to policy making (ibid: 193):

Limits to horizontal concentration: though the limitation of ‘licensing, ownership

financial participation’, to prevent an organisation from ‘controlling several channels from the same media area’ (McQuail, 2001:194).

Limits to vertical concentration have the purpose of discouraging ‘monopolies in more than one media’ (ibid). For example, through the 1996 Broadcasting Act, the United Kingdom prevented newspapers with more than 20 per cent of the national market share from having more than 20 per cent of ‘the national and regional television market share’ (ibid).

Favouring effective competition is obtained though ‘restrictive trade practice legislation, together with merger control regulation’, in order to prevent uncompetitive concentration. For example, only residents of the European Union are issued broadcasting licences (ibid: 196).

Favouring internal pluralism implies the presentation of a multitude of viewpoints, through public service broadcasting: representative for this is the 1994 White Paper of the Future of BBC, through which the media organisation is required to cater for various age groups and interests, with high standard programmes, reflecting the preferences and ‘cultural traditions of the United Kingdom’ (ibid: 197).

Enabling transparency of media concentration: media organisations have to report on their business endeavours.

These changes, in the United Kingdom, but also throughout Europe, have proved their limited efficiency at regulating the media sector. For instance, as far as the vertical and horizontal concentration of ownership is concerned, the extent of Rupert Murdock’s media portfolio, through News International, constitutes an argument against the efficiency of policies concerning television platform:

As newspaper publisher, News International reaches a total of 4,793,701 per week (Aldridge, 1994: 13), and has the supremacy over evening and Sunday press market;

In the broadcasting sector, News Corporation owned 37.6% of BskyB, U.K.’s ‘leading digital satellite broadcaster’ and 71% of Sky Radio (European Federation of Journalists, 2005: 160);

Other ventures include book publisher Harper Collins and ‘U.K. newspaper distribution’ Convoys Group (ibid)

In addition to this, the extent to which partisan interests ‘limit the range of views’ expressed by television producers is still underestimated (Tench and Yeomans, 2009: 70-1). For example, the News International group encourages a conservative viewpoint on its broadcasting outlets, but also in its newspapers, where it holds market leadership in both evening and Sunday press (Aldridge 1004: 13). At national, but also international level this raises the need for uniform and consistent transparency regulations, in order to secure a democratic and competitive discourse of power.

Nevertheless, as McQuail suggests, at local level legislators aim to provide ‘more emphasis on content diversity and less media power allocated to each media conglomerate’ (ibid: 203). In particular, the United Kingdom aims to change the ground of comparison for media concentration, from ownership to market penetration.

In conclusion, despite a wide range of policy approaches concerning competition and concentrated ownership both at continental and local level, the extent and success with which governmental bodies have regulated the distribution of power in the television domain is still limited. With a view to future developments of new media technologies, this raises the question of power equity and information distribution even further.